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THE TAX RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 
COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS-
INCOME TAX LIABILITIES OF THE ESTATE 
AND THE DEBTORt 
William T. Plumb, Jr.* 
T HE Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States (Commission), pursuant to congressional mandate/ has reported 
its recommendations for the first comprehensive revision of the 
bankruptcy laws since the Chandler Act of 1938.2 This Article 
deals with the proposals concerning the obligation of the trustee in 
bankruptcy to file returns of income and to pay federal and state 
taxes on the income, and concerning the calculation of the taxable 
incomes of the bankrupt estate and the debtor (including their 
rights to utilize each other's carryovers), as well as with certain prob-
lems in those areas in which the Commission has made no recom-
mendations. 
I. THE FIDUCIARY'S TAX LIABILITY 
The Commission recommends that a trustee in a straight bank-
ruptcy proceeding, whether or not he is operating the business of 
the debtor, be relieved of any obligation to file returns or pay taxes 
imposed by federal or state law upon, or measured by, income of 
the estate, unless the property available for distribution proves to 
be greater than the allowable claims, in which event returns shall 
be filed before final distribution and the accumulated taxes shall 
be paid from the surplus otherwise distributable to the debtor.3 In-
come taxes incurred by the debtor, computed as if his taxable year 
ended at the date of the petition, would be allowable as claims 
against the estate, but the trustee (in straight bankruptcy) would not 
t This Article is based in part on reports prepared by the writer as a consultant 
to the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States. As will be readily 
apparent from the discussion, the views expressed herein are the author's and not 
necessarily those of the Commission or its staff. 
• Member of the District of Columbia Bar. A.B. 1936, Rochester University; LL.B. 
1939, Cornell University.-Ed. 
I. Jt. Res. of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468. 
2. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (codified in scattered sections of 11 
U.S.C.). 
3. COMMISSION ON BANKRUPTCY LAws OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT pt. II, H.R. 
Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. II, § 5-104(a) (1973) [hereinafter CoMMISSION 
REPORT]. The proposed legislation has been introduced in Congress as H.R. 10792 and 
S. 2565, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). 
[937] 
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be required to report the bankrupt's income in returns filed by him.4 
In reorganization cases (which would embrace in one unified proce-
dure those now covered by Chapters X, XI and XII6), the trustee, 
receiver, or debtor in possession would not be relieved of filing re-
turns of income, but gains and losses on sales ( other than those in 
the ordinary course of business) made during the pendency of the 
proceeding or pursuant to the provisions of a plan would be dis-
regarded for tax purposes, except that the net ta."es otherwise pay-
able on such sales would ultimately be allowed to the extent, if any, 
that the plan would otherwise recognize an interest retained by the 
debtor, its partners, or its shareholders.6 
A. Power To Tax the Estate 
It has been said that "under the common law, property in the 
hands of a receiver was not taxable, or, rather, ••• property in cus-
todia legis is taxable only upon statutory authorization."7 This 
statement, however, is nothing more than the truism that taxes must 
be imposed by statutes and that the coverage of the tax law will gen-
erally not be extended beyond its express terms.8 There has never 
been any doubt, for example, that, if the legislature clearly so in-
tended, a state property tax could be imposed upon property and 
money in the hands of a trustee in bankruptcy, for 
[b]y the transfer to the trustee no mysterious or peculiar ownership 
or qualities are given to the property. It is dedicated, it is true, to 
the payment of the creditors of the bankrupt, but there is nothing in 
that to withdraw it from the necessity of protection by the State and 
municipality, or which should exempt it from its obligations to 
either. If Congress has the power to declare otherwise and wished to 
do so the intention would be clearly expressed, not left to be collected 
or inferred from disputable considerations of convenience in ad-
ministering the estate of the bankrupt,9 
It has also been long established that a federal court receiver ap-
pointed to carry on the business of the corporation and thus exer-
cising "the powers belonging to the corporation by legislative grant" 
can be subjected to a state corporate franchise tax, if the legislature 
4. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 5-104(b). 
5. 11 u.s.c. §§ 501-926 (1970). 
6. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 7-315(c). 
7. Howe v. Atlantic, Pac. & Gulf Oil Co., 4 F. Supp. 162, 164 (W.D. Mo. 1933)1 
revd, sub nom. Kansas City v. Johnson, 70 F.2d 360 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 293 U,S, 617 
(1934). 
S. See Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153 (1917). 
9. Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U.S. 441,444 (1904). 
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so intends, for "[t]axes owing to the Government, whether due at the 
beginning of a receivership or subsequently accruing, are the price 
that business has to pay £or protection and security."10 
A series of decisions, which distinguished taxes on property and 
franchises from taxes on transactions engaged in by court officers, 
held trustees and receivers in bankruptcy not- amenable to sales and 
gross receipts taxes (at least in the absence of language expressly 
including them).11 Congress, in 1934, reacted promptly to the ear-
liest of those decisions by enacting the following statute: 
[A]ny receiver, liquidator, referee, trustee, or other officers or 
agents appointed by any United States court who is authorized by 
said court to conduct any business, or who does conduct any busi-
ness, shall, from and after June 18, 1934, be subject to all State and 
loc:al taxes applicable to such business the same as if such business 
were conducted by an individual or corporation.12 
The reports on the bill declared: "No good reason is perceived why 
a receiver should be permitted to operate under such an advantage 
as against his competitors not in receivership, and the States and 
local governments be deprived of this revenue."13 Although the 
statutory words, "conduct any business," suggest that only operat-
ing fiduciaries are to be subjected to tax liabilities, and although 
some courts have so construed the language, 14 other courts have 
broadly interpreted the consent of Congress to embrace state and 
local taxation of "any activity or operation in connection with the 
handling and management of the bankrupt estate," whether with a 
view to liquidation or with a view to rehabilitation.15 
When title 28 of the United States Code was revised and codified 
in 1948, the foregoing provision (§ 960) was reworded as follows: 
"Any officers and agents conducting any business under authority 
10. Michigan v. Michigan Trust Co., 286 U.S. 334, 344 (1932). 
11. In re Messenger's Merchants Lunch Rooms, 85 F.2d 1002 (7th Cir. 1936); In re 
Flatbush Gum Co,, 73 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 713 (1935); Howe 
v. Atlantic, Pac.&: Gulf Oil Co., 4 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 1933), revd. sub nom. Kan-
sas City v. Johnson, 70 F.2d 360 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 617 (1934). 
12. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 585, 48 Stat. 993, izs amended, 28 U.S.C. § 960 (1970). - · 
13. H.R. REP. No. 1138, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. l (1934); S, REP. No. 1372, 73d Cong., 
2d Sess. l (1934). See Palmer v. Webster &: Atlas Natl. Banlc, 312 U,S. 156, 162-63 (1941). 
14. In re Califoroia Pea Prod., Inc., 37 F. Supp. 658 (S.D. C;il. 1941); In re Stat-
master Corp., 332 F. Supp. 1248, 1256-58 (S.D. Fla. 1971) (referee opinion), reud. on 
other grounds, 332 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D. Fla. 1971), affd., 465 F.2d 978 (5th Cir. 1972). 
See In re F.P. Newport Corp., 144 F. Supp. 507, 509 (S.D. Cal. 1956), reud. sub nom. 
United States v. Sampsell, 266 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1959). 
15. Missouri v. Glieck, 135 F.2d 134, 136-37 (8th Cir. 1943); In re Mid America Co., 
31 F. Supp. 601, 606 (S.D. Ill. 1939). 
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of a United States court shall be subject to all Federal, State and 
local taxes applicable to such business to the same extent as if it 
were conducted by an individual or corporation."16 The deletion 
of the express reference to trustees, receivers, and referees is with-
out significance, since they are clearly "officers" acting under the 
authority of a United States court.17 The mention of "Federal" 
taxes, which were not previously embraced by this provision, was 
"in recognition of the liability of such officers for Federal taxes 
under the revenue laws"18 but is without substantive significance, 
since the provision "is not a statute which imposes any taxes [but] 
serves merely to affirm liability for local, state and federal taxes 
which are validly imposed by other statutes."19 Since both the rev-
enue laws and 28 U.S.C. § 960 are acts of Congress, the latter "does 
not exclude liability for taxes otherwise validly imposed" by con-
gressional tax legislation on trustees and receivers in bankruptcy 
whether or not they are deemed to be "conducting any business."26 
B. The Law to Date 
I. Corporate Bankruptcies 
Prior to ratification of the sixteenth amendment, which cleared 
the way for a general income tax, Congress imposed an excise tax 
on the income of "every corporation ... with respect to the carry-
ing on or doing business by such corporation.''21 The Supreme 
Court, in United States v. Whitridge,22 held receivers not subject to 
the tax, since the receivers were deemed to be acting "as officers of 
the court, and subject to the orders of the court; not as officers of 
the respective corporations, nor with the advantages that inhere 
in corporate organization as such." The Court also noted that the 
law did not "in terms impose any duty upon the receivers of cor-
porations or of corporate property, with respect to paying taxes 
upon the income arising from their management of the corporate 
assets, or with respect to making any return of such income.''23 The 
first income tax24 imposed under the sixteenth amendment likewise 
16. 28 U.S.C. § 960 (1970), formerly ch. 585, 48 Stat. 993 (1934). 
17. 13ankruptcy Act§ 1(22), 11 U.S.C. § 1(22) (1970). 
18. 28 U.S.C.A. § 960, reviser's note (1968) (emphasis added). 
19. In re Kirby, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1J 9752, at 86,051 (S.D. Tex. 1962), 
20. See Drown v. Collector of Taxes, 247 F.2d 786, 788 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1957). 
21. Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. II2. 
22. 231 U.S. 144, 149 (1913). 
23. 231 U.S. at 149. 
24. Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § 2, 38 Stat. 166. 
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omitted any express reference to receivers for corporations and 
was, accordingly, held not to subject such receivers to tax.25 
The response of Congress to the. Whitridge decision was to enact, 
in the Revenue Act of 1916, the following provision: 
In cases wherein receivers, trustees in bankruptcy, or assignees 
are operating the property or business of corporations, joint-stock 
companies or associations, or insurance companies, subject to tax 
imposed by this title, such receivers, trustees, or assignees shall make 
returns of net income as and for such corporations, joint-stock com-
panies or associations, and i_nsurance companies, in the same manner 
and form as such organizations are hereinbefore required to make 
returns, and any income tax due on. the basis of such returns made 
by receivers, trustees, or assingees [sic] shall be assessed and collected 
in the same manner as if assessed directly against the organizations 
of whose businesses or properties they have custody and control .••• 26 
The War Revenue Act of 1917 imposed, in addition to the income 
tax, an excess profits tax on certain income of "every corporation, 
partnership or individual" derived from trade or business.27 Those 
provisions came before the Supreme Court in Reinecke v. Gardner,28 
in which the Court noted that, since the title in the property of 
the bankrupt corporation had vested in the trustee, "the income 
in question was not the income of the bankrupt corporation, but of 
the trustee and was subject to income and excess profits tax only 
if the statutes authorized the assessment of the tax against him.''29 
Since the excess profits tax law "made no mention of executors, 
receivers, trustees or persons acting in a fiduciary capacity,"30 who 
were regarded as a different breed from the corporations, partner-
ships, and individuals expressly subjected to tax, and since the 
above-quoted provision of the income tax law was not deemed to 
have been made effectively applicable, the trustee was held not to 
be subject to excess profits tax. The Court, however, held the quoted 
provision to be valid and effective to subject the bankruptcy trus-
tee operating the business of the corporation to payment of income 
tax "in the same manner" as the corporation. With immaterial 
verbal changes, that provision continued in effect until the repeal in 
1954 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 (in which it was section 
25. Scott v. Western Pac. R.R., 246 F. 545 (9th Cir. 1917). 
26. Act of Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463, § 13(c), 39 Stat. 771. 
27 •. Act of Oct. 3, 1917, ch. 63, § 2-01, 40 Stat. 303. 
28. 277 U.S. 239 (1928). 
29. 277 U.S. at 241 (emphasis added). 
30. 277 U.S. at 242. 
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52(a)); with one significant change, it remains in effect as section 
6012(b)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (IRC or Code): 
In a case where a receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, or assignee, by 
order of a court of competent jurisdiction, by operation of law or 
otherwise, has possession of or holds title to all or substantially all the 
property or business of a corporation, whether or not such property 
or business is being operated, such receiver, trustee, or assignee shall 
make the return of income for such corporation in the same manner 
and form as corporations are required to make such returns. 
a. Liquidating v. operating bankruptcies. The most controver-
sial question that has aris"en under section 6012(b)(3) and its pred-
ecessors is whether a receiver or trustee in bankruptcy of a corpora-
tion is required to file income tax returns and pay tax when he is 
merely liquidating the estate of the bankrupt, rather than "operat-
ing" its business or property. The express terms of the law in ef-
fect from 1916 to 1953 required such filing and payment only of 
"receivers, trustees in bankruptcy, or assignees [who] are operating 
the business or property of corporations."111 The Treasury Regula-
tions after 1934 took an expansive view of that requirement, how. 
ever, by specifying: 
If a receiver has full custody of and control over the business or 
property of a corporation, he shall be deemed to be operating such 
business or property within the meaning of section 52, whether he is 
engaged in carrying on the business for which the corporation was 
organized or only in marshalling, selling, and disposing of its assets 
for the purposes of liquidation.a2 
The Internal Revenue Service (Service) argued therefrom that the 
term "operating" included "liquidating."83 Close reading of the 
quoted regulation by courts, however, disclosed that it referred 
only to the obligation of a receiver and said nothing of a trustee in 
bankruptcy who, having acquired title, was engaged exclusively in 
liquidation.84 Therefore, while the courts generally found even rel-
atively limited activities (such as the making of leases, the collec-
tion of rents and royalties, the orderly disposition over a period of 
years of realty initially held for sale, and the management of the 
31. Act of Sept. 8, 1916, ch, 463, § 13(c), 39 Stat. 771 (now INT. REV. ConE OF 1954, 
§ 6012(b)(3)). 
32. Treas. Reg. 86, art. 52-2 (1934) (emphasis added); Treas. Reg, 118, § 39.52-2 
(1953) (emphasis added). 
33. See Feigenbaum, Observations Concerning Trustees in Bankruptcy and Federal 
Income Taxes, 43 REF. J. 73, 74 (1969). 
34. See In re Town Crier Bottling Co., 123 F. Supp. 588, 591 (E.D. Mo. 1954): In re 
International Match Corp., 43-1 U.S. Tax Cas.1[ 9281 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). 
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investments of an insurance company) to constitute "operating" the 
debtor corporation's business or property,35 even when they oc-
curred after an order for liquidation had been entered,36 the courts 
generally rejected the proposition that a trustee in bankruptcy or a 
·receiver who had disposed of the business of a corporation was tax-
able on interest earned on funds of the estate pending completion 
of administration;37 on royalties from patents not yet disposed of ;38 
on income earned by, but not previously taxable to, the corporation 
itself;39 or on recoveries of previously deducted bad debts40 or of 
amounts illegally diverted from the corporation by its officers and 
directors.41 
In response to those decisions, Congress, in 1954, enacted sec-
tion 6012(b)(3), above quoted, by which a receiver, trustee in bank-
ruptcy, or assignee was required to file returns for a corporation if 
he merely "ha[ d] possession of or ... title to all or substantially all 
[its] property or business •.. , whether or not such property or 
business [was] being operated."42 Clearer words could hardly have 
been chosen to establish that the distinction theretofore drawn be-
tween operating and liquidating trustees was being repudiated. Un-
fortunately, apparently in a clumsy effort to strengthen the hand 
of the Service in cases still pending under the former law, the com-
mittee reports on the 1954 Code state merely that "[a] clarifying 
change from the wording of existing law has been made in subsec-
tion (b)(3), relating to the filing of corporation returns by receivers 
or other fiduciaries."48 
Seizing upon the statement in the reports that the law was merely 
clarified by the 1954 amendment, the referee in the recent Stat-
master case declared that, while the regulation that prior decisions 
had declined to apply had now "purportedly 'become the law,' ,, 
35. Pinkerton v. United States, 170 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1948) (receiver); Louisville 
Property Co. v. Commissioner, 140 F.2d 547 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 755 (1944) 
(assignee); United States v. Metcalf, 131 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 
769 (1943) (trustee in bankruptcy); State ex rel. Gibson v. American Bonding &: Cas. Co., 
225 Iowa 638,281 N.W. 172 (1938) (receiver). 
36. United States v. Sampsell, 266 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1959), 
37. In re Owl Drug Co., 21 F. Supp. 907 (D. Nev. 1937). 
38. Doebler Die Casting Co. v. Meadows Mfg. Co., 38-2 U.S. Tax Cas. f 9498 (S.D. 
Ill.1938). 
39. In re Heller, Hirsh & Co., 258 F. 208 (2d Cir. 1919). 
40. In re International Match Corp., 43-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ,I 9281 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). 
41. Standard Oil Co. v. Apex Oil Corp., 35 Tenn. App. 225, 244 S.W.2d 176 (1951). 
42. Act of Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 733 (codified at INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, 
§ 6012(b)(3)) (emphasis added). 
43. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A396 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 
2d Sess. 563 (1954). 
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Congress had not been "advised of any such sweeping substantive 
change."44 Therefore, he concluded that "the statutory words must 
be construed narrowly in a procedural sense [in order] to avoid an 
unintended change in the substantive law."45 A nonoperating trus-
tee, he determined, is required to file a return that "need only list 
his receipts with notation for informational purposes that they arose 
from non-operating activity and therefore do not comprise taxable 
income"46-despite the plain terms of the law that the trustee, if 
subject to the law at all, must file, not an incomplete return, but 
a return "in the same manner and form as corporations are required 
to make such returns."47 
In concluding that the nonoperating trustee still need not pay 
tax on income of the estate, even though some form of return is 
now required of him, the referee noted48 that the 1954 amendment, 
section 6012(b)(3), deleted the sentence of section 52(a) of the 1939 
Code (and of corresponding provisions back to 1916) that provided 
that "[a]ny tax due on the basis of such returns made by receivers, 
trustees, or assignees [should] be collected in the same manner as 
if collected from the corporations of whose business or property they 
have custody or control." That deletion, however, merely reflected 
a restructuring of the procedural and administrative provisions of 
the tax law,49 whereby provisions that had formerly been grouped 
in the income tax chapter under the heading, "Returns and Pay-
ment of Tax,"50 were redistributed, together with parallel provi-
sions relating to other taxes, under "Chapter 61-Information and 
Returns" (!RC §§ 6001-110)-and "Chapter 62-Time and Place 
for Payment of Tax" (!RC§§ 6151-67). Therefore, whereas section 
52(a) of the 1939 Code had dealt with both returns and payments, 
IRC § 6012(b)(3) referred only to returns, and a general provision 
was made in !RC§ 615l(a) that (with an exception not pertinent) 
44. In re Statmaster Corp., 332 F. Supp. 1248, 1258 (S.D. Fla. 1971) (referee 
opinion), reod. on other grounds, 332 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D. Fla. 1971), affd., 465 F.2d 978 
(5th Cir. 1972). Since the preparation of this paper, the referee's opinion in Statmaster 
has been followed by a district court. In re I.J. Knight Realty Corp., 366 F. Supp. 450 
(E.D. Pa. 1973). Comments herein on the Statmaster opinion apply equally to that 
in Knight. 
45. 332 F. Supp. at 1261. 
46. 332 F. Supp. at 1261. 
47. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6012(b)(3). See State ex rel, Gibson v. American 
13onding &: Cas. Co., 225 Iowa 638,281 N.W. 172 (1938). 
48. 332 F. Supp. at 1254. 
49. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 99 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d 
Cong., 2d Scss. 133 (1954). 
50. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. I,§§ 51-60, 53 Stat. 27. 
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"when a return of tax is required under this title or regulations, the 
person required to make such return shall, without assessment or 
notice and demand from the Secretary or his delegate, pay such tax 
to the internal revenue officer with whom the return is filed .•.. "51 
Nevertheless, the referee refused to apply section 615l(a) be-
cause, in his view, "the legislative history of § 6012(b)(3) .•• gave 
Congress no notice that this coupling of these two new sections 
was intended to dramatically change the substantive law relating to 
taxation of trustees in bankruptcy."52 Therefore, he concluded tha't 
Congress "did not intend to overrule and change the well-established 
substantive principle of both statutory and case law to the effect that 
a nonoperating trustee in bankruptcy is not subject to federal in-
come taxes."53 However, when Congress has stated its intention in 
unmistakable terms addressed to the specific question, the fact that 
the committee reports describe the amendment as "clarifying" can-
not be taken as confirming and making applicable to the amended 
law those interpretations of prior law that were to the contrary.54 
Even if the committee reports were thought to give Congress "no 
notice" of the wording of the statute it was enacting, "an uncertain 
guess at Congress' intent provides dubious ground for disregarding 
its plain language."55 
51. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 770l(a)(l) defines "person" to "mean and include an 
individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company or corporation" and does 
not mention "trustee in bankruptcy" in so many words, In re I.J. Knight Realty Corp., 
366 F. Supp. 450, 454 (E.D. Pa. 1973), although the word "includes" is not exclusive, 
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7701(b), and a fiduciary required to file a return "for" a 
corporation, !NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6012(b)(3), would seem to be as much obligated 
as the executor who is required to file "for" an estate. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-l(a) 
(1960), which expressly includes a trustee in bankruptcy in the definition of "persons.'' 
52. 332 F. Supp. at 1260. 
53. 332 F. Supp. at 1260-61 (emphasis original). 
54. Commissioner v. Bilder, 369 U.S. 499, 502-03 (1962); United States v. Manu-
facturers Natl. Bank, 198 F. Supp. 157 (N.D.N.Y. 1961). 
55. Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375,383 (1966). Cf. Albert L. Dougherty, 60 T.C. 917, 
925 (1973). The court in In re I.J. Knight Realty Corp., 366 F. Supp. 450, 458 8: n.23 (E.D; 
Pa. 1973), thought that language in INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 60ll(e) (redesignated as 
(f) in 1971, Act of Dec. 10, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 504(a), 85 Stat. 550), which reads 
''For requirement that returns of income, estate, and gift taxes be made whether or 
not there is a tax liability, see sections 6012 to 6019:' (emphasis added by court), was 
in conflict with the government's interpretation of INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6151(a). 
Aside from the fact that cross references in the Code are "made only for convenience 
and shall be given no legal effect," !NT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 7806(a), the reference to 
section 6012 plainly relates to the fact that "every corporation" is required to file 
whether or not it has gross or net income on which a tax might be imposed and that 
others must file if they have a certain gross income even if no net taxable income 
results. No inference should result that a trustee who does show a net taxable income 
on a return that is required by section 6012 to be filed "whether or not such prop-
erty or business is being operated" need not pay the resulting tax pursuant to sec-
tion 615l(a). 
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In the view of the referee, 156 the obligation of the trustee to pay 
tax on the return he was admittedly required by the Code to file 
must still be found, not in the ta." payment provisions of the tax 
law, but in 28 U.S.C. § 960, which states (emphasis added): "Any 
officers and agents conducting any business under authority of a 
United States court shall be subject to all Federal, State and local 
taxes applicable to such business to the same extent as if it were 
conducted by an individual or a corporation." The referee followed 
the holding of the district court in In re F. P. Newport Corp.rn that 
the failure of Congress in 1954 to amend section 960 to extend the 
liability for payment of tax to others than those "conducting any 
business" meant that nonoperating trustees were still not required 
to pay taxes even though they were obliged to file returns. The 
Newport case, however, had been reversed by the Ninth Circuit in 
United States v. Sampsell,58 which held that section 6151 of the Code 
imposed the liability for tax on returns required by section 6012. 
The Ninth Circuit declared, 1'It is not likely that Congress, in pass. 
ing the 1954 I.R.C. would make the income tax liability dependent 
on a part of the Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Code."119 It is 
true that Congress has on occasion placed substantive tax provisions 
in nontax legislation, notably in certain provisions00 of the Chandler 
Act of 1938, where state as well as federal tax liabilities are affected 
by the provision, just as they are by 28 U.S.C. § 960. But the latter 
statute, the purpose and effect of which have been described above, 
is merely permissive and in itself neither imposes nor restrains the 
imposition of any tax.61 It certainly does not withdraw from Con-
gress, which enacted it, the power to impose any tax, whether or 
not within its scope, and, since the 1954 amendment dealt only with 
federal taxation, there was no occasion to broaden the permissive 
terms of 28 U.S.C. § 960. 
The referee in the Statmaster case, however, did not find authori-
tative the holding of Sampsell that IRC §§ 6012 and 6151 were the 
determinative provisions and that 28 U.S.C. § 960 had no limiting 
effect, In the referee's view, what the Ninth Circuit said in that 
connection was unnecessary to its decision since the court (in the 
56, 3112 F. Supp. at 1261. 
57. 144 F. Supp. 507, 509 (S.D. Cal. 1956), revd. sub nom. United States v. Sampsell, 
266 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1959). 
58. 266 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1959). 
59. 266 F.2d at 635. 
60, Bankruptcy Act §§ 268-71, 395-97, 520-23, 679-80, 11 U.S.C. §§ 668-71, 795-97, 
920-23, 1079-80 (1970), 
61. See text accompanying notes 11-20 supra. 
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part of the decision relating to pre-1954 Code years) had already 
held that the trustee's activities constituted "operating the bank~ 
rupt's business-a conclusion that would subject him to tax lia-
bility in any event."62 
The referee, citing "myriad unresolved questions of deductions, 
procedures, etc." and "some very practical, difficult administrative 
problems . . • which would affect the handling of bankruptcy es-
tates if a trustee were required to file returns and pay taxes for 'in-
come' realized from liquidating activities,''63 declared that the courts 
"have not been averse to ruling that conflicting provisions of the 
tax laws must on occasion bow to the strong social and economic 
policies underlying the Bankruptcy Act."~ Congress is the final 
arbiter of the conflict between tax law and practical bankruptcy ad-
ministration, however, and the bankruptcy courts have no power to 
override express tax and other statutes that they find inconvenient 
for trustee compliance.ll5 The four cases relied on by the referee 
are not to the contrary. In United States v. Randall,66 the Court de-
clined to accord the government a "trust fund" priority (ahead of 
administration expenses) for taxes withheld from employees by a 
debtor in possession under Chapter XI, where there was no trace-
able fund into which the withholdings had been paid. In so holding, 
the Court applied the same tracing requirement that was applicable 
under IRC § 7501 to taxes required to be withheld prior to bank-
ruptcy67 and cited the Congressional policy to preserve administra-
tion expense funds, not as a ground for overriding the tax law, but as 
a ground for not waiving in bankruptcy the general requirement 
thereof. In City of New York v. Saper,68 the Court found that the 
statutory interest on taxes69 was subject, like other prescriptions for 
interest, to the general rule of bankruptcy law that interest does 
not run against the estate while payment of the principal is delayed 
62. 332 F. Supp. at 1257. 
63. 332 F. Supp. at 1258-59. 
64. 332 F. Supp. at 1261. 
65. United States v. Key, 397 U.S. 822, 326-27 (1970); Nicholas v. United States, 384 
U.S. 678, 692-95 (1966); Bruning v. United States, 376 U.S. 358, 361 (1964). See also 
quotation from Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U.S. 441, 444 (1904), in text accompanying note 
9$Upra. 
66. 401 U.S. 51!! (1971). 
67. The leading case on this requirement is In re Frank, 25 F. Supp. 1005 (SD.N.Y. 
1939). 
68. !136 U.S. !128 (1949). 
69. Under present law, interest on federal taxes is prescribed by INT. REv. CODE OF 
1954, § 660l(a). 
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by the pendency of bank.ruptcy.70 The third case cited by the ref-
eree, Reinecke v. Gardner,71 held the trustee in bankruptcy of a 
corporation not to be subject to an excess profits tax imposed on 
"corporations," in the absence of a provision (such as IRC § 6012 
(b)(3)) that expressly extended such tax to trustees in bankruptcy; 
however, the Court did not question the effectiveness of the pred-
ecessor of§ 6012(b)(3) in requiring the trustee to pay the basic in-
come tax imposed on corporations. The remaining cited decision, 
In re Johnson Electrical Corp.,72 had applied the bankruptcy court's 
notion of fairness to the debtor to preclude collection of postpetition 
interest from the debtor's later free assets when the principal of the 
tax liability had been fully paid under Chapter XI; that decision 
was later reversed,73 in reliance on the Supreme Court's opinion in 
Bruning v. United States.74 
It seems clear, therefore, that, notwithstanding the referee's 
views in Statmaster (not discussed by the reviewing courts, which 
went off on procedural grounds), present law requires the trustee 
to file returns and pay corporate income tax, whether he is operating 
the business or merely liquidating. 
b. Tax identity of the fiduciary and the corporation. Another 
much mooted point is whether section 6012(b)(3) continues the 
corporate taxable entity in the person of the trustee in bankruptcy 
and thus requires him to file a return "for such corporation" in the 
place of the corporate officers, or whether the trustee becomes a new 
and separate taxable entity subject to tax "in the same manner" as 
the corporation. It has been argued, following the rationale of 
Reinecke v. Gardner, 75 that "the income taxable is not that of the 
corporation, but that of the 'f;'rustee"76 and that the "trustee in 
70. Although the Bankruptcy Act did not expressly deal with interest on tax claims, 
the Court relied on the principles of the English bankruptcy system, on which our 
law was modeled. 336 U.S. at 330, citing Se.'Cton v. Dreyfus, 219 U.S. 339, 344 (1911). 
Cf. Bankruptcy Act §§ 63a(l), (5), 11 U.S.C. §§ 103a(l), (5) (1970), which stop interest 
on judgments and written instruments. 
71. 277 U.S. 239 (1928), discussed in text accompanying notes 28-30 supra. 
72. 312 F. Supp. 840 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), revd., 442 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1971). 
73. In re Johnson Elec. Corp., 442 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1971). Accord, Hugh H. Eby Co, 
v. United States, 456 F.2d 923 (3d Cir. 1972). 
74. 376 U.S. 358 (1964), which held undischarged postpetition interest on unpaid 
taxes collectible from the debtor's after-acquired assets since the tax law "demon-
strates congressional judgment that certain problems-e.g., those of financing govern• 
ment-override" general bankruptcy policies. 376 U.S. at 361. 
75. 277 U.S. 239 (1928), discussed in text accompanying notes 28-30 supra. 
76. In re F.P. Newport Corp., 144 F. Supp. 507, 509 n.l (S.D. Cal. 1956), revd, sub 
nom. United States v. Sampsell, 266 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1959) (emphasis original). 
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bankruptcy of a corporate bankrupt simply does not own or control 
the corporation involved [but] is vested only with title to its assets."77 
The Service's position to the contrary is embodied in the Income 
Tax Regulations under the 1954 Code, which declare that "[t]he 
estate of •.. an individual or corporation in receivership or a cor-
poration in bankruptcy is not a taxable entity separate from the 
person for whom the fiduciary is acting, in that respect differing 
from the estate of a deceased person or of a trust. See section 6012 
(b)(2) and (3) for provisions relating to the obligation of the fidu-
ciary with respect to the returns of such persons."78 
Whatever "conceptual problem" may arise from the fact that 
the trustee has title to the corporate property but does not control 
the corporation,70 it is surely within the power of Congress, which 
vested title in him, to impose on him the obligations of reporting 
as if he were the corporation to whose property he succeeded and 
of paying the resulting tax from the estate. Congress appears to have 
done so, in fact, in specifying in section 6012(b)(3) that the trustee 
shall make the return "for such corporation"-that is, not for the 
estate in bankruptcy as a distinct entity. There is nothing to the 
77. In re Statmaster Corp., 332 F. Supp. 1248, 1258 (S.D. Fla. 1971) (referee opin-
ion), reud. on other grounds, 332 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D. Fla. 1971), affd., 465 F.2d 978 
(5th Cir. 1972) (emphasis original). In 415 South Taylor Bldg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 
2 T.C. 184 (1943), the corporation was in reorganization under former section 77B of 
the Bankruptcy Act (now Bankruptcy Act ch. X, 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1970)) during 
1935, but the property was reconveyed to the debtor pursuant to the reo:rganization 
plan before the income tax return for 1935 became due. The trustee filed no return, 
and the corporation filed only a statement that, by reason of the proceeding, it had 
had no operations during the year. The Service attempted to assess tax for 1935 against 
the corporation, on the ground that, while the trustee stood in its place during the 
proceeding, the real and beneficial ownership was at all times in the corporation, 
which received the economic benefit of the operation. The Tax Court, however, leav-
ing open what remedies might exist against the trustee, or against the corporation 
as transferee of the estate, held that, under Reinecke v. Gardner, 277 U.S. 239 (1928), 
the title to the property and income, and hence the primary liability for the tax, 
was the estate's and not the corporation's. While the precise issue in the 415 South 
Taylor case has been otherwise resolved by provisions (Bankruptcy Act§§ 271,397,523, 
11 U.S.C. §§ 671, 797, 923 (1970)) of the Chandler Act of 1938 that expressly permit 
assessment against the debtor or successor corporation for tax liabilities incurred dur-
ing a rehabilitative proceeding, see C.C. Bradley & Co. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 564 
(1943), the decision may still be pertinent in straight bankruptcy cases, as evidence of 
the separate taxable entity of the bankrupt estate. However, the Service indicated by 
nonacquiescence, 1943 CUM. BULL. 31, that it would not accept the decision as a precedent. 
78. Treas. Reg. § l.64l(b)-2(b), T.D. 6580, 1961-2 Cur.r. BULL. 123. 
79. In re Statmaster Corp., 332 F. Supp. 1248, 1258 (S.D. Fla. 1971) (referee opinion), 
reud. on other grounds, 332 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D. Fla. 1971), a/f d., 465 F.2d 978 (5th Cir. 
1972). The Commission's substitutes-Cor.r1111ss10N REPORT, supra note 3, §§ 4-60l(a), 
7-202-for Bankruptcy Act § 70a, 11 U.S.C. § ll0(a) (1970), abandon the "confusing and 
erroneous concept" of" 'vesting title' in the trustee" and state instead that certain prop-
erty is "property of the estate." See CoM11nss10N REPORT, supra,§ 7-201, note 1. 
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contrary in Reinecke v. Gardner,80 which relied on the trustee's 
title in holding the trustee not subject to excess profits tax as a 
corporation in the absence of any applicable provision comparable 
to section 6012(b)(3). With respect to the corporate income tax, 
the Court upheld the liability imposed on the trustee by the pred-
ecessor of that provision81 but had no occasion to consider whether 
its effect was to make the estate a separate taxable entity or (for tax 
purposes) a continuation of the corporation. 
The intent of Congress that the trustee assume the obligations 
of the bankrupt in this regard seems to be underscored by section 
6903(a),82 which provides: 
Upon notice to the Secretary or his delegate that any person is 
acting for another person in a fiduciary capacity, such fiduciary shall 
assume the powers, rights, duties, and privileges of such other person 
in respect of a tax imposed by this title (except as othenvise specif-
ically provided and except that the tax shall be collected from the 
estate of such other person), until notice is given that the fiduciary 
capacity has terminated. 
Despite the suggestion by Krause and Kapiloff83 that section 6903 
(a) does not apply to a trustee in bankruptcy, who is generally 
elected by and administers the estate for the benefit of the creditors 
and, hence, is not "acting for" the bankrupt, the trustee does act 
in a fiduciary capacity for the bankrupt, at least in applying property 
to its debts and returning the residue, if any.84 In any event, the 
report on the Revenue Act of 1926, in which the provision origi-
nated, makes it clear that the trustee in bankruptcy was meant to be 
covered.85 
80, 277 U.S. 239 (1928). 
81. Act of Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463, § 13(c), 39 Stat. 71. This section is quoted In text 
accompanying note 26 supra. 
82. The Tax Court, however, drew the opposite inference from the predecessor pro-
vision in 415 South Taylor Bldg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 184, 191 (1943), 
83. Krause & Kapiloff, The Bankrupt Estate, Taxable Income and the Trustee in 
Bankruptcy, 34 FORDHAM L. REv. 401, 402-03 (1966). 
84. See B & L Farms Co. v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 407, 410 (S,D, Fla, 1965), 
a/fd,, 368 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 835 (1967). See also 9 A111, JuR, 
2d Bankruptcy § 637 (1963). 
85. S. REP. No. 52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1926). The report expresses the concern 
of the Congress "that there ••• be some individual to whom notice may be mailed and 
upon whom demand may be made, in the case of, for example, an incompetent, a de-
cedent's estate, or an estate in the hands of a receiver or trustee in bankruptcy." (Em-
phasis added.) Although the report's only express reference is to the mailing of de-
ficiency notices and demands to the fiduciary, the provision has the further effect of 
fixing on the trustee the bankrupt's duty to pay the tax (limited to the amount in 
the estate). Cf. Fletcher Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 36, 40 (7th Cir. 1944) 
(involving the trustee of a gift in trust). While, on its face, the obligation under 
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Treatment of the estate of a bankrupt corporation as a continu-
ation of the corporate taxable entity is consistent with the treatment 
of a liquidating trustee for a corporation that is not in bankruptcy. 
It has long been established that the conveyance of corporate as-
sets to a trustee in dissolution or liquidation for the purpose of 
disposing of the assets and discharging the corporate debts does not 
terminate the existence of the corporation for tax purposes. The 
trustee is deemed to hold the assets, not as a representative of the 
shareholders, but as agent for the corporation, until its debts have 
been paid and the residue distributed.86 It makes no difference that 
the state law finally terminates the corporate existence upon the 
transfer to the trusteeB7 or that the trust instrument expressly dis-
claims representation of the corporation.BB While it is not legally im-
Im. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6903(a), is conditional upon the fiduciary's having given no-
tice to the government, it has been held that the assumption of such tax responsibility is 
not optional with the fiduciary. Fidelity Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 54, 
57-58 (3d Cir. 1944). In any event, the notice required to be given to the district 
director of internal revenue by the clerk of the court under section 58e of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 94(e) (1970), suffices for purposes of section 6903(a). Treas. Reg, 
§§ 301.6036-I(a)(l), (c) (1960). 
86. United States v. Loo, 248 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 928 
(1958); J. Ungar, Inc. v. Commissioner, 244 F.2d 90, 93 (2d Cir. 1957); First Natl. Bank 
v. United States, 86 F.2d 938 (10th Cir. 1936); Hellebush v. Commissioner, 65 F.2d 
902 (6th Cir. 1933); Taylor Oil & Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d 108 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 283 U.S. 862 (1931); National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 345 
F.2d 823 (Ct. CI. 1965); Mrs. Grant Smith, 26 B.T.A. 1178 (1932). Liquidation cases 
that arose before the 1954 Code placed some reliance on long-standing regulations 
that declared: 
When a corporation is dissolved, its affairs are usually wound up by a receiver 
or trustees in dissolution. The corporate existence is continued for the purpose of 
liquidating the assets and paying the debts, and such receiver or trustees stand 
in the stead of the corporation for such purposes • • . • Any sales of property by 
them are to be treated as if made by the corporation for the purpose of ascer-
taining the gain or loss ..•• 
E.g., Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(a)-20 (1953); Treas. Reg. 45, art. 547 (1919). That pro-
vision disappeared when the regulations were reissued under the 1954 Code and was 
replaced by a more limited statement that "gain or loss is recognized to a corporation 
[in liquidation] on all sales by it, whether directly or indirectly (as through trustees 
or a receiver),'' with an exception not here pertinent. Treas. Reg. § 1.336-1 (1955). 
The current regulation has been relied on, however, in reaching the same result as 
under prior law. Hersloff v. United States, 310 F.2d 947, 950 (Ct. CI. 1962). Further-
more, present Treas. Reg. § l.6012-3(b)(4), T.D. 6628, 1963-1 CUM. BULL. 272, 273 
links the requirement of filing by a "trustee in dissolution" to the statutorily pre-
scribed filing by "a receiver, trustee in bankruptcy or assignee,'' INT. REv. CODE OF 
1954, § 6012(b)(3), and that statute was relied on in finding continuity between a 
corporation and its liquidating trustee in National Metropolitan Bank v. United 
States, 345 F-2d 823, 825 (Ct. Cl, 1965). See also Treas. Reg. § l.6012-2(a)(2) (1959) ("A 
corporation does not go out of existence if it is turned over to receivers or trustees 
who continue to operate it."). 
87. United States v. Loo, 248 F-2d 765, 767 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 
928 (1958). 
88. Whitney Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 80 F.2d 429, 431 (6th Cir. 1935), cert. 
denied, 298 U.S. 668 (1936). 
952 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 72:935 
possible to sever the corporation's tax connection with later trans-
actions by a clear-cut distribution to shareholders, even if they ap• 
point a trustee to act for them,80 trustees who were charged, not 
merely with disposing of property and paying over the proceeds 
to shareholders, but with winding up the affairs of the corporation 
and paying its debts, were not permitted to deny their representa-
tion of the corporation.00 Such functions, of course, are performed 
by a bankruptcy trustee. 
Aside from affecting the availability of the corporation~s loss 
carryovers to the trustee, the principal practical difference between 
the two points of view discussed above is that the Service position 
requires the trustee to file a return that includes the portion of the 
year before he took title.91 In nonbankruptcy corporate liquidation 
cases, which are governed by the same regulation on returns as that 
which governs corporate bankrupts,92 it has been held that there is 
but one taxable period in the year in which the corporate assets are 
transferred to the liquidating trustee.93 One possible distinction 
between the bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy situations, however, is 
that the bankrupt corporation, instead of passing out of existence, 
may obtain a discharge and resume business under the same charter 
with fresh capital, as is permitted by section 14a of the Bankruptcy 
Act.94 The fact that this permissible, if relatively rare, occurrence 
89. United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950); United States 
v. Cummins Distilleries Corp., 166 F.2d 17 (6th Cir. 1948); Amos L. Beaty&: Co., 14 T.C, 
52 (1950); Acampo Winery & Distilleries, Inc., 7 T.C. 629 (1946). 
90. See note 86 supra and accompanying text. 
The same principle has been applied to an assignment by a corporation for the 
benefit of creditors. See Louisville Property Co. v. Commissioner, 140 F.2d 547 (6th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 755 (1944). The court held that the assignee, although he 
held legal title, was conducting not his own business but that of the corporation 
and rejected as "fanciful" the argument "that the beneficial owners were the creditors 
and stockholders." 140 F.2d at 549. But cf. Standard Oil Co. v. Apex Oil Co., 35 Tenn. 
App. 225,244 S.W .2d 176 (1951), which held that a receiver in a general creditor's suit was 
not taxable under the predecessor of INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, § 6012(b)(3), in part be-
cause the income was deemed to belong not to the corporation but to its creditors and 
shareholders. 
91. G.C.M. 12207, XII-2 CuM. BULL. 83, 85 (1933), declared obsolete by Rev. Rul. 
71-498, 1971-2 CUM. BULL. 434. The declaration of obsolescence presumably refers to 
the consolidated return issues dealt with in the ruling, since there has been no per-
tinent change in the law on the present point. 
92. See note 86 supra. 
93. National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 345 F.2d 823, 827 (Ct. Cl. 1965); 
Mrs. Grant Smith, 26 B.T .A. 1178, 1187 (1932). 
94. 11 U.S.C. § 32(a) (1970). See Theobald-Jansen Elec. Co. v. Harry I. Wood Engr. 
Co., 285 F. 29 (6th Cir. 1922); In re Marshall Paper Co., 102 F. 872 (1st Cir. 1900); In 
re Hargadine-McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 239 F. 155 (E.D. Mo. 1917), revd., 244 F. 719 
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 245 U.S. 667 (1917). The Commission has recommended deny-
ing the owners of the bankrupt corporation the option to obtain a discharge and re-
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might result in two entities ·with the same tax identity if the govern-
ment's position were sustained has been cited as a reason for judicial 
narrowing of the application of section 6012(b)(3) of the Code and 
for the view, expressed by the referees, that the trustee, if required 
to file at all, should report only the income from the estate's own 
operations and the corporation should file its own return covering 
the prebankruptcy portion of the year (as well as the period there-
after if the corporation resumes operations after discharge).95 Krause 
and Kapiloff, on the other hand, accept the Service position that, 
in general, the trustee continues the identity of the corporate 
bankrupt for tax purposes, but they would· make an exception for 
the unusual case where the discharged corporation resumes business 
activity. In such a situation, they say, the trustee should not file 
corporate returns for the estate in his hands but should file fidu-
ciary (estate) returns in the same manner as the trustee of a bank-
rupt individual or partnership, since the discharge severs the cor-
poration from the estate.96 
The referee in the Statmaster case97 declared that the Supreme 
Court, in Nicholas v. United States,98 "took pains to negate any im-
plication that its decision extended to the filing of tax returns by 
the trustee for pre-petition periods." The referee, however, misread 
the Nicholas case, in which the Court, in holding a trustee for a 
bankrupt corporation subject to civil penalties for failure to file 
withholding, social security, and cabaret tax returns that came due 
after his appointment but covered periods while the debtor was in 
possession under a Chapter XI arrangement, stressed "the continuity 
of interest between the debtor in possession and the trustee as offi-
cers of the bankruptcy court"99 and stated that "nothing said in this 
opinion may be taken as imposing any obligations upon a trustee 
activate the corporate shell. COMMISSION REPORT, sujJra note 3, § 4-505(a) & note 3 
thereto. 
95. In re Statmaster Corp., 332 F. Supp. 1248, 1258, 1261 (S.D. Fla. 1971) (referee 
opinion), reud. on other grounds, 332 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D. Fla. 1971), afjd., 465 F.2d 978 
(5th Cir. 1972); In re Town Crier Bottling Co., 123 F. Supp. 588, 592 (E.D. Mo. 1954). 
96. Krause & Kapiloff, supra note 83, at 405-06, 415. Perhaps that view can be 
reconciled with the terms of !NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6012(b)(3), on the theory that, 
at least from the time the corporation acquires new assets, the trustee no longer 
"has possession of or holds title to all or substantially all the property or business 
of [the] corporation." (Emphasis added.) Concerning the taxation of the estate of an 
individual or partnership as a separate entity, see text accompanying notes 106-34 
infra. 
97. 332 F. S~pp. at 1259. 
98. 384 U.S. 678, 693 n.27 (1966). 
99. 384 U.S. at 693 n. 27. 
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in bankruptcy to file returns for taxes incurred before the initiation 
of proceedings under the Act."100 The Court cited101 I.T. 3959,102 
which holds that a trustee is not authorized to file an income tax 
return for the prebankruptcy period of an individual. In the case 
of individuals, however, there is no express statute, such as section 
6012(b)(3), that requires the trustee to "make the return of income 
for the corporation";10a nor was that provision relevant or given 
consideration in Nicholas, since the statute relates only to corporate 
income taxes, which were not there involved. 
I submit, therefore, that present law requires the trustee in 
bankruptcy to file income tax returns as and for the corporate bank• 
rupt, without break in the accounting period of the corporation and 
without becoming a new and separate taxable entity.104 
2. Individual and Partnership Bankruptcies 
Whereas section 6012(b)(3), whatever its conceptual and practical 
inadequacies, at least undertakes to regulate the tax duties of cor. 
porate bankrupts and their fiduciaries, the tax law with respect to 
trustees for bankrupt individuals and partnerships is a virtual vac-
uum. The taxing authorities and the courts, therefore, have had to 
improvise and apply rules not framed with the bankruptcy situation 
in mind.1°11 
Since an individual bankrupt, after the transfer of his assets to the 
trustee, may obtain new- employment or new assets from which 
he will derive income independent of that which the trustee may 
simultaneously derive from the assets transferred to him, it has 
been the "long-established practice" of the Service to treat the estate 
100. 384 U.S. at 693 n.27, 
IOI. 384 U.S. at 693 n.27. 
102. 1949-I Cu111. BULL. 90. 
103. See text accompanying notes 105-06 infra. 
104. There appears to be no room to question the proposition that, whatever might 
be the general conclusion with respect to trustees, a receiver (of all or substantially all of a 
corporate debtor's property), appointed under the Bankruptcy Act and having only 
possession and not title (Bankruptcy Act § 2a(3), II U.S.C. § Il(a)(3) (1970); Imperial 
Assur. Co. v. Livingston, 49 F.2d 745, 749 (8th Cir. 1931)), stands completely in the 
shoes of the debtor in filing returns "for such corporation," rather than becoming a 
distinct taxable entity. INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, § 6012(b)(3); Treas. Reg. § I.6012-
3(b)(4), T .D. 6628, 1963-1 CUM. BULL. 272, 273; Treas. Reg. § l.64l(b)-2(b), T .D. 6!l80, 
1961-2 CuM. BULL. 123. Therefore, losses of the debtor may be used on the return, 
In re Kepp Elec. & Mfg. Co., 98 F. Supp. 51, 53 (D. Minn. 1951), and the receiver files 
for the full unbroken accounting year of the corporation, including the period be-
fore the receiver took control. Rev. Rul. 69-600, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 241. If the prop-
erty is restored to the debtor, the debtor files for the full year, including the period 
the receiver was in charge. Rev. Rul. 69-641, 1969-2 Cu111. BULL. 241. 
105. See Henry C. Mueller, 60 T.C. 36, 44-45 (1973). 
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in the hands of a trustee for a bankrupt individual (in contrast to 
the rule asserted in corporate bankruptcies) as a taxable entity sep-
arate from the individual.106 The Service holds the trustee taxable 
under section 641 of the Code, which imposes a tax on "the taxable 
income of estates or of any kind of property held in trust," although 
the nonexclusive107 list of specific examples that follows that general 
language refers to no "estates" other than "estates of deceased per-
sons,"108 and the Service undercuts its case by perversely holditi.g 
that not all the tax provisions applicable to "estates" apply to es-
tates in bankruptcy.100 
Knowledge of that "long-established practice" apparently es-
caped the draftsmen of the first regulations promulgated under the 
1954 Code. It was provided in the 1956 version of Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.64l(b)-2(b) that 
[t]he estate of an infant, incompetent, or other person under a 
disability, or, in general, 0£ an individual or corporation in receiver-
ship or bankruptcy is not a taxable entity separate from the person 
for whom the fiduciary is acting, in that respect differing from the 
estate of a deceased person or of a trust. See section 6012(b)(2) and (3) 
for provisions relating to the obligation of the fiduciary with respect 
to returns of such persons.no 
Relying on that regulation, the court in In re Kirby 111 held that 
the trustee in bankruptcy of an individual is not subject to income 
tax and added that, if Congress had meant to impose the tax, it 
would have done so expressly, as it had done with respect to cor-
porations. The "estates" subjected to ta.x by section 641 were held 
to be confined to decedents' estates. While the case was pending; 
the Treasury hastily amended the regulation. The words imme-
diately following "in general" in the old regulation were amended 
106. G.C.M. 24617, 1945 Cu111. BULL. 235; Rev. Rul. 72-387, 1972-2 COM. BULL. 632, 
632. See Krause & Kapiloff, supra note 83, at 405. 
107. See INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 770l(b) ("The terms 'includes' and 'including' 
when used in a definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other 
things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined."). See Groman v. Conunis-
sioner, 302 U.S. 82, 86 (1937). 
108. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 64l(a)(3). 
109. Rev. Rul. 66-266, 1966-2 Cu111. BuLL. 356, discussed in note 112 infra; Rev. 
Rul. 68-48, 1968-1 CUM. Buu. 301, 303, discussed in text accompanying note 220 infra. 
See Henry C. Mueller, 60 T.C. 36, 45 (1973). 
110. T.D. 6217, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 336, 344. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6012(b)(2), 
referred to in the regulation, requires an agent, committee, guardian, or fiduciary to 
file returns for an individual under disability. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6012(b)(3), 
which relates to fiduciaries for corporations, has been discussed in the text accom-
panying notes 75-104 supra. 
111. 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ,J 9752 (S.D. Tex. 1962). 
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to declare that the estate "of an individual or corporation in receiv-
ership or a corporation in bankruptcy [the reference to a bankrupt 
individual was deleted] is not a taxable entity separate from the per-
son for whom the fiduciary is acting .... "112 The Kirby case was then 
settled for $140,000.00, out of a claimed $575,644.18 in tax and 
penalty, and the government dismissed its appeal.113 
Although the Kirby case remains the only reported decision that 
has held a liquidating trustee for a bankrupt individual immune 
from income tax, the two reported cases to the contrary114 are less 
than satisfactory in their reasoning. Both relied on 28 U.S.C. § 960 
and broadly construed the statutory term, "conduct[ing] any busi-
ness," to embrace "'any activity or operation in connection with 
the handling or management of the bankrupt estate' ";UG the later 
case added that, in any event, "§960 does not purport to exclude 
a liquidating Trustee from paying tax on income received."116 But, 
having neutralized section 960, which neither imposes nor inhibits 
112. T .D. 6580, 1961-2 CuM. BuLL. 123, 123. The confusion in the Service concern• 
ing the status of a bankrupt estate continued, however. In construing INT. REv. CODE 
OF 1954, § 137I(a)(2), under which a so-called "small business corporation," the in-
come of which (if so elected) is taxed to its shareholders and is immune from cor-
porate tax, is disqualified for such treatment if it has any shareholders other than in-
dividuals and "estates[s]," the Service ruled that disqualification occurs if a share-
holder becomes bankrupt and a trustee in bankruptcy takes title to his shares. Rev. 
Ru!. 65-90, 1965-1 CuM. BULL. 428. Citing the above-quoted regulation as it had 
read before the amendment four years earlier, see text accompanying note HO supra, 
the ruling stated that "the estate of a decedent is the only estate which may be recog-
nized as a taxable entity." Rev. Rul. 65-90, 1965-1 CUM. BULL. 428, 429. That general• 
ization, as well as the reference to the regulation, was deleted when the ruling was 
revised and superseded by Rev. Rut. 66-266, 1966-2 CuM. BULL. 356. But it was never• 
theless concluded, Rev. Rut. 66-266, 1966-2 CUM. BULL. 356, 357 (emphasis added), 
that "an 'estate,' within the meaning of section 1371 of the Code, includes only the 
estate of a decedent," without explaining why the meaning was different for that 
purpose than for others. Cf. Rev. Rul. 74-9, 1974 INT. REv. BULL. No. 1, at 17, which 
holds than an individual debtor in possession under chapter XII is neither an in• 
dividual nor an estate for the purpose of section 1371. 
113. United States v. Kerr, 64-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1[ 9184 (5th Cir. 1963). Although it 
has been said that the "precedential value of the Kirby case was undermined sub-
stantially" by the compromise pending its appeal, Krause 8: Kapiloff, supra note 83, at 
410, the view of the Tax Court in similar circumstances is that such a settlement "docs 
not affect the vitality of the opinion as an expression of the Tax Court's views on the 
issue involved." Cosmopolitan Credit Corp., 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mero. 404, 414 n.4 (1972), 
114. In re Steck, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ,r 9702 (S.D. Ill. 1962) (referee opinion) (tax• 
ing farm income pending sale of farm}; In re Loehr, 98 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. Wis. 1950) 
(taxing gain on sale of bankrupt's property). 
115. In re Steck, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ,r 9702, at 85,839 (S.D. Ill. 1962) (referee 
opinion), quoting In re Mid America, 31 F. Supp. 601, 606 (S.D. Ill. 1939); In re Loehr, 
98 F. Supp. 402, 403 (E.D. Wis. 1950), quoting In re Mid America Co., 31 F. Supp. 601, 
606 (S.D. Ill. 1939). 
116. In re Steck, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ,I 9702, at 85,839 (S.D. Ill. 1962} (referee opinion). 
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the imposition of a federal tax,117 the decisions fail to address them-
selves to the affirmative basis for liability.118 
The Kirby referee, like the referee in Statmaster on the corporate 
side of the same issue,119 based his finding of the absence of such an 
affirmative basis on the principle that" '[t]he extension of a tax by 
implication is not favored.' "120 That principle stems ultimately, at 
least in the federal income tax field, from Gould v. Gould,121 a 
1917 case, in which the Supreme Court said, "In the interpretation 
of statutes levying taxes it is the established rule not to extend their 
provisions, by implication, beyond the clear import of the language 
used, or to enlarge their operations so as to embrace matters not 
specifically pointed out. In case of doubt they are construed most 
strongly against the government, and in favor of the citizen." So far 
as the Gould case may require construing all doubts against the 
government, however, such a requirement "is no longer the law,"122 
in view of a later declaration of the Supreme Court: 
We are not impressed by the argument that, as the question here 
decided is doubtful, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the 
taxpayer. It is the function and duty of the courts to resolve doubts. 
We know of no reason why that function should be abdicated in a 
tax case more than in any other where the rights of suitors turn on 
the construction of a statute and it is our duty to decide what that 
construction fairly should be.123 
Although Gould is, nevertheless, still relied on,124 its role is clearly 
limited to the interpretation of provisions levying taxes.125 When 
the tax-levying provisions extend, as they do here, to· "all income 
from whatever source derived,"126 including "the taxable income of 
estates or of any kind of property held in trust,"127 and thus evidence 
117. See text accompanying notes 18-20 supra. 
ll8. This criticism is noted in Krause & Kapiloff, supra note 83, at 409. 
119. In re Statmaster Corp., 332 F. Supp. 1248, 1259-60 (S.D. Fla.) (referee opinion), 
revd. on other grounds, 332 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D. Fla. 1971), afld., 465 F.2d 978 (5th Cir. 
1972). See text accompanying notes 44-74supra. 
120. 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 86,050, quoting Reinecke v. Gardner, 277 U.S. 239, 244 
(1928). 
121. 245 U.S. 151, 153 (1917). 
122. Endler v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 945, 949 (D.N.J. 1953). But cf. Busse v. 
Commissioner, 479 F.2d 1147, 1151 (7th Cir. 1973). • 
123, White v. United States, 305 U.S. 281,292 (1938). 
124. E.g., Tandy Leather Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 693, 694 (5th Cir. 1965). 
125. See Parker Pen Co. v. O'Day, 234 F.2d 607,609 (7th Cir. 1956). 
126. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6l(a). 
127. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 64l(a). 
958 Michigan Law Review [Vol, '12:935 
the purpose of Congress "to use the full measure of its taxing 
power,"128 the applicable principles are that "those who seek an 
exemption from a tax must rest it on more than a doubt or am• 
biguity [since] [e]xemptions from taxation cannot rest upon mere 
implication,''129 and that even express exemptions from a generally 
imposed tax "are to be strictly construed."130 
Partnerships are not themselves taxable under the federal in-
come tax law but are treated as conduits, the partners being directly 
taxable in accordance with their distributive shares of the income 
determined at the partnership level.131 A partnership may, however, 
become bankrupt, either separately or jointly with one or more or 
all of its general partners.132 Originally, it was ruled that a bank-
rupt partnership was no more a taxable entity than the partnership 
itself and that the trustee should file the regular partnership in-
formation return Form 1065 on behalf of the partnership, which 
was considered to continue in existence as such during its dissolu• 
tion by the trustee; the distributive shares were ruled to be taxable 
to the trustees for the bankrupt partners (and directly to any part-
ners not in bankruptcy).138 That ruling was subsequently recon-
sidered, however, in light of the asserted inconsistency in treatment 
of trustees for partnerships and trustees for individuals. It was then 
determined that the trustee for a bankrupt partnership, like the 
trustee for an individual, should be ta.-x:ed under section 641 of the 
Code as an estate, separate from both the partnership and the 
partners.184 
No separate taxable entity results, however, if a receiver, rather 
than a trustee, holds all, or substantially all, the property of an 
individual185 or a partnership.136 The law provides that "[i]f an in-
12s. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940); Blassie v, Commissioner, 894 
F.2d 628, 630 (8th Cir. 1968). 
129. United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, '71 (1940). 
130. Helvering v. Northwest Steel Rolling Mills, Inc., 311 U.S. 46, 49 (1940). Accord, 
Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, '151-52 (1969). 
131. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 701-04; United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441, 448 
(1973). 
132. Bankruptcy Act § 5a, 11 U.S.C. § 23(a) (1970). To the same effect, see Co111-
MISSION REPORT, supra note 3, §§ 1-102(34), 4-201, -204, -206, -305. 
133. G.C.M. 8488, X-1 CUM. Buu.. 270 (1931). 
134. G.C.M. 24617, 1945 CuM. BULL, 235; Rev. Rul. 68-48, 1968-1 CUM, BULL, 301, 
Not only does this treatment (which has been tested in no reported case) subject the 
bankrupt estate to the highest individual rate schedule (INT, REv, CoDE OF 1954, § I(d)), 
but also the lumping of the interests of all the partners into a single entity taxable at 
graduated individual rates may place the estate in a substantially higher tax bracket than 
its members. 
135. Treas. Reg. § 1.64l(b)-2(b), T.D. 6580, 1961-2 CUM. BULL, 123. 
136. See text accompanying note 140 infra. 
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dividual is unable to make a return ... , the return of such individ-
ual shall be made by ... his ... fiduciary or other person charged 
with the care of the person or property of such individual," with 
an express exception in the case of a receiver of "only a part of the 
property of an individual."137 The regulation thereunder specifies 
that "[a] receiver who stands in the place of an individual must 
make the return of income required in respect of such individual," 
but an individual only a part of whose property is held by a receiver 
"must make his own return."188 The Tax Court has held,139 how-
ever, that an individual whose property is held by a receiver is not 
necessarily "unable to make a return," as the statute provides, and 
that the receiver may discharge his obligation by seeing that the tax-
payer himself files a return. Whether filed by the receiver or the in-
dividual, the return is that of the individual and may be joined in 
by the debtor's spouse, in order to take advantage of the lower rates 
applicable to joint returns-a privilege that is unavailable to a 
trustee in bankruptcy. With respect to partnerships, there was for 
many years a regulation that stated that a receiver in charge of the 
business of a partnership should file the partnership information re• 
turn Form 1065 rather than filing as an estate, as a trustee for a 
bankrupt partnership must do.140 While that provision disappeared 
from the regulations after 1954, the rule no doubt remains the 
same.141 
3. Reorganization and Rehabilitation Proceedings 
In reorganization and rehabilitation proceedings of the kind 
embraced in Chapters X, XI, and XII, whether involving corpora-
tions, partnerships, or individuals, and whether administered by a 
trustee or receiver or by the debtor in possession, the present Bank-
ruptcy Act provides that "all taxes which may become owing to 
the United States or any State[1421 from a receiver or trustee of a 
137, INT, REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6012(b)(2). 
138. Treas. Reg. § l.6012-3(b)(5) (1960) (emphasis added). 
139. Selma Heasley, 45 T.C. 448, 460-62 (1966). 
140. E.g., Treas. Reg. 45, art. 424 (1919); Treas, Reg. 118, § 39.142-4 (1953). 
141. The reasons for stating this are that (1) while neither section 142 of the 1939 
Code (on which the former regulation purported to rest) nor section 6012 of the 
1954 Code directly deals with receivers for partnerships, there is nothing in the latter 
section or elsewhere in the 1954 Code to indicate that the prior interpretation was 
changed or undermined, and (2) the old regulation and the author's conclusion as to 
the present law are consistent with the principle that a receiver is in effect a custo-
dian that does not take title and hence is not a new taxable entity. 
142. The Commission would add "or any subdivision thereof," for clarification. 
COMIIIISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 7-315(e). 
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debtor or from a debtor in possession, shall be assessed against, may 
be collected from, and shall be paid by the debtor or the corporation 
organized or made use of for effectuating a plan or arrangement 
under one of those chapters."143 The italicized words indicate that, 
while the obligation to file returns falls upon the receiver or trustee, 
if one is appointed and holds all, or substantially all, the property of 
the debtor,144 and while the taxes "become owing" from the fidu-
ciary, the debtor is viewed. as the actual taxpayer, even during ad-
ministration (resulting in continuity of the taxable year and avail-
ability of the debtor's loss carryovers),m since the taxes "shall" be 
assessed against and "shall" be paid by the debtor (or his successor). 
While the taxes "may" be collected from the debtor, they may also 
be collected from the estate, with the priority of administration 
expenses.146 
C. Legislative Alternatives 
I. Complete or Partial Exemption of the Trustee from Tax 
Under the proposals of the Commission, the trustee in straight 
bankruptcy, whether of an individual, a partnership, or a corpora-
tion, and whether or not operating or conducting the business of 
the debtor, would be relieved of any obligation to file returns or 
pay any federal, state, or local tax upon or measured by income 
of the estate. However, in order to avoid a windfall to the debtor 
in the unusual case where the property available for distribution ex-
ceeds the aggregate amount of allowable claims, the taxes for the 
entire period of administration would have to be computed on re-
turns to be made by the trustee before approval of his final account, 
and the taxes would then be paid ratably from and to the extent of 
the amount othenvise distributable to the debtor. The running of 
the statute of limitations on assessment and collection of administra-
143. Bankruptcy Act §§ 271, 397, 523, II U.S.C. §§ 671, 797, 923 (1970) (emphasis 
added). The Commission, which would merge such procedures into one procedure 
called "reorganization" (even when an individual is involved), would carry fonvard 
the substance of those provisions (simplified to state that the taxes "may be assessed 
against and collected from" the debtor or successor) in proposed section 7-315(c) and 
would extend them to railroad reorganizations (on which the law has heretofore been 
silent in this respect) m proposed section 9-101. 
144. INT, REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6012(b)(2), (3), 
145. In re Lister, 177 F. Supp. 372, 373 (E.D. Va. 1959); Stoller v. United States, 
320 F.2d 340, 341-42 (Ct. Cl. 1963). The Service, however, has ruled that an individ• 
ual debtor in possession, at least under chapter XII, is a taxable entity distinct from 
the debtor himself. Rev. Rul. 74-9, 1974 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 1, at 17. 
146. Berryhill v. Gerstel, 196 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1952): In re Gates, 256 F. Supp 
1 (E.D. Wis. 1966). 
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tive taxes would be suspended until the date of approval of such 
account, and any deficiency later determined would be collectible 
from the debtor by transferee proceedings147 to the extent of any 
distribution he received.148 
The proposal to exempt the trustee from tax is not a new one, 
and the arguments for it are perhaps adequately summarized in 
Judge Yankwich's dictum that, "Historically, income taxes are levied 
on the profits of the owners of a successful enterprise, not on the 
dividends paid to the creditors on the 'winding-up' or 'closing-out' 
of a defaulted and bankrupt business."149 For purposes of analysis, 
it is necessary to deal with the two parts of that statement separately. 
First, it is not strictly true that, either "historically" or under 
current law, only "the profits of the owners of a successful enter-
prise" are subject to the income tax. Income taxes are determined 
on an annual basis and reflect the il)come and deductions of a tax-
able year; the profitability or unprofitability of the taxpayer's aggre-
gate business over a period of years is relevant only as specific statu-
tory provisions, such as those for loss carryovers, make it so.150 If, 
in the application of those provisions, a net income does develop, 
"[p]rofits made in the business of liquidation are taxable in the same 
way and to the same extent as if made in an expanding business,"151 
and, except in so far as carryover provisions may be applicable, 
"[t]he fact that it might prove that when the business was fully 
liquidated the profits . . . were offset by heavy loss of [other] years 
is immaterial."152 
The second part of Judge Yankwich's statement assumes that the 
tax is imposed upon the "dividend" to creditors. The tax is not, of 
course, imposed upon their receipt of payment of their debts (al-
though they may be independently taxable if the payments reflect 
recovery of previously untaxed income, rather than of capital). The 
147. See !NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6901. 
148. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 5-104(a). 
149. In re F.P. Newport Corp., 144 F. Supp. 507, 510 (S.D. Cal. 1956), revd. sub 
nom. United States v. Sampsell, 266 F.2d 631 (9~h Cir. 1959) (emphasis original). The 
Commission merely "rests on the premise that estates undergoing liquidation in bank-
ruptcy and the officers administering them should be relieved from filing returns and 
paying income taxes so long as the payment of such taxes on income earned during 
the administration of the estate would diminish the assets of the estate necessary for 
the full payment of all its creditors." COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 5-104, 
note 1. 
150. Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 :U.S. 359 (1931); United States v. Rexach, 
482 F.2d 10, 22-23 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3306 (U.S., Nov. 20, 1973). 
151. Heiner v. Mellon, 304 U.S. 271, 275 (1938). 
152. Heiner v. Mellon, 304 U.S. 271, 276 (1938). 
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taX is on the bankrupt estate (whether deemed to be a continuation 
of the identity of a bankrupt corporation or, in other circumstances, 
a separately taxable estate), The special circumstance of the trustee's 
realization of income and appreciation in value accrued before 
bankruptcy is left aside for later discussion.168 In general, the other 
forms of income (interest, royalties, rent, or income from the con-
duct of business) that may be taxed to the bankrupt estate involve 
increments in the amount of assets that were available to creditors 
at the date of bankruptcy, and while, to the creditors, the greater 
amount thereby recovered from the estate merely constitutes a re• 
duction of their loss, it is to the trustee-as it would have been to 
the bankrupt if he had continued to be the owner of the source-
an accession to income.154 The fact that it was earned by an insolvent 
estate under judicial supervision (hence, "in custodia legis'') affords 
no more reason for exempting such income than it would for re• 
lieving the income of a decedent's estate, a guardianship, or the like, 
To paraphrase the Supreme Court's response to a comparable argu-
ment that judicial custody precluded property taxation, "the trans-
fer to the trustee [gives] no mysterious or peculiar ownership or 
qualities ••• to the property [and does not] withdraw it from the 
necessity of protection by the [United States]."166 
Essentially, the argument of Judge Yankwich comes down to 
what later courts have described as the "manifest inequity" of im-
posing any taX on the insolvent estate when "its burden would fall 
upon the creditors by further reducing what at best is only a partial 
recovery of amounts owing to them from the bankrupt,"160 so that, 
"[i]n effect, the creditors would ••. be asked to pay a tax on their 
loss."157 That argument, as the reviser of Collier has pointed out, 
"implies a limitation on the taxing power that may appeal to the 
emotion, but has little justification in law."168 The argument may 
be relevant to the "negative income" resulting to the bankrupt 
through the reduction of his liabilities, which results in no incre-
ment in available assets-a form of income for which, in conse-
153. See text accompanying notes 242-72, 336-85 infra. 
154, In re Steck, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas.1f 9702 (S.D. Ill. 1962) (referee opinion). 
155. Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U.S. 441, 444 (1904), The actual quotation is found fn 
the te.xt accompanying note 9 supra. 
156. In re Kirby, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ,J 9752, at 86,051 (S.D. Tex. 1962). 
157. In re Statmaster Corp., 332 F. Supp. 1248, 1260 (S.D. Fla.) (referee opinion), 
retJd. on other grounds, 832 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D. Fla. 1971), afld., 465 F.2d 978 (5th Cir. 
1972). 
158. 3A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ,r 62.14[3) (rev. 14th ed. J. Moore 1972). See note 
187 infra. 
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quence, a conditional exemption has been expressly provided.1119 At 
least in so far, however, as the income in question reflects an actual 
increment in the amount available to creditors, there is no inequity 
in charging such increment first with the "price" exacted from all 
citizens for the protection afforded by the government, just as it is 
charged with the expenses directly incurred in its production. The 
equity of charging that increment with the tax thereon is further 
evidenced by the fact that, if the creditors had been paid on the 
date of bankruptcy, they would have received only the principal 
amount of assets then in the estate, without the later increment, and, 
if they had then invested the proceeds and earned interest or other 
income therefrom, they would surely have been taxed on that in-
come, notwithstanding their prior unrecovered loss on the debt from 
the bankrupt.160 
The creditors' loss is properly reflected, for tax purposes, not in 
exemption of the estate from tax on its income, but in the creditors' 
own deductions for bad debts (or, in some circumstances, in their 
not being taxable in the first instance on amounts that they fail to 
collect). It may be asked why it would not be simpler, then, to dis-
pense with the trouble of collecting a tax from the trustee and to 
make up the difference through the greater taxable recoveries or 
lesser deductions resulting to the creditors. The effect of the tw-o 
treatments is not identical, however, as may be evidenced by an ex-
ample: Suppose the bankrupt, with 250,000 dollars of assets, has a 
single' creditor to whom he owes 500,000 dollars. During adminis-
tration, the estate earns 12,000 dollars net of expenses. Under pres-
ent law, as interpreted in the preceding discussion, the trustee would 
pay, say, 2,600 dollars of tax. The creditor recovers 259,400 dollars 
(250,000 dollars plus 12,000 dollars less 2,600 dollars) and claims a 
bad debt deduction of 240,600 dollars, which reduces his tax (as-
suming a forty-eight per cent rate) by 115,488 dollars. If the pro-
posed exemption were adopted, the trustee would pay no tax, the 
creditor would recover 262,000 dollars (250,000 plus 12,000 dollars), 
the bad debt deduction would be 238,000 dollars, and the creditor's 
tax would be reduced by 114,240 dollars. In the former case, the 
creditor's loss, net of tax saving, is 125,112 dollars; in the latter, it 
is 123,760 dollars. The difference reflects the fact that, to the extent 
of the 2,600-dollar tax that the interest or other income would have 
159. Bankruptcy Act §§ 268, 270, 395-96, 520, 522, 679, 11 U.S.C. §§ 668, 670, 795-96, 
920,922, 1079 (1970). See also text accompanying notes 247-59 infra. 
160. Cf. Allen v. Trust Co., 180 F.2d 527 (5th Cir.), cert. d1mied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950). 
See also text accompanying notes 256-59 infra. 
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borne if earned directly by either the debtor or the creditor, the gov-
ernment, in effect, rebates the creditor's loss rather than bearing 
only a fraction thereof through an augmented bad debt deduction. 
If, as argued by Krause and Kapiloff, "[i]t is reasonable for the 
Government to absorb a share of the rehabilitation process" by for-
giving the tax on current income of the estate unless all other cred-
itors have been satisfied in full161-thus, in effect, placing such taxes 
on a priority level below general creditors-it would be at least 
equally reasonable to do the same with respect to unpaid taxes on 
income of past years. The argument expressed by one referee, that 
"[t]axing authorities and collectors are not responsible for a dollar's 
_ worth of goods on any bankrupt's shelves or for one single fixture 
in his store and every penny paid in tax priorities is at the expense 
of the general creditors,"162 is more appropriately addressed (and 
in fact was addressed) to past taxes, which are a dead weight on the 
estate, rather than to current taxes, which, in general, take only a 
share of the increment and are the price exacted for current gov-
ernmental protection of the estate.163 Yet, Congress has not hereto-
fore been willing to forego priority over general creditors for past 
taxes unless the tax collector has had at least three years before bank-
ruptcy in which to attempt to collect them,104 and it is not recom-
mended even by the Commission that such priority be relinquished 
if less than one year has elapsed since the tax fell due.10G Even "stale" 
taxes are not disallowed or subordinated but stand on a parity with 
general creditors and thus encroach upon the latter's recovery.100 
Since there has, of course, been no prior opportunity to collect the 
tax on income earned during administration, there would seem to 
be even less reason for the government to yield its place to other 
creditors with respect to current taxes than with respect to those 
incurred before bankruptcy. 
It has been urged that section 7507 of the Code affords a prece-
dent for relieving the bankrupt estate from tax on income earned 
during administration if payment would diminish the assets neces-
161. Krause & Kapiloff, supra note 83, at 416. 
162. In re Raflowitz, 43 Am. Banlcr. Rep. (n.s.) 358, 361 (D. Conn. 1940) (referee 
opinion), revd., 37 F. Supp. 202 (D. Conn. 1941). 
163. See Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U.S. 441,444 (1944). 
164. Bankruptcy Act § 64a(4), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(4) (1970). 
165. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 4-405(a)(5)(A), to be discussed in part 
I(B)(2)(c) of Plumb, The Tax Recommendations of the Commission on the Banh-
ruptcy Laws-Priority and Dischargeability of Tax Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. - (1974). 
166. In re Autorama Tool & Die Co., 412 F.2d 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 
397 U.S. 1043 (1970). 
April 1974] Tax Recommendations 965 
sary for full payment of all creditors. That provision, first enacted in 
1879,167 in general bars the assessment or collection of tax on any 
insolvent bank or trust company if the result would be to diminish 
the assets available for full payment of depositors. If the precedent 
were valid at all, it would support.subordination of past, as well as 
current, tax.es to all other creditors. In fact, however, it reflects no 
concern for creditors generally, but only the special concern of 
Congress for bank depositors as a class peculiarly in need of protec-
tion.108 
The further argument has been advanced169 that requiring trus-
tees to prepare returns puts an unwarranted financial burden on 
estates and tends to defeat the prime objective of economical bank-
ruptcy administration. Nevertheless, that consideration has not mo-
tivated Congress to relax the trustee's obligation to account to the 
bankruptcy court,170 and it may be questioned whether any "legiti-
mate interest would be served by permitting the trustee to escape 
the unburdensome [further] responsibility of merely filing the re-
turns and thereby notifying the United States of the taxes that are 
due."171 The Commission had before it, however, unpublished sta-
tistics purporting to show that the net return to the Tre~ury is 
simply not worth the trouble and expense imposed on bankruptcy 
administration, since the aggregate federal tax.es paid on current in-
come of bankrupt estates, at least in the year covered by the study, 
is quite small and even that small recovery is offset to a significant 
167. Act of March 1, 1879, ch. 125, § 22, 20 Stat. 351, 
168. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7507-9(b) (1957). In some circumstances, other creditors 
may unavoidably benefit as well where state law places them on a parity with de-
positors. Treas. Reg. § 301.7507-9(b) (1957); Rev. Rul. 73-294, 1973 INT. REV. BULL. 
No. 27, at 17. 
169. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, pt. I, at 277-78. 
170. Bankruptcy Act §§ 47a(5), (12), (13), 11 U.S.C. §§ 75(a)(5), (12), (13) {1970), now 
superseded by BANKR. R. 218. 
171. See Nicholas v. United States, 384 U.S. 678, 695 (1966). It is acknowledged that 
the Court's reference to an "unburdensome responsibility" was directed to taxes other 
than the income ta.", but a more suitable approach to the peculiar problems raised 
by income tax returns might be through tax simplification, return simplification, and 
expanded taxpayer assistance directed at all taxpayers including trustees, rather than 
through exempting one class from the burden because compliance is troublesome. The 
bankruptcy trustee's special problems in ascertaining the gain on property acquired 
from the bankrupt and in including in his return the prebankruptcy portion of the 
taxable year of a bankrupt corporation are dealt with in text accompanying notes 230· 
39, 273-95 infra. In a related connection, the Commission itself has discounted the 
alarms of two referees, quoted in In re Freedomland, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 647, 650-54 
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), ret1d., 480 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.SL.W. 3415 (U.S., 
Jan. 21, 1974) (No. 73-374), that bankruptcy administration would be unduly burdened 
by having to withhold taxes on wage dividends to employees and to report such 
withholdings. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 4-405, note IO. 
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extent by the fact that such tax payments and the trustee's expenses 
of compliance reduce the amount otherwise available for federal 
claims of lower priority.172 But statistical summaries, especially when 
confined to a single year, tend to obscure individual cases in which 
the escape from tax would be far in excess of the relatively nominal 
amounts indicated by the averages,173 as illustrated by the $384,-
484.52 in tax (covering twenty-seven years in straight bankruptcy, 
during which no returns were filed) that was involved in In re 
Kirby,174 and the $492,150.33 in income that was involved (for just 
two of the nineteen years that the estate was in straight bankruptcy) 
in United States v. Metcalf.115 
Unconditional exemption, therefore, may not be the most ap-
propriate means of relieving the burden on bankruptcy administra-
tion. A large part of that burden might be relieved simply by alter-
ing the rule-although it is a rule apparently more honored in the 
breach than the observance176-that requires trustees to file returns 
even when it is obvious that no tax liability will result. The law 
( construed as heretofore discussed) now requires the trustee for 
every corporate bankrupt to file an annual income tax return even 
when the estate has neither gross nor net income177 and requires the 
trustee for a bankrupt individual or partnership to file if the estate 
has as much as 600 dollars in gross income, whether or not there is any 
net income.178 This reflects the general unwillingness of Congress to 
leave it to the taxpayer, when his gross income exceeds the minimum 
net income on which a tax would be incurred, to determine pri-
vately, without setting out his claimed deductions in a return, tliat 
his net income is insufficient to produce a tax liability. In view of 
the judicial supervision of the trustee's accounts170 and the fact that, 
as recommended by the Commission, many estates in the future may 
172. To the extent that such other taxes, if owed by individuals, arc not discharge• 
able under Bankruptcy Act § 17a(l), 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(l) (1970), however, the depletion 
of the amount available for their satisfaction from the estate may not be a true meas• 
urc of the ultimate offsetting loss to the government. 
173. A critical analysis of the statistics is found at pages 48-51 of this writer's report 
on Federal Income Tax Returns and Liabilities in Bankruptcy, in which the Commis• 
sion did not concur but which it published in part III of its Report. COMMISSION RE• 
PORT, supra note 3, pt. III, at 48-51. 
174. 62-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. 1J 9752 (S.D. Tex. 1962). 
175. 131 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 769 (1943). 
176. COMIIIISSION REPORT, supra note 3, pt. I, at 277-78. 
177. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6012(a)(2), (b)(3); Treas. Reg. § I.6012-2(a)(2) (1958); 
Treas. Reg. § I.6012-3(b)(4), T.D. 6628, 1963-1 CUM, BULL, 272,273. 
178. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6012(a)(3); Treas. Reg. § I.6012-3(a)(l)(i) (1959). See 
text accompanying notes 106-09 supra. 
179. Bankruptcy Act§§ 47a, 62a(l), 11 U.S.C. §§ 75(a), 102(a)(I) (1970). 
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be administered by government-employed professionals,18° Con-
gress might be willing to make an exception and dispense with the 
filing of returns by bankruptcy trustees when there is no net taxable 
income-although, once the trustee has made the calculations neces-
sary to negate a tax liability, it may be no more of a burden to em-
body the calculations in a return. A further salutary step might be 
to allow exemption from tax (and from return filing) on some mini-
mum amount of othenvise taxable income, the amount to be deter-
mined by Congress pragmatically in light of the expense of the trus-
tee's preparation of returns and the fact that some part (but not all) 
of the lost tax will, in any event, be made up from the creditors 
through reduction of their bad debt deductions, or more directly 
in some cases through greater recovery on lower priority tax claims. 
Whatever the merits of complete exemption from return filing 
and tax payment when incidental income is derived in the course of 
liquidation, it seems more difficult to justify the Commission's pro-
posal in so far as it relieves a trustee in straight bankruptcy from 
payment of tax on the regular operations of a business, 181 which, in 
some instances, have been known to go on for years even without 
formal authorization.182 The proposal is, in this regard, a significant 
departure from the policy firmly established by Congress for federal 
income tax purposes ever since 1916;183 that policy was strongly 
affirmed, with respect to state taxes, in 1934, when Congress, in en-
acting the predecessor of 28 ·u.S.C. § 960, declared: "No good rea-
son is perceived why a receiver should be permitted to operate un-
der such an advantage as against his competitors not in receiver~ 
180. Unless the creditors choose to elect a trustee, COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 
3, § 5-101, civil service employees of the United States Bankruptcy Administration 
would perform the functions of the trustee in liquidating bankruptcies. Id. §§ 3-102(C), 
4-301, 5-IOI(c). 
181. Id. § 5-104(a), which exempts the trustee, does not distinguish, under id. 
§ 3-303(a), which expands the investment mandate of Bankruptcy Act § 47a(2), 11 U.S.C. 
§ 75(a)(2) (1970), between income from the mere investment of funds awaiting dis-
tribution and the income from business operations, which may be authorized by the 
court under BANKR. R. 216 "for such time and on such conditions as may be in the 
best interest of the estate and consistent with orderly liquidation thereof." The bank-
ruptcy administrator, when acting as trustee under the proposed legislation, will be 
neither equipped nor authorized to operate the ongoing business of the bankrupt, 
Co1111111ss10N REPORT, supra note 3, § 3-202, note 7, other than as an incident to winding 
up, id. § 3-202(b)(3), but the proposal contemplates that the court may, in such cases, 
direct the administrator to designate a receiver to operate the business. Id. § 4-302(a). 
Although the proposed tax exemption extends only to the "trustee" and not to a re-
ceiver, the latter would probably share the exemption as an agency of the trustee. · 
182. E.g., United States v. Metcalf, 131 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 
U.S. 769 (1943). 
183. See text accompanying note 26 supra. 
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ship."184 In more recent provisions, which relate to businesses owned 
by charitable, educational, and religious organizations, Congress has 
further evidenced its strong concern about the unfair competitive 
advantage gained when a business is conducted under the shelter 
of an income tax exemption and is thus enabled to expand or to 
engage in price-cutting at the expense of others whose profit margin 
is eroded by tax.es.185 While a business that is in bankruptcy or un-
dergoing reorganization or rehabilitation is subject to a severe eco-
nomic disadvantage, the practical effect of income tax exemption 
is-felt only when the estate has realized profits (and, in the case of a 
corporate bankrupt, sufficient profits to absorb loss carryovers avail• 
able from the preceding five years). "No good reason is perceived" 
why at that point, merely on the ground that the creditors-in effect 
the equitable owners of the estate under administration180-have not 
recovered their stake in the enterprise, the estate should be favored 
over the owners of other enterprises, which are subjected to tax on 
their current income whether or not their invested capital is im-
paired.187 Therefore, any exemption (other than of a relatively nom-
inal amount of income) that Congress may determine to provide 
should at least except cases where the trustee is "operating" or "con-
ducting" a business.188 
The Commission, in effect, acknowledged that principle in part 
by not extending the proposed exemption to the operating income 
(as distinguished from income from sales out of the ordinary course 
of business189) of estates in reorganization and rehabilitation pro-
184. H.R. REP. No. 1138, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934); S. REP. No. 1372, 73d Cong., 
2d Sess. 1 (1934). 
185. H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1950); S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 
2d Sess. 28 (1950). See also U.S. TREASURY DEPT., REPORT ON PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS [TO 
nm SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 89rn CoNG., lsr SESS.] 31-42 (Comm. Print 1965), which 
recites numerous instances in which taxable businesses were "placed at a serious com-
petitive disadvantage" that led Congress to tighten substantially the corrective provi-
sions, INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 511-14, in the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No, 91-
172, 83 Stat. 487. For the view that "the arguments about unfair competition [that 
results from tax exemption of businesses owned by charities, cooperatives, and mutuals] 
are based on economic theory that is at best naive and incomplete and is most likely 
just plain wrong,'' Klein, Income Taxation and Legal Entities, 20 UCLA L. REv. 18, 
61 (1972), see id. at 59-68. However, the premises of Professor Klein's argument rest 
on the peculiar nature of those entities and would not appear to be applicable where 
both competitors are private business corporations. 
186. See Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179, 183·84 (1942), 
187. Except in the cancellation-of-indebtedness area, the existing solvency or in-
solvency of the taxpayer has no bearing on the taxability of income actually realized. 
Home Builders Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 1009, 1011 (5th Cir, 1948); 
Parkford v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 249, 251 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 741 (1943). 
188. Cf. text accompanying notes 12, 26 supra. 
189. See text accompanying notes 242-72 infra. 
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ceedings. It wisely ignored the recent ill-considered resolution of 
the National Bankruptcy Conference that, while likewise leaving 
such estates taxable on operating income, would have relieved the 
trustees of any obligation to file income tax returns.190 Exemption 
from filing returns is supportable in circumstances in which tax is 
not to be imposed at all, but it seems impossible to justify abroga-
tion of the return requirement where ordinary business operations 
are intended to remain taxable. It is unclear who, if anyone, would 
be expected, under the Conference proposal, to make formal dis-
closure of such operating profits. It is hardly to be supposed that 
the debtor, divorced from his funds, business, personnel, and books, 
could prepare and verify a return of the trustee's operations.191 It 
must have been contemplated by the Conference, therefore, that the 
Service, in order to determine ·whether the estate had net income 
subject to tax, would be required to delve directly into the books 
and records of the estate without the aid of a verified declaration by 
the fiduciary conducting the operation. A fundamental character-
istic of the income tax system, however, is that the tax is "self-
assessed" in the first instance and that ( except in cases of unlawful 
failure to file returns) the starting point for an audit is the tax.-
payer's own declaration of his income and deduc?ons.192 
2. Deductions Allowable to the Trustee 
One referee has referred to the "myriad of unresolved questions 
of deductions" as one reason why Congress could never have in-
tended to subject nonoperating bankrupt estates to the burden of 
filing income tax returns.193 The proper remedy for such uncer-
tainties, however, would seem to be, not to exempt the trustee from 
tax (except in the case of estates with minimal income), but to direct 
attention to removal of the uncertainties. Even if the Commission's 
190. National l3ankruptcy Conference, Summary of Proceedings, Oct. 26-28, 1972, 
at 5 (Resolution No. 3) [copy is on file with the Michigan Law Review]. 
191. Although the referee in In re Town Crier l3ottling Co., 123 F. Supp. 588, 592 
(E.D. Mo. 1954), expressed the view that "the government has the legal right to com-
pel corporate officers to file the returns," that seems an unrealistic view. See text ac-
companying notes 230-35 infra. In any event, that was a straight bankruptcy case and 
involved returns for periods before the proceeding. · 
192. In re Statmaster Corp., 465 F.2d 978, 980-81 (5th Cir. 1972). See Commissioner 
v. Lane-Wells Co., 321 U.S. 219, 223 (19#). Cf. United States v. Harrison, 72-2 U.S. 
Tax Cas. ,r 9573 (E.D.N.Y.), affd. per curiam, 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ,r 9295 (2d Cir. 1972), 
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 965 (1973) (holding a taxpayer criminally responsible for failure 
to file a return, despite his claim that the Service could have reconstructed his taxable 
income from a mass of data available to it). 
193. In re Statmaster Corp., 332 F. Supp. 1248, 1258-59 (S.D. Fla.) (referee opinion), 
revd. on other grounds, 332 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D. Fla. 1971), affd., 465 F.2d 978 (5th Cir. 
1972). 
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exemption proposal is adopted, these ambiguities will remain a 
problem in those situations (reorganization, rehabilitation, and 
solvent straight bankruptcy cases) where tax is still to be imposed; 
the Commission, however, made no recommendations on this 
matter.194 
a. Administration expenses. The estate of a bankrupt individual 
or partnership, like a decedent's estate or a trust, is entitled, under 
section 64l(b) of the Code, to the same deductions that are provided 
for individuals (with some differences expressly provided for).10u 
Such deductions include "all the ordinary anti necessary expenses 
•.. in carrying on any trade or business" (section 162(a)) and "all 
the ordinary and necessary expenses ..• (1) for the production or 
collection of income; (2) for the management, conservation, or main-
tenance of property held for the production of income; or (3) in 
connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax" 
(section 212). 
The first regulation under the predecessor of section 212 was 
enacted in 1942 and provided: 
The ordinary expenditures incurred in a receivership or bank-
ruptcy proceeding are not deductible. Such expenditures include 
expenditures of administration incurred in the performance of the 
ordinary duties of a receiver or trustee in bankruptcy, as, for example, 
fees paid to the attorney for the petitioning creditors, fees paid to the 
appraisers, and disbursements which are made in connection with 
the proceeding and which look toward the collection of assets and 
their preservation pending ultimate distribution to the parties en• 
titled thereto.196 
In Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner,191 however, the Supreme 
Court held that expenses incurred in connection with the distribu-
tion of a trust at its termination were just as much a part of the man-
agement of the income-producing property of the trust as those 
directly concerned with production of the income. Thereupon, the 
above quoted paragraph of the regulation and others equally in-
consistent with the Bingham rationale were stricken out and the fol-
lowing was substituted: 
Reasonable amounts paid or incurred by the fiduciary of an es-
tate or trust on account of administration expenses, including fidu-
194. The Commission's recommendation concerning the trustee's use of the debtor's 
loss carryovers is discussed in text accompanying notes 484-93 infra. 
195. Treas. Reg. § l.64l(b), T .D. 7177, 1971-2 CUM. BULL. 5, 56. 
196. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23(a)-15(b), T .D, 5196, 1942-2 CUM. BULL, 96, 99 (em• 
phasis added); Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23(a)-15(b) (1948) (emphasis added). 
197. 825 U.S. 865, 372-75 (1945). 
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ciaries' fees and expenses of litigation, which are ordinary and neces-
sary in connection with the performance of the duties of administra-
tion are deductible under this section, notwithstanding that the es-
tate or trust is not engaged in a trade or business, except to the extent 
that such expenses are allocable to the production or collection of 
tax-exempt income.19s 
In Revenue Ruling 68-48, it was declared that, where a trustee 
in bankruptcy of a partnership does not operate the business, the 
trustee may deduct under section 212 the estate's payments for com-
pensation of the referee, the trustee, the trustee's attorneys and ac-
countants, the bankrupt's attorney, and the attorneys for the petition-
ing creditors, as well as the trustee's bond premium, charges of court 
reporting and transcripts, and the filing costs of petitioning creditors, 
"if and to the extent that, they are paid for services rendered for the 
production and collection of income, for the management, conserva-
tion, or maintenance of property held for the production of income, 
or in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any 
tax for the estate in bankruptcy."199 The italicized qualification of 
the generality of the ruling, while following the language of the 
statute, drains the ruling of practical utility to the trustees in deter-
mining the circumstances in which the enumerated items of expendi-
tures are deemed to be made for the purposes stated. There have 
been disturbing indications, in fact, that the Service has been revert-
ing to the strict position it took in I.T. 2004,200 an ancient ruling 
the substance of which had been embodied in the 1942 regulation201 
that was repudiated in the Bingham decision and ~xpunged in 
1946.202 
While the present regulation denies deduction of the portion of 
administration expenses allocable to exempt income (as section 265 
198. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23(a)-15(b), T .D. 5513, 1946-1 Cu111. BULL, 61, 61-62. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.212-l(i) (1957) reaches the same result. 
199. 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 301, 302 (emphasis added). 
200. Ill-I CuM. BULL. 292 (1924). The ruling held that administrative expenses of 
a receiver, including fees paid to the appraiser, the attorney for the petitioning cred-
itors, and the attorney for the receiver, unless related to the conduct of the bankrupt's 
business, were not deductible. 
201. See text accompanying note 196 supra. 
202. The Chief of the General Litigation Division of the Internal Revenue Chief 
Counsel's Office, who is responsible for bankruptcy matters and the putative father 
of Rev. Rul. 68-48, after expounding on the ruling in a talk to the National Con-
ference of Referees in Bankruptcy soon after its promulgation, added cryptically, 
"However, limitations may e.xist as indicated in I.T. 2004.'' Feigenbaum, supra note 
33, at 77. In addition, a very recent decision, although it involved a corporate bank-
rupt and hence arose under section 162 rather than section 212, viewed I.T. 2004 as 
viable authority. See Narragansett Wire Co. v. Commissioner, 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 
11 9234 (1st Cir. 1974). 
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of the Code prescribes), neither that regulation nor any decision 
that has been found prescribes that the property of the estate be 
income-producing at all-although this prescription may be im-
plicit from section 212, on which the regulation rests.203 Like many 
decedents' estates, a bankrupt estate may consist primarily or en-
tirely of a residence, an automobile, and nonexempt personal ef-
fects, and very little of the trustee's commissions and expenses may 
be attributable to interest earned on time deposits, gains on sales 
of property, or the like, which may be the estate's only gross income. 
Nevertheless, every asset in the bankrupt estate, of whatever nature, 
is held for the purpose of sale or other realization for the benefit of 
creditors-for whom the trustee acts, as well as for the bankrupt201 
-with the object either of collecting the ta."{able income from their 
transactions ·with the bankrupt or of minimizing their bad debt 
losses.205 It is true that the bankrupt himself could not convert an 
asset in personal use into one held for income production merely by 
ceasing to use it and putting it up for sale.200 But the trustee for a 
bankrupt individual is a separate taxable entity, and the purpose of 
his holding must be judged independently of the manner in which 
the property was held by the bankrupt.207 
The task of the trustee for a noncorporate bankrupt in deter-
mining his tax liability would be eased by declaring I.T. 2004 ob-
solete208 and by striking out the meaningless qualification italicized 
in the above quotation209 from Revenue Ruling 68-48. These actions 
would be supported by the present regulation, which appears to 
have determined unqualifiedly that the statutory requirements are 
inherently satisfied by expenses that are reasonable, ordinary, and 
necessary in connection with the performance of the duties of ad-
ministration of an estate.210 If changes in the rulings are not made, 
amendment of the statute may be in order. 
203. Cf. Whittemore v. United States, 383 F.2d 824, 830 (8th Cir. 1967); Alfred I. 
duPont Testamentary Trust, [1974 Transfer Binder] P-H TAX Cr. REP. 1J 62.6. 
204. Mascot Stove Co. v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 153, 156 (6th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 
315 U.S. 802 (1942); Imperial Assurance Co. v. Livingston, 49 F.2d 745, 748-49 (8th 
Cir. 1931). 
205. The minimization of a deductible loss is a purpose recognized as income-
producing under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 212. Treas, Reg. § 1.212-l(b) (1957). 
206. May v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 725 (4th Cir. 1962); Frank A. Newcombe, 54 
T.C. 1298 (1970). 
207. Cf. Aero Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 334 F.2d 40, 43 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 
379 U.S. 887 (1964); Estate of Jacques Ferber, 22 T.C. 261 (1954). 
208. The program of reviewing old rulings to identify those that are no longer 
determinative because of changes in law, regulations, or court decisions is described 
in Rev. Proc. 67-6, 1967-1 CUM. BULL. 576. 
209. See text accompanying note 199 supra. 
210. See text accompanying note 198 supra. 
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The trustee for a corporate bankrupt is subject to the tax pro-
visions applicable to corporations,211 to which section 212 of the 
Code, the Bingham decision, and the Bingham-inspired regulation212 
do not apply. Therefore, such a trustee's expense deductions, apart 
from such items as taxes and interest, which are specially treated, 
must qualify under section 162 as "ordinary and necessary expenses 
.•. in carrying on any trade or business." The First Circuit has re-
cently held, therefore, in a case involving a receivership that was en-
gaged, not in "carrying on," but only in liquidating the corporate 
business, that the expenses of the receivership cannot be deducted.213 
Yet, it has long been settled that the final "ordinary and necessary" 
step in the carrying on of a corporate business is its liquidation and 
that the expenses thereof are properly deductible under section 
162.214 Since the trustee for a corporation is not a distinct taxable 
entity but stands in the shoes of the corporation,216 he should have 
the same right to deduct liquidation expenses as the corporation 
would have in the absence of bankruptcy.216 
b. Deduction for distributions to creditors. The trustee in bank-
ruptcy for an individual or a partnership, as we have seen, is taxed 
as an "estate" under section 641.217 In general, an estate has always 
been treated as a conduit for tax purposes, in that it is allowed a de-
duction for certain distributions that are taxed to its beneficiaries.218 
With the enactment of sections 661 and 662 of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1954, all distributions (with exceptions in section 663 that 
211. See text accompanying notes 26-104 supra. 
212. See text accompanying note 198 supra. 
213. Narragansett Wire Co. v. Commissioner, 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 11 9234 (1st Cir. 
1974), which relied on I.T. 2004, III-I CuM. BuLL. 292 (1924). See note 200 supra. 
214. Commissioner v. Wayne Coal Mining Co., 209 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1954); Pacific 
Coast Biscuit Co., 32 B.T .A. 39 (1935), acquiesced in, 1954-1 CuM. BuLL. 6. Direct 
expenses of sales of assets, however, would ordinarily be offset against the proceeds. 
See cases reviewed in Of Course, Inc., 59 T.C. 146 (1972). 
215. See text accompanying notes 75-104 supra. 
216. Concerning the trustee's right to deduct expenses paid by him but incurred 
before bankruptcy, see text accompanying notes 226-29 infra. 
217. See text accompanying notes 105-34 supra. 
218. In G.C.M. 24617, 1945-1 CuM. Buu.. 235, however, it was ruled that a bank-
rupt estate was not entitled to a deduction for distributions to creditors "because 
such distributions represent[ed] capital payments," which were not deductible under 
section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939; authority for the ruling was Helver-
ing v. Pardee [sic; actual name-Helvering v. Butterworth], 290 U.S. 365, 370 (1933), 
which held that an annuity payable without regard to the availability of income was 
not a distribution of income within the meaning of a corresponding provision of 
earlier law. The Pardee principle, however, was totally abandoned with the enactment 
of sections 661 and 662 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. See text accompanying 
note 219 infra. The specific application of the principle that was involved in the 
Pardee case had earlier been repudiated by section 110 of the Revenue Act of 1942, 
ch. 619, § 110, 56 Stat. 808. 
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are not pertinent) were to be deductible by the estate and taxable 
to the beneficiaries, to the extent that the estate had distributable net 
income, even if the distribution came from the corpus and had no 
relation to the beneficiary's interest in income of the estate,210 Never-
theless, Revenue Ruling 68-48220 rules that a bankruptcy trustee's dis-
tributions are not deductible under section 661 because that section 
applies only to distributions to "beneficiaries," and creditors are not 
deemed to be such, In support of that conclusion, the ruling cites 
Thom(J,S Lonergan Trust,221 which had so held under earlier terms 
of the law,222 and section 643(c), which provides that "the term 
'beneficiary' includes heir, legatee, devisee"; it notes that creditors 
"do not fall within this definition," even though the law further 
provjdes that the word "includes" does not "exclude other things 
otherwise within the meaning of the term defined."223 Nevertheless, 
while it might be argued that the only "benefici,nies" of a bank-
rupt estate are the creditors, they may say a silent prayer of thanks-
giving that they are not so treated. The distortions reflected in 
Harkness v. United States,224 which arose from disproportionate dis-
tributions by a decedent's estate and which might be mirrored in 
the case of a bankrupt estate if priorities or late filing of claims 
caused disproportionate distributions among creditors, as well as 
the possibility of double taxation of income or income taxation of 
capital recQveries,225 are reason enough for such thanks. 
A crucial unanswered question, however, is whether the estate 
of a bankrupt individual or partnership is entitled to deduct its 
payments to the bankrupt's creditors of expenses and similar obliga-
tions that accrued or had their origin before bankruptcy but that 
had not theretofore become deductible under the bankrupt's ac-
counting method. Walter Feigenbaum has stated that deductions 
''probably would be allowed to the trustee'' for distributions allo-
cable to obligations that would have been deductible if paid by the 
219. See Harkness v. United States, 469 F.2d 310 (Ct. Cl. 1972), cert, denied, 414 
U.S. 820 (1973). 
220. 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 301, 303. 
221. 1968-1 Cul\J. BULL. at 303, citing 6 T.C, 715 (1946). 
222. At that time, only distributions out of income were taxable to beneficiaries. 
See note 218 supra. 
223. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 770l(b). 
224. 469 F.2d 310 (Ct. Cl. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 820 (1973). In Harlmess, 
corpus distribution~ to the widow, out of proportion to her testamentary share in the 
income of the estate, caused her to be taxed on more of the estate's income than she 
was ~ntitled to receive. 
225, As envisioned in Krause&: Kapiloff, supra note 83, at 410-l2, 
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bankrupt,226 but he cites no authorities, and those that exist suggest 
the contrary. The above-cited rulings, which deem distributions to 
creditors to be nondeductible "capital payments," relate only to 
distributions of "the amount by which the estate's income exceeds 
its expenses" and fail to define what expenses may be allowable to 
the trustee.227 The bankrupt estate, although succeeding to the busi-
ness of the individual or partnership, is, nevertheless, a distinct tax-
able entity,228 and analogous precedents treating as nondeductible 
capital expenditures (in the absence of express statutory provision 
for their deductibility) the payment of a predecessor's expenses by 
transferees, even after tax-free transactions, cast doubt on the trus-
tee's right to deductions in this situation.229 
3. Taxable Year of the Corporate Bankrupt 
We have seen that, at least in the view of the Service, the taxable 
year during which a corporation becomes bankrupt is deemed to 
be one unbroken accounting period, 236 so that the trustee, having 
assumed the responsibilities of management before the end of the 
period, must reconstruct-often from the disordered books and 
records of a failing corporation-the taxable income or loss arising 
before he assumed control. 231 Referees have expressed the view that 
226. Feigenbaum, supra note 33, at 77. See note 202 supra. 
227. G.C.M. 24617, 1945-1 CUM. BULL. 235,236; Rev. Rul. 68-48, 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 
301,303. 
228. See text accompanying notes 106-34 supra. 
229. Corporate transferees in tax-free transactions were denied deductions for 
such expense payments in Birmingham Business College v. Commissioner, 276 F.2d 
476, 481 (5th Cir. 1960); Holdcroft Transp. Co. v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 
1946); Commissioner v. Breyer, 151 F.2d 267, 272 (3d Cir. 1945); Merchants Bank Bldg. 
Co. v. Helvering, 84 F.2d 478 (8th Cir. 1936); Falk Corp. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 204 
(7th Cir. 1932). Succession to such deductions is now provided in the case of certain 
intercorporate transfers. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 38I(c)(4), (16); Treas. Reg. 
§§ I.38l(c)(4)-l(a)(l)(ii), I.38l(c)(l6)-l(a)(2) (1964). The estate of a decedent (to which 
the bankrupt estate is analogized, see text accompanying notes 106-09 supra) was denied 
deduction for the decedent's expenses paid after death in John M. Brown, 11 B.T .A. 
1203 (1928), before such succession was expressly provided for by INT. REv. CODE OF 
1954, § 69l(b) (which is confined to estates of decedents). 
However, it will be suggested hereafter, in connection with the calculation of the 
bankrupt's own tax liabilities, that it may be more appropriate to take amounts paid 
by the trustee, and not theretofore deductible by the bankrupt, into account in the 
bankrupt's own tax for the period terminating with bankruptcy, rather than to allow 
such deductions in computing the estate's own tax liability, if any; such action will 
result either in a loss carryover to be used by the estate or in the reduction of a 
claim for prebankruptcy tax liability. See text accompanying notes 386-441 infra. 
230. See text accompanying notes 91-104 supra. 
231. More often than not, of course, a loss will be discovered and the trustee may 
be motivated to reconstruct the figures if there were any recent profitable years against 
which to carry the loss back. Nevertheless, sales of assets before bankruptcy might 
have resulted in a taxable income. 
976 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 72:935 
the trustee should not be required to sign, under the penalties of 
perjury,232 a return embracing a period concerning which he has 
no personal knowledge and that the court may instead order the 
corporation or "the principals of the corporation" to prepare and 
file a return for that period;233 this seems to overlook the fact that 
the corporate officers and accounting personnel will no longer be 
on the payroll, unless on that of the trustee, and that, while they 
may be required to give information, they can hardly be expected 
to undertake without compensation the task of preparing a return 
that, by law, is not their obligation but that of their former em-
ployer. Congress has elected to charge the trustee, as one of his 
duties, with the obligation to prepare the return "for such corpora-
tion,"234 and, since the trustee will have or can get possession of 
the books and records,235 such as they are, and will be employing 
the personnel who remain connected with the business, he 
is the only one in a position to make a return covering that pe-
riod. The trustee's possible ignorance of the results of the pre-
bankruptcy period is no greater than that of, for example, the ad-
ministrator of a decedent's estate, and he will not be penalized if 
he bases an honest report on the information available to him or ob-
tainable through the processes of the bankruptcy court. 
The Commission, however, has taken the pragmatic view that 
there will too rarely be a tax liability resulting from operations of 
the last months of a corporation's plunge toward bankruptcy to 
warrant imposing on the trustee the administrative burden of pre-
paring a return for that period. Therefore, in addition to relieving 
the trustee in a straight bankruptcy case both of filing returns and 
of paying tax (in most circumstances) for the period of the bank-
ruptcy, the Commission would relieve him of filing returns for the 
bankrupt corporation itself for any period.236 It would, however, 
terminate the corporation's taxable year at the date of bankruptcy237 
and thus permit the Service, if it believes the results may repay the 
232. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 6062, 6065; Treas. Reg. § 1.6065-l(a) (1960). 
233. In re Statmaster Corp., 332 F. Supp. 1248, 1259, 1261 (S.D. Fla.) (referee 
opinion), revd. on other grounds, 332 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D. Fla. 1971), affd., 465 FJ?d 
978 (5th Cir. 1972). Cf. In re Town Crier Bottling Co., 123 F. Supp. 588, 592 (E.D. 
Mo.1954). 
234. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6012(b)(3). 
235. BANKR. R. 108, 205, 402; Bankruptcy Act § 14c, 11 U.S.C. § 32(c) (1970); COM· 
MISSION REPORT, supra note 3, §§ 4-313, -502, -505. See Dier v. Banton, 262 U.S. 147 
(1923); Ex parte Fuller, 262 U.S. 91 (1923); Kaufman v. Hurwitz, 176 FJ?d 210 (4th Cir, 
1949). 
236. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 5-104(a). 
237. Id.§ 5-104(b). 
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effort, to audit the prebankruptcy period unaided by a return238 and 
to make claim for any tax it may determine.239 · 
If the Commission's proposal to exempt the bankrupt estate from 
tax is not adopted, the proposed division of the taxable year of the 
debtor corporation, however convenient it may be for the trustee 
who is relieved of responsibility for the earlier period, should also be 
reconsidered. If the estate later enjoys taxable income against which 
the loss carryovers of the debtor might be offset, the division of the 
year of bankruptcy into two taxable periods would impose an un-
warranted penalty, since each such short period is considered a 
"taxable year," and the normal period of five "taxable years" dur-
ing which the debtor's loss carryovers may be availed of would be 
reduced by one year.240 
A similar question of dividing the taxable year arises in non-
corporate cases but, since that has no effect on the obligations of the 
trustee, it will be considered at a later point.241 
4. Gains and Losses on Sales of the Bankrupt's Property 
a. Exemption of gains and denial of losses. The Commission, 
while not extending to trustees, receivers, and debtors in possession 
in reorganization and similar proceedings the same qualified exemp-
tion from all taxation of income that it would provide in straight 
bankruptcy cases, proposes that, subject to recoupment of the tax 
saving for the benefit of the Government if an equity is ultimately 
found to exist for the debtor or the shareholders, such fiduciaries 
and debtors be exempt from federal, state, or local tax on gains from 
sales of property made during the pendency of the proceeding or 
pursuant to the plan, other than in the ordinary course of business.242 
Except perhaps in a prolonged proceeding, such gains would gen-
238. Cf. te.xt accompanying note 192 supra. 
239. A salutary effect of the Commission's proposal to close the corporation's tax-
able year at bankruptcy is that it would rectify the existing rule, formulated in 
Florida Natl. Bank v. United States, 87 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1937), that the tax (if any is 
incurred) for the entire year becomes an administration expense allowable on a parity 
with expenses incurred by the trustee and ahead of wages and state and local taxes, 
even though the part attributable to prebankruptcy transactions is as much "rooted 
in the pre-bankruptcy past," see text accompanying note 462 infra, as any fourth 
priority tax. This effect will be discussed, along with other priority questions, in part 
I(B)(2)(a) of Plumb, supra note 165. 
240. See Treas. Reg. § l.172-4(a)(2) (1956). Cf. the illustration in Treas. Reg. 
§ l.38l(c)(l)-l(e)(3) (1960). The tax for the full year should nevertheless be divided for 
priority purposes. See note 239 supra. 
241. See text accompanying notes 319-35 infra. 
242. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 7-315(c). Losses on such sales would also 
be disallowed. 
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erally result from appreciation in value that occurred prior to the 
proceeding or from a low basis that reflected depreciation or deple-
tion deductions previously taken by the debtor,243 and it is regarded 
as inequitable to deplete the proceeds available for satisfaction of 
creditors by a tax on such gains. 
Although the question before the referee in In re Statmaster 
Corp.244 concerned only the taxability of a liquidating trustee for a 
corporate bankrupt on interest earned during the proceeding, the 
referee's extended discussion of the "dramatic change" that would 
result in the substantive law if the trustee were subjected to income 
tax at all245 included an expression of the rationale for exemption 
from tax on gains on sales: 
[I]n cases of sale of tangible assets by a liquidating trustee where a 
capital gain would occur because of a low basis stemming from the 
time when the bankrupt acquired the property ... [taxation of the 
gain to the trustee] is highly inequitable, inasmuch as the creditors 
would have incurred no such tax burden if the bankrupt had simply 
transferred the assets directly to them. A creditor who has supplied 
goods and is not paid in full for them has suffered a capital loss [and 
taxation of the estate's gain] could lead to the spectacle of the gen-
eral creditors of the bankrupt indirectly paying a capital gains tax 
upon their capital Iossl246 
Actually, of course, the creditors themselves incur no tax (except 
in so far as their claims include previously untaxed income), whether 
the property is sold pursuant to a proceeding under the Bankruptcy 
Act or the debtor simply transfers his property directly to the cred-
itors. Whether the imposition of tax is "inequitable" in the former 
circumstance-or any more "inequitable" than the general priority 
of tax claims over unsecured creditors-depends, therefore, on the 
validity of the premise that taxing the trustee causes a greater ero-
sion of assets available to creditors than would have resulted from 
a direct transfer. That requires consideration of (1) whether a di-
rect transfer by the debtor would have been taxable; (2) whether the 
debtor's loss carryovers, if unavailable to the trustee, would have 
minimized the tax, if any, payable by the debtor; and (3) whether 
, 243. Trustees for both corporate and individual bankrupts use the same asset basis 
as the debtor. See text accompanying notes 273-80 infra, In fact, in the case of debtor 
relief and reorganization proceedings, whether corporate or individual, the debtor con-
tinues to be the taxpayer against whom the tax is assessed. See notes 142-46 supra and 
accompanying text. 
244. 332 F. Supp. 1248, 1250-62 (S.D. Fla.) (referee opinion), revd. on other 
grounds, 332 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D. Fla. 1971), afjd., 465 F.2d 978 (5th Cir. 1972). 
245. See text accompanying notes 44-55 supra. 
246. 332 F. Supp. at 1260. 
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the creditors might, in effect, have enjoyed a preference over any 
tax payable by the debtor. 
(I) As a general rule, it is well established that one who transfers 
property to his creditor in satisfaction of an obligation is taxable, or 
realizes a loss, on the difference between the value of the property 
and its basis, exactly as if he had sold the property and used the 
proceeds to pay his debt.247 Ordinarily, the fact that a person is 
insolvent and still has a negative net worth after realizing certain 
income does not affect the income's taxability.248 Logically, the tax-
ability of the quasisale with which we are here concerned should 
no more be affected by the insolvency of the debtor than if the in-
solvent had first sold the property and then assigned the proceeds 
to his creditors, a transaction that was held taxable in Home Build-
ers Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, where the court said, "Both the 
solvent and the insolvent may receive profits and be liable for the 
tax thereon .... (I]t is immaterial whether or not the proceeds of 
the sale were sufficient to pay the indebtedness of the taxpayer in 
full."249 In one exceptional situation, the solvency of the taxpayer 
has a direct bearing on the taxability of income. When an indebted-
ness of the taxpayer is forgiven in whole or in part, he may be taxed 
thereon (in the absence of an applicable exemption) on the ground 
that he has "improved his net worth,"250 and, if he repurchases a 
bond or other obligation for less than he had received upon its is-
suance, he is taxed because the transaction "made available . . . 
assets previously offset by the obligation ... now extinct."251 But 
if the taxpayer is insolvent after, as well as before, such transaction, 
there is no improvement in net worth, and no net assets are freed 
from the claims of creditors, so the justification for taxability is 
deemed not to exist. Whatever advantage the taxpayer may have 
enjoyed, by the initial receipt of funds, property, or services for 
which he need no longer pay, has already vanished with his insol-
vency.262 To the extent, however, that actual, existing property 
247. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962); United States v. General Shoe 
Corp., 282 F.2d 9, 12 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 843 (1961); Lutz &: Schramm 
Co., 1 T.C. 682, 688-89 (1943); Carlisle Packing Co., 29 B.T .A. 514 (1933). 
248. Parkford v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 249, 251 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 
741 (1943) (compensation taxed to earner although collected by his trustee in bank-
ruptcy). 
249. 165 F.2d 1009, 1011 (5th Cir. 1948). 
250. Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 38 (1949). 
251. United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1931). 
252. See Dallas Transfer &: Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, 70 F.2d 
95 (5th Cir. 1934); Commissioner v. Simmons Gin Co., 43 F.2d 327 (10th Cir. 1930); 
Rev. Rul. 58-600, 1958-2 CUM. BULL. 29. 
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values-not vanished values-are applied toward the debt, no for-
giveness or cancellation of indebtedness is involved, and the in-
solvency of the debtor should be irrelevant to taxability of the re-
sulting gain.253 In Dallas Transfer & Terminal Warehouse Co. v. 
Commissioner,254 the insolvent taxpayer had transferred property to 
its creditor in return for cancellation of indebtedness. The taxpayer 
had conceded in the trial court255 that it was taxable on the differ-
ence between its basis and the actual fair market value of the prop-
erty applied in satisfaction of its debt, and it was only the excess of 
the indebtedness over such value (which was forgiven, not satisfied) 
that was held nontaxable because of the taxpayer's insolvency. On 
the other hand, in Main Properties, lnc.,256 in which the Commis-
sioner acquiesced,257 the· insolvent taxpayer was not taxed on any 
gain on its transfer of a building and leaseholds, with a value of 
$260,256.72 and a basis of $212,182.02, in return for the cancellation 
of $600,000 in bonds. Under the foregoing reasoning, there should 
have been a taxable gain of $48,074.70, and the Court's failure to 
tax any gain might be deemed a rejection of such analysis. But the 
Court's attention was fixed on the Commissioner's claim that the 
entire excess of the $600,000 debt over the basis of the property was 
taxable, and the Court did not address itself to the possibility that a 
lesser amount might be taxed on a different theory. Therefore, 
neither the decision nor the Commissioner's acquiescence therein 
can be regarded as authority that the insolvency rule would exempt 
from tax the actual appreciation in value of property applied by the 
debtor himself in satisfaction of his debts, or as supporting the ar-
gument that the trustee should, accordingly, also be exempted.21i8 
"Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the 
253. Cf. J.K. McAlpine Land &: Dev. Co., 43 B.T.A. 520, 526·27 (1941), affd. on 
other issues, 126 F.2d 163 (9th Cir. 1942), 
254. 70 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1934). 
255. 27 B.T .A. 651, 656 (1933). 
256. 4 T.C. 364, 383 (1944). 
257. 1945 CUM. BULL. 5. 
258. Although Texas Gas Distrib. Co., 3 T.C. 57 (1944), has also been cited on 
this question, it is not authority thereon. That taxpayer conveyed its assets, subject 
to a $400,000 lien, for $14,610 in cash (concededly taxable) and the assumption of 
other liabilities of $108,649. Since the aggregate of the cash and liabilities exceeded 
the taxpayer's cost of $455,155.82 by $68,103.18, the Commissioner sought to tax that 
amount as gain. The Tax Court held the taxpayer nontaxable on its relief from in• 
debtedness that exceeded the value of its assets. However, since the court also found 
such value to be only $235,000, which was less than the taxpayer's cost, the question 
whether insolvency would have relieved it from tax if the value had been as great as 
the Commissioner contended was not resolved. 
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attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as 
having been so decided as to constitute precedents."259 
(2) Krause and Kapiloff, on whom the Statmaster referee relied 
in asserting inequity to creditors,260 actually made no claim that tJ?.e 
debtor would not have been taxable if he had transferred appre-
ciated assets to creditors. Rather, they pointed out that, if the bank-
rupt is an individual or a partnership (rather than a corporation, as 
in Statmaster, where their argument was misapplied), the trustee's 
tax may be greater than the debtor's would have been because of 
the unavailability to the trustee of the debtor's loss carryovers,261 a 
deficiency in the law that is more appropriately dealt with by mak-
ing such carryovers available to the trustee than by wholly exempt-
ing the gain.262 
(3) A further, but generally unspoken, practical difference is that, 
if the debtor, without making provision for payment of tax on the 
gain, had simply transferred all his nonexempt property to his cred-
itors, the tax he incurred on the resulting gain would have gone 
unsatisfied, and the creditors would have received correspondingly 
more than they receive in bankruptcy. That difference, however, 
reflects only the unpleasant fact of life that the occurrence of bank-
ruptcy precludes preferences and requires that the debtor's obliga-
tions be satisfied in the prescribed order of priority;263 while the 
creditors might have escaped with their preference if events had 
taken a different course,264 they can hardly complain of inequity 
when bankruptcy forestalls them. 
259. Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507,511 (1925). 
260. 332 F. Supp. at 1260, citing Krause & Kapiloff, supra note 83, at 417-18. 
261. "While the debtor would not have to pay the tax because he could use his 
business losses to offset the income, the bankrupt estate (of an individual] does not 
have a similar right to use the debtor's pre-bankruptcy business losses to offset any 
income it realizes. The Government receives a tax windfall by virtue of the bankruptcy 
proceedings, which is at the expense of the creditors." Krause & Kapiloff, supra note 
83, at 417-18 (emphasis added). 
262. See text accompanying notes 484-93 infia. Although Krause & Kapiloff, 
on broader grounds, urged total exemption of the trustee from tax, their alternative, 
if full exemption were denied, was, not to exempt the gain on the sale as such, but 
to allow the trustee "all of the tax benefits to pe derived from a debtor's pre-bank-
ruptcy history of operating losses." Krause & Kapiloff, supra note 83, at 418. Actually, 
even where the debtor is an individual, in the rehabilitation cases with which we are 
here concerned the estate is not considered a taxable entity separate from the debtor, 
see text accompanying notes 142-46 supra, and the inequity envisioned by those 
authors would not arise. 
263. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act §§ 60, 64, 11 U.S.C. §§ 96, 104 (1970). Cf. Sampsell v. 
Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215,219 (1941). 
264. See, e.g., Hartman v. Lauchli, 238 F.2d 881, 886-88 (8th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 
353 U.S. 965 (1957). 
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The unsoundness of the proposal is underscored by the fact that 
there is complete continuity for tax purposes between the debtor, 
the estate, and the corporation (if any) that is "organized or made 
use of for effectuating a plan." The trustee (or debtor in possession) 
stands in the tax shoes of the debtor, whether corporate or individ-
ual, and the law expressly directs that all tax.es that become owing 
during administration shall be assessed against and paid by the 
debtor or the successor.265 Both the estate266 and the successor cor-
poration267 have the same asset basis as the debtor, the premise being 
that the creditors step into the shoes of the shareholders in the own-
ership of the reorganized or rehabilitated corporation.288 The anom-
alous result of the proposal would be that, if the debtor sold assets 
out of the ordinary course of business before the proceeding began, 
or if the creditor-controlled successor (or continuing corporation) 
sold the same assets under like circumstances after consummation 
of the plan, a tax.able gain, measured by the debtor's original basis 
(adjusted for depreciation, etc.), would be realized, but the identical 
gain would be tax-free if the sale were made by the estate, standing in 
the shoes of the debtor, in the interval between the petition and 
the consummation. The effect would be to place a premium on 
maximum liquidation of assets in a proceeding designed, not for 
liquidation, but for rehabilitation of the business. 
Moreover, there is no conflict between the taxation of these 
gains realized during administration and the policy declared in 
265. Bankruptcy Act §§ 271, 397, 523, 11 u.s.c. §§ 671, 797, 923 (1970). COMMISSION 
REPORT, supra note 3, § 7-315(e), is in accord. In corporate cases, this reaffirms the tax 
identity established by INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6012(b)(3). See text accompanying 
notes 75-104 supra. In individual rehabilitations, unlike liquidating bankruptcies where 
the debtor is severed from his properties and obligations and goes his separate way, 
tax identity is established by sections 397 and 523 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 797,923 (1970). See text accompanying notes 142-46 supra. 
266. See text accompanying notes 273-80 infra. Cf. United States v. Sampse1I, 266 
F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1959). 
267. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 372(a), 374(b). Those provisions relate to a corporate 
or railroad reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act, as well as under a receivership, 
foreclosure, or "similar proceeding," but probably do not embrace a chapter XI pro-
ceeding in which a successor corporation is utilized. See Tillinghast &: Gardner, 
Acquisitive Reorganizations and Chapter X and XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 26 TAX L. 
REv. 663, 688-89 (1971); Practical Techniques for Handling Tax Problems in Ba11l,-
ruptcy: A Panel Discussion, N.Y.U. 27TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1115, 1129-30 (1969), In 
some chapter XI and XII cases, however, the general provision for inheritance of basis, 
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 362, would be satisfied when a corporation succeeds to the 
property of a corporate or individual debtor. The Commission would bring all forms 
of reorganization and rehabilitation proceedings in bankruptcy under the basis pro-
visions of INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 372, but with an adjustment for certain reductions 
of indebtedness. See note 270 infra. 
268. Treas. Reg. § I.371-l(a)(4) (1955). Cf. Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Lime• 
stone Co., 315 U.S. 179, 183-84 (1942). 
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sections 268, 395, and 520 of the Bankruptcy Act,269 by which no 
taxable income or gain results from the modification or cancellation 
of indebtedness pursuant to a Chapter X plan or a Chapter XI or 
Chapter XII arrangement. The rationale on which such relief from 
tax may be supported is that, in the typical case, the equitable owner-
ship of the business has passed to the creditors and it would truly be 
making them "pay a tax on their loss" if the business were saddled 
with a tax on income measured by what the creditors gave up-
values that have either disappeared or been contributed to the cor-
poration by the creditor-mvners themselves.270 On the other hand, 
when the trustee in a reorganization or similar case sells assets for 
more than their basis, the gain reflects, not values that no longer 
exist or values contributed to capital by the creditors, but an incre-
ment in the value of the assets of the debtor, an increment that is 
thereby made available either for satisfaction of the debtor's obliga-
tions or for other purposes. 
The argument that the depletion of the sum available to creditors 
through the imposition of a tax on the estate's realization of accu-
mulated appreciation requires the creditors to "pay a tax on their 
loss" is essentially the same contention that is advanced for complete 
exemption of the insolvent liquidating estate from income tax, and 
the answer is the same. There is no inequity in first charging the 
realized appreciation with the "price" exacted from all citizens for 
the protection afforded by government,271 provided that the erosion 
of the value available for creditors is the same whether the sale or 
application of the property on debts occurs before, during, after, or 
in the absence of the proceeding in bankruptcy. That condition is 
met in the case of reorganization and debtor relief proceedings, in-
dividual or corporate, as well as in corporate liquidating bank-
269. 11 u.s.c. §§ 668, 795, 920 (1970). 
270. Where the indebtedness reduced was not owed to a creditor who acquires an 
equity, the tax on the debtor is (with some exceptions) merely postponed through 
an adjustment to the basis of property for future gain or loss or depreciation, Bank-
ruptcy Act §§ 270, 396, 522, 11 U.S.C. §§ 670, 796, 922 (1970), and the Commission 
would confirm that treatment and make it more uniform. COMMISSION REPORT, supra 
note 3, §§ 7-315(d), 9-101; id. at 296 (proposed amendment to INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, 
§ 372(a)). But such basis adjustment is and would continue to be inapplicable where 
an equity security is substituted for the debt. This important distinction will be ex-
plored in depth in Plumb, The Tax Recommendations of the Commission on the 
Bankruptcy Laws-Reorganizations, Carryovers, and the Effects of Debt Reduction, 
29 TAX L. REv. - (1974). 
271. See text accompanying notes 149-68 supra. However, for reasons discussed in 
the text accompanying notes 442-51 infra, it would be more appropriate to recognize 
the gain (or loss) in computing the tax of the debtor (allowable as a claim against the 
estate) than the tax of the estate. 
984 Michigan Law Review [Vol, 72:935 
ruptcies. It is not met in the case of noncorporate liquidating bank-
ruptcies, but the remedy for the inequity in those cases is not tax 
exemption, but allowance to the trustee of the benefit of the bank-
rupt's carryovers.272 
b. Treatment of gain or loss if not exempted. If, as here recom-
mended, exemption of gains on sales of assets in reorganization and 
debtor relief proceedings is not to be provided for, and if the bank-
rupt estate in other situations is not to be exempted from tax, cer-
tain other matters should be considered. 
(1) Proof of asset basis. One of the difficulties confronted by trus-
tees in bankruptcy in filing returns is the establishment of the basis 
of property of the estate. As a general rule, the estate's basis is the 
same as that of the bankrupt or the debtor. In the case of a corporate 
bankruptcy, or any debtor relief or reorganization proceeding, this 
follows from the premise that the trustee stands in the tax shoes of 
the bankrupt or the debtor, without change in the taxable entity.273 
But the same conclusion has been reached in the case of individual 
and partnership bankruptcies, despite the fact that the trustee is 
there regarded as a taxable entity distinct from the bankrupt.274 
Although the courts have been singularly remiss in discussing, 
or even identifying, the statutory foundation for so holding in non-
corporate cases, the Service, in Revenue Ruling 68-48,271l relied on 
section 1012 of the Code, which prescribes that the basis of property 
shall be its cost, unless otherwise provided. But the "cost" of prop-
erty is not ordinarily considered to be what was paid by someone 
else, a distinct taxable entity.276 On the contrary, before express pro-
visions of law made applicable a basis other than cost, the "cost" to 
one who acquired property by gift or to a corporation that succeeded 
to the property of another corporation with the same shareholders 
was held to be, not the transferor's cost, but the fair market value at 
the time the taxpayer acquired the property.277 Rather, the appli-
cable provision appears to be section 1015(b), which prescribes that 
272. See text accompanying notes 484-93 infra. 
273. See United States v. Sampsell, 266 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1959). See text 
accompanying notes 75-104, 142-46 supra. 
274. In re Loehr, 98 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. Wis. 1950); Homer A. Martin, Jr., 56 T.C. 
1294, 1299 (1971); Norris Bloomfield, 52 T.C. 745, 750 (1969), motion denied, 54 T.C. 
554, 556 (1970); Rev. Rul. 68-48, 1968-1 CuM. BULL. 301, 303. See text accompanying 
notes 105-34 supra. 
275. 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 301. 
276. See Hartley v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 216, 219 (1935). 
277. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1562 (1919) (gift); Maltine Co., 5 T.C. 1265, 1271-72 (1945) 
(reincorporation). 
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the basis of property "acquired ... by a transfer in trust ( other than 
by a transfer in trust by a gift, bequest, or devise) ... shall be the 
same as it would be in the hands of the grantor increased in the 
amount of gain or decreased in the amount of loss recognized to the 
grantor on such transfer," although a technical objection to its ap-
plication might be made on the ground that the bankrupt estate, 
for other tax purposes, has been viewed, not as a trust, but as an 
estate.278 Since it has been held that a bankrupt realizes no gain or 
loss upon the transfer of his property to the trustee in connection 
with the discharge of his debts,279 the trustee inherits the bankrupt's 
basis without adjustment, and it is the estate, not the bankrupt, that 
realizes, on subsequent sales by the trustee, the taxable gain or de-
ductible loss that was inherent in the bankrupt's property.280 
The possibility exists that the information on basis may be un-
obtainable by the trustee, or obtainable only at excessive cost, par-
ticularly if the bankrupt's records have been poorly maintained. The 
problem parallels that of the donee of property, who is required to 
use as his basis the basis of the property in the hands of the donor or 
of the last preceding owner by whom it was not acquired by gift (or, 
in the case of a loss, the lesser of such amount or the value at the date 
of the gift).281 The law provides that, if the facts concerning such 
previous owner's basis are unknown to the donee, the Service shall 
itself, if possible, obtain the facts from the previous owner or any 
other person; if that is impossible, the basis is to be the fair market 
value as found by the Service as of the approximate time when such 
previous owner acquired the property, according to the best informa-
tion the Service is able to obtain.282 That provision in effect places 
the burden of investigating the facts upon the Service, which has 
inquisitorial powers,283 as well as access to past returns in which 
such basis may have been pertinent, although the Service might still 
try to disallow any basis if it is unable to find the necessary evi-
dence.284 The situation of the trustee (whether treated as a separate 
taxpayer or as acting for a bankrupt corporation or debtor in a re-
278. See text accompanying notes 106-34 supra. 
279. Homer A. Martin, Jr., 56 T.C.1294, 1299 (1971). 
280. Schilder v. United States, 71-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1f 9595 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Norris 
Bloomfield, 52 T.C. 745, 750 (1969). 
281. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1015(a). 
282. INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, § 1015(a). 
283. INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, §§ 7402, 7602-05; Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 
517 (1971). 
284. See, e.g., James E. Caldwell & Co., 24 T.C. 597, 613, 621 (1955), revd., 234 
F.2d 660 (6th Cir. 1956). 
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organization or similar proceeding) is comparable to that of the 
donee, in the sense that the information needed to determine the 
basis may be in the possession of others. But the trustee's position 
differs from that of the donee in that, through the Bankruptcy Act2811 
and Rules,286 the trustee may avail himself of inquisitorial powers 
comparable to those available to the Service287 and, as statutory 
successor to the bankrupt, may demand access to the Service's files 
of the bankrupt's past returns.288 Therefore, any proposal to impose 
on the Service the burden of ascertaining basis, as is done under 
section 1015(a), must be based not on need, but on economy of 
bankruptcy administration. In any event, it does not appear that the 
possibility of difficulty of proof in some cases in itself affords any 
justification for exempting the gains from ta." when a gain is found 
to have been realized. 
(2) Character of the gain or loss. The Revenue Service, in Rev-
enue Ruling 68-48, has taken the following position: 
The tax treatment of the gain or loss on the sale or exchange of 
each asset depends upon the nature of the asset in the hands of the 
bankrupt. For example, if the bankrupt held certain assets for sale 
to customers in the ordinary course of business, the sale of these 
assets by the trustee would give rise to ordinary income or loss. Con-
versely, the sale of assets which were capital assets in the bankrupt's 
hands would generate capital gain or loss income when sold by the 
trustee in bankruptcy.2so 
That principle is sound enough in the case of a corporate bankrupt 
(which was not involved in the ruling), and it would be sound as 
applied to individual bankrupts if, as hereafter proposed,290 the 
gain or loss were treated as if realized by the individual. In general, 
the fact that a sale is made in liquidation does not convert property 
to a capital asset when it has been theretofore held for sale to cus-
tomers, with no interim period of holding for some other purpose.291 
Nor, conversely, does the fact that property, formerly held for invest-
ment or for use in business, is sold in the course of orderly liquida-
tion convert such property into an ordinary income asset held for 
285. Bankruptcy Act§ 14c, 11 U.S.C. § 32(c) (1970). 
286. BANKR. R. 205; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 4-310. 
287. See text accompanying notes 230-35 supra. 
288. Treas. Reg. §§ 30I.6103(a)-l(c)(l)(ii)(d), (iii)(d), (iv)(d), (vii)(d) (1961). 
289. 1968-1 Cur.r. BULL. 301, 302-03. 
290. See text accompanying note 417 infra. 
291. E.g., Estate of Freeland v. Commissioner, 393 F.2d 573, 583-84 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 393 U.S. 845 (1968); Thompson v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1963); 
Donald J. Lawrie, 36 T.C. lll7 (1961). 
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sale to customers.292 However, when a sale is made by a trustee for 
a noncorporate bankrupt, which is a distinct taxpayer, analogous 
precedents determine the character of the asset exclusively by the 
activities of the seller with respect thereto, without regard to how 
it was held by the previous owner. In Estate of Jacques Ferber,293 an 
executor who was liquidating a decedent's stock of goods was deemed 
not to be holding them for sale to customers, even though the de-
cedent had so held them and could not himself have changed their 
character by making a bulk sale. Similarly, the character of assets 
received in liquidation of a corporation is judged exclusively by 
the recipient's use of them,294 even when the recipient succeeds to 
the corporation's asset basis.295 
If the proposal to exempt gains realized by the estate is not 
adopted, it may be desirable to confirm by legislation the result in-
dicated by Revenue Ruling 68-48, which makes more sense than the 
rule of the cases last described. 
(3) Priority status. To the extent that gains on sales made during 
a proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act are taxable, either gen-
erally, as here recommended, or limited to sales in the ordinary 
course of business, consideration should be given to the impropriety 
of according top priority, as an expense of administration, to taxes 
attributable to the realization by the estate of appreciation in value 
arising before the proceeding commenced.296 
5. Personal Holding Company Tax 
The federal tax law imposes a special tax at a prohibitive seventy 
per cent rate on the undistributed income of a personal holding 
company (which, in brief, is a closely held corporation with predom-
inantly passive investment income).297 The object is to force such 
companies to distribute their income to shareholders so that the in-
come ·will be subjected to individual tax rates and will not enjoy 
the shelter of the generally lower corporate rates. In a recent case,298 
the Service attempted to impose the personal holding company tax 
292. Heller Trust v. Commissioner, 382 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1967). 
293 •. 22 T.C. 261 (1954). 
294. E.g., Grcenspon v. Commissioner, 229 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1956); C. Frederick 
Frick, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 286 (1972). But cf. Heller Trust v. Commissioner, 382 
F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1967). 
295. Aero Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 334 F.2d 40, 43 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 
U.S. 887 (1964). 
296. See note 239 supra. 
297. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 541-47. 
298. In re I.J. Knight Realty Corp., 366 F. Supp. 450 (E.D. Pa. 1973). 
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on a corporation in bankruptcy, which had primarily interest in-
come, but the court concluded, in reliance on the referee's opinion 
in Statmaster,299 that the estate was not taxable at all; thus, it did 
not reach the question whether, if taxable, a bankrupt estate could 
be a personal holding company.300 If, as here urged, the bankrupt 
estate is subjected to income tax, the law should make clear that the 
personal holding tax, the purpose of which is wholly foreign to the 
bankruptcy situation, is not to be imposed. 
!I. INCOME TAX LIABILITIES OF THE DEBTOR 
The Commission recommends that bankruptcy not be regarded 
as involving a premature disposition of the bankrupt's property, 
causing him to incur the burden of "recapture" of investment cred-
its previously allowed to him.301 The Commission further proposes 
that the tax liability, if any, of an individual bankrupt, computed 
to the date of bankruptcy, be made allowable as a claim against the 
estate, rather than leaving the full year's tax as an obligation col-
lectible only from his exempt and after-acquired property;302 it stops 
short of the full relief that could result from lumping into that al-
lowable amount the tax attributable to sums earned by the bank-
rupt before the petition and collected thereafter by the estate (al-
though taxed to the earner as postbankruptcy income) and from re-
ducing such tax by allowing deductions for expenses incurred by him 
and satisfied by the trustee from his assets and declines to treat the 
occurrence of bankruptcy as the event at which gain or loss on the 
assets dedicated to the bankrupt's debts is realized.303 
A. Investment Credit Recapture 
In order to stimulate investment in tangible personal property 
for productive use in business, the federal ta." law allows an "invest-
ment credit," to be applied in reduction of income tax otherwise 
payable, in an amount generally (omitting many refinements) equal 
to seven per cent of the qualified investment in such property.804 To 
prevent excessive benefit being derived from credits based on pur-
chases of assets expected to be replaced within a short time, the law 
299. 366 F. Supp. at 459-60, dting 332 F. Supp. at 1250-62. See text accompanying 
notes 44-74 supra. 
300. See 366 F. Supp. at 460 n.25. 
301. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 293 (proposed INT. REV, CODE OF 1954, 
§ 47(d)). 
302. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 5-104(b). 
303. See text accompanying notes 336-451 infra. 
304. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 38, 46-50. 
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allows no credit if the expected useful life of the property to the 
taxpayer is under three years and bases the credits on graduated 
percentages of the investment if the useful life is three to seven 
years.805 Since the life estimated at the outset may differ from the 
facts as they actually develop, provision is made for the "recapture" 
of excessive investment credits previously allowed if the property 
is disposed of prematurely, other than by reason of death or of 
certain tax-free intercorporate transfers or by reason of "a mere 
change in the form of conducting the trade or business so long as 
the property is retained in such trade or business as [ qualified] 
property and the taxpayer retains a substantial interest in such 
trade or business."ao5 
Since the trustee for an individual bankrupt, unlike the trustee 
for a corporation, is considered an entity distinct from the debtor 
for tax purposes,807 and since the debtor is considered to have 
retained no "substantial interest" in the business in the hands of 
the estate, bankruptcy becomes the occasion for imposing on the 
distressed debtor an obligation to disgorge tax benefits enjoyed by 
him in palmier days.308 Although imposed as an "increase" in the 
income tax for the year of such disposition, it is payable even if 
the return for that period shows a substantial loss.309 And since 
that period, under present law, is unbroken at bankruptcy, the tax 
for the year is deemed a postbankruptcy obligation burdening the 
debtor's exempt and after-acquired property.310 The Commission 
would afford relief from that burden on the individual, consistently 
with the general principle of not taxing him on his relief from 
debts that he is unable to pay,311 by amending the Internal Revenue 
Code to make clear that the transfer of title to a trustee in bank-
ruptcy is not, in itself, to be deemed a disposition of the property 
causing recapture of investment credits.312 While the trustee's own 
305. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 46(c)(2), 48(a). 
306. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 47. 
307. See text accompanying notes 75-113 supra. 
308. Henry C. Mueller, 60 T.C. 36, 46-47 (1973). 
309. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 47(a)(l); Treas. Reg. § 1.47-l(b)(l) (1967). 
310. See text accompanying notes 319-35 infra. In contrast, in the case of a cor-
porate bankrupt, there is no "disposition" unless and until the trustee liquidates the 
property, and the resulting liability then falls on the estate. See text accompanying 
notes 75-104 supra. 
311. Treas. Reg. § l.61-12(b) (1957). 
312. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 293 (proposed INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, 
§ 47(d)). Using the reasoning employed by the Tax Court in Henry C. Mueller, 60 T.C. 
36, 46-47 (1973), one could conclude that bankruptcy of an individual would cause 
deferred gains on installment sales previously made by him to become taxable under 
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subsequent sale of the property would be such a disposition, the 
proposal to relieve the trustee of all income taxes in liquidation 
cases313 would preclude recapture of the credit from the estate. 
Recapture of investment credits may also result, as if the prop-
erty had been partially disposed of, when "the basis (or cost) of 
[ qualified] property is reduced, for example, as a 1·esult of a refund 
of part of the cost of the property . . . . "314 A further provision 
of the Commission's proposed amendment would preclude mis-
application of that principle to cause recapture of investment credits 
when the basis of property is reduced, not as a result of renegotia-
tion of the price, but merely as a convenient device adopted by 
Congress to postpone the liability for tax on income otherwise re-
sulting from an adjustment of indebtedness,316 whether in Bank-
ruptcy Act cases or otherwise.316 Since the freedom of debtors in 
straight bankruptcy from tax on their relief from indebtedness317 
is not conditioned upon reduction of the basis of any prop-
erty, 318 this phase of the proposal would not affect tax liabilities 
of the bankrupt in such cases. 
B. Allocating Income, Deductions, and Tax Liability 
Before and After Bankruptcy 
I. Closing the Individual's Taxable Year at Bankruptcy 
The taxable period of an individual bankrupt, like that of a 
corporation, 319 continues without interruption at the date of bank-
section 453(d)(l) of the Code when the obligation is "disposed of" to the trustee. Al• 
though the Commission does not deal directly with this matter, the inequity would 
be relieved by its general proposal to cut off the debtor's taxable year at bankruptcy 
for the purpose of making the tax computed to that date allowable as a claim against 
the estate rather than a postbankruptcy obligation of the debtor. See text accompany-
ing notes 319-35 infra. 
313. See text accompanying notes 147-92 supra. 
314. Treas. Reg. § I.47-2(c)(l) (1967). 
315. See Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 39, 45-56 (1949). 
316. The Service has ruled that recapture of investment credits occurs in a non• 
bankruptcy situation where basis is electively reduced under section 1017 of the Code 
as an alternative to immediate taxability of income derived by a debtor from re-
purchase of his bonds below face. Rev. Rul. 1974-17, 1974 INT. R.Ev. Buu.. No. 17, at 6. 
But the same principle might be applied where basis is adjusted to reflect debt reduc-
tions under the reorganization and rehabilitation provisions of the Bankruptcy Act-
§§ 270, 396, 522, 11 U.S.C. §§ 670, 796, 922 (1970). See Tillinghast & Gardner, supra 
note 267, at 701. 
317. Treas. Reg.§ l.61-12(b) (1957). 
318. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 1017, reduces basis only where the debt adjustment 
would otherwise have been taxable. Retail Properties, Inc., 23 CCH Tax Ct. M:em. 
1463, 1474-75 (1964). 
319. See text accompanying notes 75-104 supra. 
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ruptcy.820 But, in the case of an individual, it is not the trustee 
but the individual himself who files a return for the unbroken 
taxable year,821 while the trustee (under existing law) files inde-
pendently for the estate to reflect its transactions during the period 
of administration.822 Although it is generally assumed that the 
bankrupt will have a loss for the immediate prebankruptcy period, 
it is entirely possible that he will have a net taxable income. His 
misfortune may have resulted from extravagance in personal, non-
deductible expenditures; he may have sold property for more than 
its depreciated cost; or, being on the cash basis of accounting, he 
may have had taxable receipts in excess of the business expenses 
he was in a position to pay323-and he gets no credit for their sub-
sequent payment by the trustee out of his assets324 or for the losses 
the trustee may sustain on the sale thereof. 325 Since his tax liability 
is not determinable until the end of the year, it has been held326 
that no part of the tax for the year in which bankruptcy occurs 
can be collected from the estate as a tax "legally due and owing" 
at bankruptcy and that, even though the benefits of prebankruptcy 
transactions that gave rise to the tax liability may have passed to 
the trustee, the tax is collectible, if at all, only from the bankrupt's 
320. Homer A. Martin, 56 T.C. 1294, 1298 (1971); Norris Bloomfield, 52 T.C. 745, 
749 n.5 (1969). 
321. Rev. Rul. 72-387, 1972-2 Cu:r.1. BULL, 632. 
322, See text accompanying notes 106-34 supra. 
323. Such was the situation in Henry C. Mueller, 60 T.C. 36, 43 (1973), where a 
prebankruptcy taxable income of 60,000 dollars resulted from the debtor's inability to 
pay and qualify for deduction of expense obligations that were in a greater amount. 
See text accompanying notes 400-21 infra. Cf. F.R. Humpage, 17 T.C. 1625, 1631-32, 
1640 (1952), in which a corporation, although rendered insolvent by its guaranty of its 
subsidiary's bonds that it was unable to meet (and hence could not deduct), never-
theless had over 2 million dollars surplus in its earnings and profits account for tax 
purposes. 
324, Cf. Henry C. Mueller, 60 T.C. 36, 43 (1973). 
325. Schilder v. United States, 71-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1[ 9595 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Norris 
Bloomfield, 52 T.C. 745 (1969). 
326. In re Cooney, 35 Am. Bankr. R. (n.s.) 247 (N.D.N.Y. 1938) (referee opinion). 
See Frances M. Parkford, 45 B.T.A. 461, 466 (1941), affd., 133 F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1943). 
Cf, In re International Match Co., 79 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1935). The referee in the Cooney 
case adverted to the fact that no attempt had been made by the Commissioner to 
terminate the individual's taxable year at the date of bankruptcy under the prede-
cessor of section 6851 of the Code, which permits such action in order to enable im-
mediate assessment and collection when the taxpayer "designs ••• to do any ••• act 
tending to prejudice or to render wholly or partly ineffectual proceedings to collect 
the income tax for the current • • • taxable year unless such proceedings be brought 
without delay." The inference that the result of the Cooney case would have been 
altered if that had occurred, however, seems unfounded. The termination of the tax-
able year is merely a provisional remedy, and the tax is to be redetermined and 
adjusted on the basis of the full taxable year after completion of such period, Irving 
v. Gray, 479 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1973); Ludwig Littauer & Co., 37 B.T .A. 840 (1938); 
hence, the liability for the year would still be a postbankruptcy obligation. 
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exempt and after-acquired property.327 That effect might be avoided 
if the courts were to give a broad construction to the words "debts" 
and "claims,"328 unencumbered by the concept of "legally due and 
owing," which appears only in the provision320 that establishes prior-
ity, not in the provisions with regard to provability and allow-
ability.330 The part of the bankrupt's income tax attributable to 
the prebankruptcy portion of the year should be viewed as a con-
tingent claim against the estate, readily determinable when the tax-
able year ends a few months after the filing of the petition and, 
hence, provable and allowable under sections 57d and 63a(8) of the 
Bankruptcy Act.381 At the date of bankruptcy, the inchoate tax lia-
bility, while subject to modification by events later in the year, 
exists as a claim against the bankrupt as surely as the inchoate 
right to a carryback refund (when a loss was sustained in that period) 
existed as an asset of the bankrupt in Segal v. Rochelle,832 and 
it is as surely "rooted in the prebankruptcy past." It is doubtful, 
however, that this equitable result can be assured without legislation. 
The Commission proposes, therefore, that the taxable year of 
an individual bankrupt be tentatively closed at the date of filing, 
solely for the purpose of making the income tax, computed to that 
date, an allowable claim against the estate.333 If the actual tax for 
the full taxable year proves to be greater, the excess would be a 
postbankruptcy obligation of the debtor, neither collectible from 
the estate nor dischargeable; if less, only the actual tax liability 
would be allowed against the estate.334 Since the taxable period would 
327. In contrast, a corporate ta" for the year in which bankruptcy occurs not only 
is collectible from the estate but also ranks as an administration expense and thus 
raises an entirely different set of problems. See note 239 supra. 
328. See, e.g., In re Plankinton Bldg. Co., 135 F.2d 273,275 (7th Cir. 1943). 
329. Bankruptcy Act§ 64a(4), II U.S.C. § 104(a)(4) (1970), 
330. Cf. In re Connecticut Motor Lines, Inc., 336 F.2d 96, 102-06 (3d Cir, 1964), 
which held employment and withholding taxes incurred during the proceeding, with 
respect to payments of prebankruptcy wages, to be provable debts or claims rather 
than administration expenses but then (by dictum) stretched the general understand-
ing of "legally due and owing" to bold the taxes to be fourth priority items, The 
Commission's proposals abandon the "legally due and owing" concept, even for 
priority purposes, COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 4-405(a)(5), but still determine 
the existence of allowable nonadministrative claims as of the date of filing of the 
petition. CoMMISSION REPORT, supra, § 4-403(b). 
331. 11 U.S.C. §§ 93(d), l03(a)(8) (1970). See Coclin Tobacco Co, v. Griswold, 408 
F.2d 1338, 1341 n. 6 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 940 (1969). 
332. 382 U.S. 375 (1966). See text accompanying notes 455-67 infra. 
333. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 5-104(b). The device of tentatively closing 
the taxable year, subject to final calculation on a full-year basis, has precedent in 
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6851. See note 326 supra. 
334. The proposal in these respects docs rough, rather than exact, justice to the 
bankrupt. In the rare cases in which the bankrupt's income spans a significant range 
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be divided only for this limited purpose, there would be no injec-
tion of short "taxable years" with resultant curtailment of the aggre-
gate period in which loss carryovers may be used.335 
2. Income Earned Before, but Deemed Realized After, Bankruptcy 
Merely dividing the individual bankrupt's taxable year, as pro-
posed by the Commission, would only begin to resolve the inequity, 
for many items of income that would fall into the debtor's post-
bankruptcy taxable period under the rules of tax accounting would 
nevertheless become assets of the bankrupt estate. 
Under the bankruptcy law, the trustee takes title to the bank-
rupt's nonexempt and transferable or leviable claims for compensa-
tion for services rendered before bankruptcy,336 including compen-
sation for uncompleted services if the contract is divisible,337 although 
the bankrupt retains the right to the full compensation for then 
uncompleted work if no part is payable in the absence of further 
performance of services.338 The trustee's title is not affected by the 
fact that the amount payable is determined only by later resolu-
tion of a dispute339 or that it is contingent upon future profits 
or other subsequent events, provided the bankrupt has done before 
bankruptcy all that he is required to do to entitle him to payment.340 
Any other causes of action, which may be productive of taxable 
income, also pass to the trustee.341 The trustee, of course, also 
acquires the right to accrued rents, interest, and dividends from 
the bankrupt's property, as well as his right to the proceeds of sales 
previously made by him. 
of tax brackets, the higher applicable brackets, rather than an average, will be ap-
plied to his income for the postbankruptcy portion of the year. If he has net income 
for the early part of the year and suffers a net loss after bankruptcy, the loss, which 
his future resources must bear, reduces a prebankruptcy liability rather than being 
available to offset his future taxable income. 
335. See text accompanying note 240 supra. 
336. In re Aveni, 458 F.2d 972 (6th Cir. 1972); Kolb v. Berlin, 356 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 
1966). The Commission would delete the requirement that the property be transferable 
or subject to seizure under state law. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 4-601, 
notes 1-2. 
337. In re Brown, 4 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1924). But cf. Fischer v. Liberty Natl. Bank 
&: Trust Co., 61 F.2d 757,759 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 611 (1933). 
338. In re Leibowitt, 93 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 652 (1938); 
In re Coleman, 87 F.2d 753 (2d Cir. 1937); In re Furness, 75 F.2d 965 (2d Cir. 1935). 
339. In re Evans, 253 F. 276 (W.D. Tenn. 1918). 
340. Hudson v. Wylie, 242 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1957); In re Wright, 157 F. 544 (2d 
Cir. 1907). See Lockhart v. Mittleman, 123 F.2d 703, 704 (2d Cir. 1941); In re Leibowitt, 
93 F.2d 333, 335 (3d Cir. 1937). 
341. Gochenour v. Cleveland Terminals Bldg. Co., 118 F.2d 89, 93 (6th Cir. 1941). 
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Among the basic principles of tax law are the principles that the 
one rendering services is taxable on the income therefrom,842 that the 
one owning property is taxable on interest or dividends accruing 
while he owns it, 343 and that the seller of property is taxable on the 
profit from the sale344-even though the amount is never collected 
by him but is applied directly to "procure a satisfaction that can be 
obtained only by the expenditure of money or property," whether 
that is the nonmaterial satisfaction involved in a family gift845 or 
the payment of one's debts.346 The fact that the amount payable is 
in dispute at the time of the transfer347 or is dependent upon future 
events348 affects the timing, but not the existence, of the earner's 
liability for tax.349 Those principles are controlling even where the 
application of the payment on the taxpayer's debts is involuntary, by 
attachment or other levy,350 and they have been held equally applic-
able in bankruptcy, notwithstanding that the debtor would have 
been discharged of his debts whether or not the creditors realized 
anything.a111 
In principle, there can be no quarrel with the holdings that 
income earned by the bankrupt before bankruptcy should be tax-
able to him, whether or not the event fixing the time of tax.ability 
under his accounting method has yet occurred.852 To the bankrupt 
342. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930). 
343. United States v. Joliet &: Chicago R. R., 315 U.S. 44 (1942); Helvering v. Horst, 
311 U.S. Il2 (1940); Austin v. Commissioner, 161 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1947), 
344. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945); Wood Hannon 
Corp. v. United States, 311 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1963); Floyd v. Scofield, 193 F.2d 594 (5th 
Cir. 1952). Concerning the taxability of deferred gains on installment sales upon the 
occurrence of bankruptcy, see note 312 supra. 
345. Helveringv. Horst, 311 U.S. 112,117 (1940). 
346. Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446, 465-66 (1959); Steckel v. Commissioner, 
253 F.2d 267 (6th Cir. 1958). 
347. Wood Harmon Corp. v. United States, 311 F.2d 918, 924 (2d Cir. 1963). 
348. J. Ungar, Inc. v. Commissioner, 244 F.2d 90 (2d Cir, 1957). 
349. But cf. Jones v. Commissioner, 306 F.2d 292, 301 (5th Cir. 1962). 
350. Ward v. Commissioner, 224 F,2d 547, 552-53 (9th Cir.1955). 
351. Parkford v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 249, 251 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 
741 (1943). Parkford happened to involve a taxpayer on the accrual basis, who would, 
in any event, have been immediately taxable on his compensation when earned, ir-
respective of its later disposition, and the Tax Court for this reason had felt it un• 
necessary to rely on the foregoing line of cases. Frances M. Parkford, 45 B.T .A. 461, 470 
(1941). But the Ninth Circuit squarely relied on those principles, in taxing the bank• 
rupt not only on amounts fully earned before bankruptcy but also on compensation 
that was contingent on the subsequent results of his prebankruptcy services. The Tax 
Court itself has applied those principles to a bankrupt using the cash basis, in Charles 
E. Cooney, 1 CCH Tax Ct. Mero. 264 (1942), remanded pursuant to settlement, (2d 
Cir., May 29, 1944). Cf. Orval C. Walker, 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 690, 692 (1973) (under 
chapter XIll). 
352. See note 351 supra. 
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estate, the money is not income (as interest earned during admin-
istration would be) but the collection of capital in the form of an 
account receivable that came to the estate as property of the bank-
rupt under section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act.363 "It is idle to 
contend it is inequitable to tax [the bankrupt] upon it because [he] 
did not personally receive it. All of it was used to pay [his] debts, 
and, if equities were to be weighed, it would be far more inequitable 
to the fiscus to permit the income to escape taxation altogether."3154 
What is ·wrong with this application of the rule is that, although the 
trustee collected the earnings as prebankruptcy property, the tax 
incurred by the bankrupt thereon was a postbankruptcy item that, 
in the bankruptcy proceedings, was held not to be a provable claim 
against the estate. The purpose of the Bankruptcy Act to give the 
bankrupt "an unencumbered fresh start,"366 "'a new opportunity 
in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pres-
sure and discouragement of preexisting debt,' "366 is frustrated when 
the mechanical application of rules of tax law causes income earned 
before bankruptcy and appropriated by the trustee to be taxed to 
the individual bankrupt in periods ending after bankruptcy, for 
which the tax liability is not chargeable against the estate. The 
bankrupt's "fresh start" is, of course, inevitably "encumbered" by 
nondischargeable taxes that the assets in the estate are insufficient 
to satisfy, but it is wholly inconsistent with the "fresh start" prin-
ciple to burden the bankrupt with continuing liability for a tax 
on prebankruptcy earnings that are paid over to the trustee and 
that the estate, including the amount of that income, would have 
been adequate to satisfy at the fourth priority level. 
That merely dividing the taxable year at the date of bankruptcy 
would not remove the inequity is evident from the fact that, under 
the principles discussed above, a taxpayer on the cash basis becomes 
taxable only at the time his earnings are collected by his assignee, 
rather than at the time of the transfer.357 Although an exception is 
353. II U.S.C. § ll0(a) (1970). Cf. Nichols v. United States, 64 Ct. Cl. 241 (1927), 
cert. denied, 277 U.S. 584 (1928); William. C. Frank, 6 B.T .A. 1071 (1927) (which, be-
fore Congress dealt expressly with the subject, see text accompanying notes 866-72 
infra, held that a decedent's estate received the decedent's uncollected and untaxed 
compensation and interest earnings as corpus of the estate and was not subject to 
income tax thereon). 
354. Frances M. Parkford, 45 B.T .A. 461, 470 (1941), afjd., 133 F.2d 249 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 319 U.S. 741 (1943). 
355. Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 380 (1966). 
356. Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 19 (1970), quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 
292 U.S. 234, 244-45 (1934). 
357. Jones v. United States, 395 F.2d 938, 943 (6th Cir. 1968); Sol C. Siegel Prods., 
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recognized in cases where the transfer is made for a present con-
sideration, 858 the prevailing view is that the transfer to the trustee 
of assets from which the bankrupt's liabilities will ultimately be 
satisfied or discharged is not, in itself, such a transfer for a con-
sideration. 859 In any event, and even if the bankrupt uses the accrual 
basis of accounting, taxability would be postponed to the individ-
ual's postbankruptcy period if the amount were contingent, since 
it cannot be known how much of the bankrupt's debts will be sat-
isfied from the assigned income right until the contingency is 
resolved. It seems desirable, therefore, to devise a way to make 
postbankruptcy taxes, to the extent attributable to prebankruptcy 
earnings appropriated by the trustee, allowable against the estate. 
The way to accomplish that purpose would be to make taxable 
in the period ending with the date of bankruptcy all items of there-
tofore untaxed income that pass to the trustee, whether or not they 
would yet have been taxable under the bankrupt's method of ac-
counting. There is precedent for such action in cases involving 
the liquidation of corporations. Under section 446(b) of the Code 
and predecessor provisions, when a taxpayer's regular method of 
accounting "does not clearly reflect income," it must be computed 
"under such method as, in the opinion of the Secretary or his dele-
gate, does clearly reflect income." In order to prevent the permanent 
escape of tax on earned income that at the time of liquidation had 
not yet become taxable under methods of accounting that took earn-
ings into ta.xable income only when received in cash or its equiv-
alent or when contracts were completed, the courts have sustained 
findings by the Service that income can be clearly reflected in the 
final year only by modifying the accounting method to pick up all 
accrued income or a percentage of the income on uncompleted 
contracts.360 That precedent is deficient, however, in that it does 
not reach items of income that, while fully earned, are still con-
tingent in amount at the crucial date and, therefore, would not be 
Inc., 46 T.C. 15, 23-25 (1966); Estate of Florence E. Carr, 37 T.C. 1173 (1962); Rev, 
Rul. 72-312, 1972-1 CuM. BULL. 22. 
358. E.g., Estate of Stranahan v. Commissioner, 472 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1973). 
359. Homer A. Martin, 56 T.C. 1294, 1299 (1971). But cf. Charles R. Stuart, 38 
B.T .A. II47, II51 (1938). 
360. Commissioner v. Kuckenberg, 309 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1962): Idaho First Natl, 
Bank v. United States, 265 F.2d 6 (9th Cir. 1959); Standard Paving Co, v. Commissioner, 
190 F.2d 330 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 860 (1951); Jud Plumbing &: Heating, 
Inc. v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1946). 
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taxable in that final period under any recognized method of ac-
counting.861 
A more effectual precedent is found in section 42 of the Revenue 
Acts of 1934,362 1936,863 and 1938864 and of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1939365 as originally enacted. As a result of court decisions 
that held a decedent's estate not taxable on the collection of income 
that had not previously been taxed to the decedent,866 Congress 
enacted the following: "In the case of the death of a taxpayer there 
shall be included in computing net income for the taxable period 
in which falls the date of his death, amounts accrued up to the date 
of his death if not otherwise properly includable in respect of such 
period or a prior period." The Supreme Court, in Helvering v. 
Enright,861 broadly construed the term "amounts accrued" in order 
to effectuate the legislative purpose that no income should escape 
taxation as a result of death. The Court, therefore, taxed in the 
decedent's final return his share of fees from unfinished business 
of his law partnership. In other cases it was held that the amounts 
so taxable include executors' and trustees' commissions that would 
have become fixed and payable only upon final settlement and that 
would not have been accruable by a living taxpayer before that 
time.868 
Under that provision, the courts also struggled with the treat-
ment of dividends, which may be declared on one date, payable 
at a later date, to those who were shareholders at some intermediate 
record date. In Estate of Putnam v. Commissioner,869 it was deter-
mined that a dividend declared before death, payable to share-
holders of record on a date after death, was not "accrued" income 
taxable to the decedent. Although declaration of the dividend 
creates an obligation to the shareholders, the Court concluded that 
361. See, e.g., Telephone Directory Advertising Co. v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 
884 (Ct. Cl. 1956). 
362. Ch. 277, § 42, 48 Stat. 694. 
363. Ch. 690, § 42, 49 Stat. 1666. 
364. Ch. 389, § 42, 52 Stat. 472. 
365. Ch. 1, § 42, 53 Stat. 24. 
366. Nichols v. United States, 64 Ct. Cl. 241 (1927), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 584 (1928); 
William G. Frank, 6 B.T .A. 1071 (1927). 
367. 312 U.S. 636 (1941). 
368. Helvering v McGlue's Estate, 119 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1941); Estate of Lewis Cass 
Ledyard, Jr., 44 B.T .A. 1056, 1064 (1941), aff d. on this issue sub nom. Commissioner 
v. United States Trust Co., 143 F.2d 243, 244 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 727 (1944). 
369. 324 U.S. 393 (1945). 
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it "leaves the identity of the recipient at large.''370 The Court noted 
that, unlike the situation in the Enright line of cases, the income 
would not go untaxed if not made taxable to the decedent, since 
a dividend on stock owned by the estate on the record date would 
be taxable to it.371 Even though the stock, in which the earnings 
and the right to the declared dividend inhere, comes to the estate 
as capital, the scheme of the tax law is to treat the severance of 
earnings from the stock and from the corporation as the event giving 
rise to taxable income to the shareholder.372 
Following the pattern of that provision, it might be provided 
that income that had been earned by the bankrupt's services or 
property prior to bankruptcy should continue to be taxable to him 
but should be deemed income of the short taxable period ending 
with his bankruptcy (if not properly reportable in an earlier period). 
With respect to income from services, from certain causes of action, 
and from other nonproperty-connected income, the standard applied 
should be whether the right to the income passes to the trustee: 873 
If it does, the taxability of the income to the individual should be 
accelerated into the prebankruptcy taxable period-irrespective of 
whether the income has technically "accrued," even by the broader 
standard of the Enright case-since the purpose is to make the tax 
a claim against the estate if the estate collects the income; if the 
right to the income is dependent upon further action by the bank-
rupt, so that the estate does not become entitled to it, the tax 
thereon should not be a claim against the estate but should be 
imposed on the individual in the postbankruptcy period in which 
the income would be taxable under his regular accounting method. 
In the case of income from property that passes to the estate, that 
line of demarcation could not be used, since the trustee will acquire 
the right to such income whether it accrues before or after bank-
ruptcy; therefore, the test in this instance should be, as under former 
section 42, whether the income had "accrued" at the date of bank-
ruptcy. 
This proposal, of course, raises a problem of reporting the income 
and establishing a claim for the tax. The individual, in filing his 
return for the short period, will be unable to anticipate what 
recoveries may be made by the trustee on theretofore uncollected 
370. 324 U.S. at 400. 
871. 324 U.S. at 396-97. This is still the situation today. Treas. Reg, § l,61-9(c) 
(1957). 
372. United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156, 171-72 (1921), 
373. See text accompanying notes 336-41 supra. 
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items, particularly those that may be contingent. Therefore, his 
obligation to file a return should be deemed satisfied if he deter-
mines his income on his regular basis of accounting. If a tax is 
shown on such return, or if (with or without a filed return) the 
Service determines a tax on that basis, claim for so much thereof 
as is allowable against the estate should be filed in the usual manner. 
There should be no requirement to file a claim, however, with 
respect to the tax on additional collections, of which the trustee 
would have :firsthand knowledge. A claim, if required, would neces-
sarily be based on information furnished by the trustee himself, 
since the income giving rise to the claim would be received during 
administration. It would, in any event, be impossible to file the 
claim within the time prescribed by section 57n of the Bankruptcy 
Act;374 moreover, while the claim timely filed with respect to the 
original return could be amended after the time for filing to 
increase the amount, 375 there might have been no original claim if 
there were no tax or only a nominal tax shown on such return (if 
filed). 
In lieu of requiring a claim, the trustee should be made re-
sponsible for reporting such additional income taxable in the bank-
rupt's final prebankruptcy period by amending either the bankrupt's 
return or the calculations reflected in the government's claim. If there 
has been no claim, the trustee's responsibility should be deemed 
discharged if his report of additional income and tax starts from a 
base of zero (although, if the bankrupt had a loss, it would be in 
the estate's interest to ascertain that fact and reflect it in the calcu-
lations). Such reporting might be required either annually or at 
such times as dividends on priority tax (or lower-ranking) claims 
are to be distributed. 
No prejudice to the administration should result from the exist-
ence of an open-ended priority claim for which no claim need be 
filed. Each increase in the liability will reflect a correspondingly 
greater increment in the estate, from which the amount of the 
anticipated tax liability may be reserved without reducing the 
amounts projected to be available for other creditors. The admin-
istration would not be prolonged thereby, since the estate would 
presumably be kept open in any event so long as significant amounts 
of the bankrupt's earnings remain to be collected. If the trustee 
374. 11 u.s.c. § 93(n) (1970); BANKR. R. 302(e). See COMMISSION REPORT, supra 
note 3, § 4-40l(a). Cf. In re Freedomland, Inc., 480 F.2d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. 
granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3415 (U.S., Jan. 21, 1974) (No. 73-374). 
375. See Menick v. Hoffman, 205 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1953). 
1000 Michigan Law Review [Vol. '12:935 
sells the right in order to close the estate, the proceeds will be the 
final amount taxable. If he abandons a contingent or disputed 
claim to the bankrupt in order to save further expense of admin-
istration, 376 the bankrupt would be taxable on subsequent collec-
tions, if any, as if the right had never vested in the trustee. 
One advantage of making the trustee responsible for reporting 
such income, without need for a claim, is that such a requirement 
avoids the inequity that may result if the government neglects or 
chooses to refrain from filing a claim and thus causes the estate 
to be disbursed to creditors whose claims, if unsatisfied, would have 
been discharged, while the tax that could have been satisfied as a 
priority claim out of the assets of the estate survives as an unsatisfied 
and undischarged obligation of the individual.377 
It should be noted, in connection with the precedent cited above 
for this proposal, that Congress soon abandoned taxation of "ac-
crued" earnings in a decedent's final return, on the ground that 
the ad hoc change of his accounting method caused hardship when 
income that in the usual course might have been taxable over a 
period of years was bunched into a single year at higher rates.878 
Therefore, Congress instead prescribed, 379 in what has since become 
section 69l(a) of the Code, that income of a decedent not properly 
includible during his lifetime under his accounting method should 
be taxed as income of his estate or of its beneficiaries. Despite the 
argument that the amounts passed to them as capital, it was held 
constitutional to tax them on what would have been income if 
received by the decedent.380 In view of the trustee's representation 
of the bankrupt as well as of the creditors,881 it would presumably 
be equally valid to treat like income as taxable to the bankrupt 
estate if that should be the legislative choice. 
376. Abandonment is provided for in BANKR. R. 608 and COMMISSION REPORT, 
supra note 3, § 4-611. See First Natl. Bank v. Lasater, 196 U.S. 115, 118-19 (1905): In 
re Kokoszka, 4'79 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3352 (U.S., Dec. 10, 
1973) (No. 73-5265). 
3'17. See Newberg v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), affd., 296 F.2d 
152 {2d Cir. 1961). Cf. In re Curtis, 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1J 9433 (W.D. Mich. 1969) 
(referee opinion), which refers to previous legislative proposals to correct this in• 
equity. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 4--401(c), like the recently adopted BANKR. 
R. 303, entitles the debtor or the trustee to file a tax claim on the creditor's behalf, 
in order to avoid this result: the claim would be of no avail where the potential 
existence of the claim is unknown at the time proof thereof must be filed. 
378. H.R. REP. No. 2333, '77th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1942); S. REP. No. 1631, 7'lth 
Cong., 2d Sess. 100 (1942). 
379. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 619, § 134(e), 56 Stat. 831 (1942). 
380. Richardson v. United States, 294 F.2d 593 (6th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 
802 (1962). Cf. Taft v. Bowers, 278 U.S. 470 (1929); text accompanying note 353 supra. 
381. See, e.g., B 8: L Farms Co. v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 407, 410 (S.D, Fla. 
1965), a[Jd. per curiam, 368 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 835 (1967), 
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Trucing the trustee rather than the individual permits imposing 
the tax for the years of actual receipt rather than bunching the 
income in one taxable period. But it is doubtful that, in the bank-
ruptcy situation, there would be many cases in which the bunching 
of income in the individual's return would cause tax in very high 
brackets, and, if such situations were to arise, relief is now available 
to individuals under the provisions for five-year averaging of in-
come, 382 which were not in the law in 1942, when Congress retreated 
from trucing the decedent rather than his estate. Therefore, the 
determination of whether the tax ought to be imposed on the bank-
rupt or the trustee (in either event, collectible from the estate) may 
rest on other considerations. 
One objection to imposing the tax on the estate, rather than 
on the individual, is that, if the estate, even as augmented by such 
recoveries, is insufficient to pay all taxes, including the tax on such 
items, the liability will be uncollectible from anyone, whereas, if 
the tax is imposed on the bankrupt, the unpaid balance would re-
main as a nondischargeable liability. Such tax liability would be 
nondischargeable if the income had been realized shortly before 
bankruptcy, and there appears to be no good reason why the fact 
that prebankruptcy earnings of the bankrupt happen to be col-
lected after, rather than before, bankruptcy should relieve the indi-
vidual of the tax thereon if it cannot be collected from the aggre-
gate assets of the estate. It should be enough that he is relieved of 
the existing inequity of having the tax on his uncollected prebank-
ruptcy earnings charged entirely against his exempt and after-
acquired property, rather than ·first against the estate into which 
those earnings were paid. 
It seems clear, in any event, that the tax on prebankruptcy 
earnings collected by the trustee after bankruptcy, should remain 
at the individual level (although made collectible as a claim against 
the estate) if the Commission's proposal to exempt the trustee 
entirely from tax in most situations is adopted, since the trustee's 
collections of income earned by the bankrupt are in no sense admin-
istrative income, and since the fortuity that such earnings are col-
lected after, rather than before, the date of bankruptcy and that 
the bankrupt had used the cash basis of accounting (or that the 
claim was contingent) should not alter its taxability to someone.383 
382. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1301-05. The higher tax rates applicable to estates, 
as contrasted with either married or single individuals, compare section I(d} with 
sections I(a}-(c), might well nullify any remaining advantage from avoiding bunching 
of income in the bankrupt's return. · 
383. See text accompanying notes 147-88 supra. 
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Further, even if the trustee remains a taxable entity, such earnings 
ought, in any event, to be ta.xable at the individual level unless 
(a) the bankrupt's loss carryovers are made available to the trustee 
(as the Commission has proposed), so that they may offset the trustee's 
taxable income reflecting such prebankruptcy earnings;384 and (b) 
the trustee's tax liability is made apportionable, so that the portion 
of the ta.""C attributable to such prebankruptcy earnings, earnings 
that reflect collections of capital of the estate rather than increments 
therein, would not enjoy the priority status of an administration 
expense. 385 
While the foregoing discussion has focused on individual bank-
ruptcies, the same treatment ought to be applied in corporate cases 
if the trustee is granted exemption from tax, since there is no 
justification for exempting prior corporate earnings merely because 
they are collected after bankruptcy. There would be less need to 
apply it to corporate bankruptcies if the estate remains a taxpaying 
entity, since corporations are not subject to the inequity suffered 
by individuals who now incur a postbankruptcy tax on income that 
is taken by the trustee. But if the estate of a corporate bankrupt 
is to remain taxable on such income, the tax should be apportioned, 
as above suggested, so that the amount attributable to prior earn-
ings will not enjoy the priority of an administration expense. 
3. Deductions for Expenses Incurred Before Bankruptcy 
The foregoing problem has its analogue on the deduction side, 
in situations where the individual bankrupt had incurred expenses 
of a deductible nature but his right to deduct them had not matured 
before bankruptcy, either because the amount was not yet fixedaso 
or because the bankrupt, being on the cash basis of accounting, 
had not made payment.387 
In the early case of Charles R. Stuart,388 the bankrupt was a 
corporate director against whom a judgment for over 7 million 
dollars had been entered shortly before he filed a voluntary petition 
in bankruptcy. He claimed on his individual return a deduction 
for a loss, equal to the cost basis of property turned over to the 
384. See text accompanying notes 473-79 infra. 
385. The impropriety of treating as an administration expense a tax attributable 
to prebankruptcy income will be discussed in part I(B)(2)(a) of Plumb, supra note 165. 
386. E.g., Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 281 (1944); Lucas v. 
American Code Co., 280 U.S. 445 (1930); Commissioner v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, 281 
F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 964 (1961). 
387. Helvering v. Price, 309 U.S. 409 (1940). 
388. 38 B.T.A. 1147 (1938). -
April 1974] Tax Recommendations 1003 
trustee. The Service, declaring that no loss is sustained upon the 
transfer of one's property to a trustee in bankruptcy,889 although 
conceding that the judgment itself would have resulted in a de-
ductible loss if the bankrupt had been using the accrual method 
of accounting,890 denied the deduction. The court, however, unan-
imously rejected the view that taxpayers using the cash basis could 
be permanently deprived of deductions to which they would have 
been entitled if they were using the accrual basis and declared that 
"[t]he only difference in treatment countenanced by the income 
tax law is the year of deduction."891 · 
In B & L Farms Co. v. United States,892 the facts generally paral-
lelled those of the Stuart case, except that the bankrupt was a corpo-
ration. The bankrupt, which used the cash basis of accounting, had 
over 2.4 million dollars of unpaid and undeducted trade accounts, 
which its trustees paid in the year following bankruptcy. Seeking to 
avail itself of a loss carryback to its last profitable year, three years 
before the year of bankruptcy, the bankrupt (through its trustees) 
claimed deduction of those expenses as if they were satisfied in the 
year title was transferred to the trustees, rather than in the subse-
quent year, when they were actually paid.893 The district court held 
that the accounts were not satisfied by the transfer of the accounts to 
the trustees, who represented the interests of the bankrupt as well as 
of his creditors and who did not, at that time, have "any fixed duty to 
pay over any specific amounts to any particular creditors."894 The 
court initially distinguished Stuart as involving "a specific deductible 
loss, arising from a court judgment"395-although a hundred trade 
accounts are surely as "specific" as one judgment-and then, on re-
hearing, rejected Stuart outright as "directly contrary to the over-
whelming weight of authority on this point."396 (The court was re-
389. It relied on I.T. 2898, XIV-I Cm.r. BULL. 70 (1935). 
390. On the accrual basis, the extreme unlikelihood that an otherwise deductible 
item will ever be paid by a failing or insolvent debtor is not a ground for denying 
or deferring a deduction therefor. Fahs v. Martin, 224 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1955); Zim-
merman Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 130 F.2d IOU (8th Cir. 1942); Edward L. Cohen, 
21 T.C. 855 (1954), acquiesced in, 1954-2 Cu11r. BULL. 4; Rev. Rul. 70-367, 1970-2 Cm.r. 
BULL.37. 
391. 38 B.T .A. at 1151. 
392. 238 F. Supp. 407 (S.D. Fla. 1965), affd. per curiam, 368 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 
1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 835 (1967). 
393. A three-year carryback, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 172(b)(l)(A), from the year 
of payment by the trustee would not have reached the last profitable year. 
394. 238 F. Supp. at 410. 
395. 238 F. Supp. at 411. 
396. 238 F. Supp. at 414. 
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ferring397 to cases that hold that "payment" of expenses by a cash-
basis taxpayer must be made in cash or its equivalent, and not merely 
by changing the form of the obligation.) The Fifth Circuit affirmed 
without opinion, approving "the conclusions" of the district court 
over the dissent of Judge Brown, who argued in vain that upon 
adjudication the bankrupt "lost irrevocably control over the use or 
disposition of corporation assets," that "[b ]y every realistic standard 
the creditors were 'paid' at the moment the Trustee came into pos• 
session and control of the Bankrupt's assets under the inescapable 
obligation to hold and distribute them (or their proceeds) to cred-
itors,"398 and that "the Trustee's obligation, first, foremost, and 
always, is to the creditors" and only incidentally to the bankrupt.800 
In the recent case of Henry C. Mueller,400 the Tax Court, without 
referring to Stuart, held B &- L Farms equally applicable to individual 
bankrupts. Because of his inability to pay $100,000 of offsetting ex-
penses, $43,702.31 of which was, in fact, paid two years later by the 
trustee from the proceeds of his assets, Mueller was found to have 
taxable net income of $60,000 to the date of his bankruptcy. No 
deduction was allowed to the bankrupt either in the year of bank-
ruptcy or by way of carryback from the later taxable year of the 
estate,401 which, as a distinct ta."{payer, lacked income to offset the 
expenses.402 The Tax Court felt that the rationale of the district 
court opinion in B &- L Farms, in effect approved by the Fifth Circuit 
to which Mueller would go on appeal,403 left no room for distinguish-
397. 238 F. Supp. at 410-11, citing Helvering v. Price, 309 U.S. 409 (1940); Doggett 
v. Commissioner, 275 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1960); P.G. Lake, Inc. v. Commissioner, 148 
F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1945); Citizens Natl. Trust 8: Sav. Bank v. Welch, 119 F.2d 717 (9th 
Cir. 1941); Arthur Kniffen, 39 T.C. 553 (1962); Vander Poel v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 
407 (1947). 
398. 368 F.2d at 571. 
399. 368 F.2d at 572. 
400. 60 T.C. 36, 44 (1973). 
401. Concerning carryovers or carrybacks of losses between the trustee and the 
individual, see text accompanying notes 484-517 infra. 
402. It is open to question whether the trustee, as a distinct taxpayer from the one 
who incurred the expense, would have been entitled to the deductions in any event. 
See text accompanying notes 226-29 supra. No claim was made that the bankrupt him-
self might deduct the expenses in the year of payment by the trustee. In some circum• 
stances, the payment of one's expenses by another may entitle the obligor to a deduc-
tion. Leward Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner, 245 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1957); Norman 
Cooledge, 40 B.T .A. 1325 (1939). But cf. Arthur L. Kniffen, 39 T.C. 553, 566·67 (1962): 
Hanna Furnace Corp. v. Kavanagh, 50-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ,i 9443 (E.D, Mich, 1950), 
However, the fact that the debtor would meanwhile have been discharged of his ob-
ligations might be an impediment in this instance. 
403. The Tax Court, although a court of nationwide jurisdiction, considers itself 
bound by a decision of the court to which the particular case would go on appeal. 
Jack E. Golsen, 54 T.C. 742, 756-58 (1970), afjd. on other grounds, 445 F.2d 985 (10th 
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ing individual from corporate cases. It ignored the very real differ-
ence that a trustee for a corporate bankrupt is taxed under section 
6012(b)(3) as a continuation of the taxable entity of the corporation 
so that the transfer of title to the trustee in such a case involves 
payment to the taxpayer's alter ego404 and denial of the deduction at 
that time to the cash-basis corporation affects only the timing, not the 
ultimate allowability, of that taxpayer's deduction.405 The individual 
bankrupt, in contrast, passes his property to a distinct taxable entity 
at the date of bankruptcy,406 and a deduction denied to him then, 
although incurred and accrued in his business, is lost to him forever, 
solely because of his choice of accounting method. 
Five judges, dissenting in Mueller, declared that the effect of that 
decision was to tax a cash-basis bankrupt on his gross receipts and 
that "this disparity in result as between a cash basis taxpayer and an 
accrual basis taxpayer ... [cannot] be allowed to stand."407 They 
referred to Bongiovanni v. Commissioner,408 in which, in another 
connection, the Second Circuit had stated, "There is no justification 
for making an accounting method inadvertently chosen by the tax-
payer determinative of the tax benefits ... of that taxpayer."409 Un-
fortunately, however, the Second Circuit was stating an ideal rather 
than reflecting reality, since such discriminations are not uncommon 
in our tax system.410 Three judges who concurred in the prevailing 
decision in Mueller although they viewed its results as "unfortunate" 
were perhaps more realistic in recognizing the problem as calling 
for a legislative, rather than a judicial, solution.411 
In considering the appropriate legislative solution, we must first 
clear away some underbrush, reflected in the prevailing opinion in 
Mueller, which, in partial justification for denying the bankrupt the 
benefit of deductions attributable to expenses paid from the proceeds 
of his assets, declared: 
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971). It was not precluded, however, from finding a 
relevant appellate decision to be distinguishable, cf. Estate of George I. Speer, 57 T.C. 
804, 812 (1972), particularly as the Fifth Circuit had endorsed only the "conclusions" 
below. -
404. See text accompanying notes 75-112 supra. 
405. See text accompanying note 391 supra. 
406. See text accompanying notes 106-34 supra. 
407, 60 T.C. at 48. 
408. 60 T.C. at 48, citing 470 F.2d 921 (2d Cir, 1972). 
409. 470 F.2d at 924. 
410. E.g., United States v. Catto, 384 U.S. 102, 113-17 (1966); United States v. 
Rexach, 482 F.2d 10, 20 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3306 (U.S., Nov. 20, 1973); 
Willging v. United States, 474 F.2d 12 (9th Cir. 1973). 
411. 60 T.C. at 47-48. 
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· A bankrupt ta.xpayer does not have a diminished interest in his 
bankrupt estate because of expenses or losses incurred by the estate, 
but rather his creditors receive a lesser amount. In fact, through the 
bankruptcy proceedings, the bankrupt taxpayer is discharged from 
liabilities which here were (and usually are) greatly in excess of the 
basis in the property which he turned over, and is also relieved from 
any income from cancellation of indebtedness as well.412 
Four points in that statement require comment. 
First, the court's statements about the amounts that were can-
celled were gratuitous, since the issue concerned not the tax treat-
ment of amounts that went unpaid, but the deductibility of amounts 
that the bankrupt's assets sufficed to pay. There is no necessary rela-
tionship in any given case between the amount of otherwise deducti-
ble debts in fact paid from such assets and the amount of capital 
obligations or ot4er nondeductible items that go unpaid and result 
in at least a theoretical benefit to the discharged debtor, a benefit 
that, under long-standing judicial and administrative policy, is re-
lieved from tax.413 If the policy of exempting the latter is unsound, 
one should attack it directly, rather than enforce a "trade-off" by 
denying deductions for actual payments that may be greater or less 
than the benefit derived from relief from obligations that go un-
paid. 414 
Second, the court's remark415 about the discharged debts' being 
in excess of the basis of the debtor's property, while uncalled for in 
the particular case (in which the debtor sought to deduct no more 
than the adjusted basis of the property applied to his debts), does 
point to the fact that a logical, and perhaps necessary, corollary to 
treating the transfer to the trustee as satisfaction of the individual's 
obligations would be to treat such transfer as realizing gain or loss 
equal to the difference between the adjusted basis and the value of 
the property so applied, 416 contrary to the Tax Court's view that no 
taxable disposition occurs at such time.411 
412. 60 T.C. at 45. 
413. Treas. Reg.§ l.61-12(b) (1957). Cf. text accompanying note 269 supra. 
414. Cf. quotation from Tillinghast & Gardner, supra note 267, at 714, in note 508 
infra. The Commission has proposed that, except where the creditor involved suc-
ceeds to an equity interest in the debtor, the debtor's carryovers and other deductions 
for periods ending after the discharge should be adjusted to exclude the effect of 
obligations that will never have to be paid. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, 
§ 7-315(b); id. at 293 (proposed INT. R.Ev. Com~ OF 1954, § 172(d)(7)). See Plumb, supra 
note 270. 
415. 60 T.C. at 43. 
416. See text accompanying notes 442-51 infra. Such is the rule in the absence of 
bankruptcy. See note 446 infra. Mueller's deduction of only the amount of the ad• 
justed basis of the property transferred was a shortcut to a similar result, although 
it could differ if, for example, the gain was capital and the expense was ordinary. 
417. Homer A. Martin, 56 T.C. 1294, 1299 (1971). 
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Third, while it was true in Mueller that the allowance of the de-
duction that reduced tax liability for the year in which bankruptcy 
occurred would have benefited the discharged bankrupt rather than 
his unsatisfied creditors, that would no longer be true under the 
Commission's proposal to make the bankrupt's tax, computed to the 
date of bankruptcy, an allowable priority claim against the estate,418 
since any deduction permitted against such liability would make 
more assets available for creditors.419 
Fourth, despite the preachments of the opinion against allowing 
deductions even for satisfied obligations when others have been dis-
charged, the Tax Court has not in this generation questioned the 
axiom that an accrual-basis taxpayer may deduct even expenses that 
he is patently unable to pay and does not pay;420 moreover, it seems 
clear that, even on the cash basis, the trustee for a corporate bankrupt, 
standing in the debtor's shoes, may deduct and carry back to pre-
bankruptcy years the expense claims actually paid from the estate.421 
Clearly, an unwarranted penalty is imposed if, in a bankruptcy 
situation, a tax is, in effect, imposed on gross income or gross receipts 
of a noncorporate cash-basis taxpayer and otherwise allowable deduc-
tions are lost forever as a result of the intervention of the trustee as a 
technically separate taxpayer. It is no answer to allow the deductions 
to the trustee,422 even if (contrary to the Commission's recommenda-
tion) the estate remains subject to tax, for such treatment may separ-
ate the deductions from the income to which they relate423 and there 
is a high probability that the estate will have insufficient gross income 
during the period of administration to offset an accumulation of the 
bankrupt's previously unpaid expenses. Nor would it be appropriate 
418. See text accompanying notes 319-35 supra. 
419. If, instead of net income, the bankrupt had had a net operating loss for the 
year of bankruptcy and had had net income in past years against which to offset it, 
the benefit of the deduction would have been enjoyed by the creditors, whether under 
present law, Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966), or under the proposed legislation. 
See text accompanying notes 455-67 infra. 
420. See note 390 supra. In an earlier day, the Tax Court stood firm against such 
deductions only to have the government concede the case on appeal. Millar Brainard, 
7 T.C. 1180 (1946). 
421. Cf. text accompanying notes 75-104 supra. The government's position in B & L 
Farms Co. v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 407 (S.D. Fla. 1965), affd. per curiam, 368 
F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 835 (1967), was not that expense pay-
ments by a corporate bankrupt could not be deducted, but that, on the cash basis, 
the corporation, represented by the trustee, could not deduct them until payment by 
the trustee. 
422. Concerning present law, see text accompanying notes 226-29 supra. 
423. This occurred in the Mueller case. See text accompanying notes 400-02 supra. 
While the matching of income with the related deductions is an ideal not invariably 
achieved in the tax law, see, e.g., Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128 (1963); Heaven 
Hill Distilleries, Inc. v. United States, 476 F.2d 1327, 1336-37 (Ct. CI. 1973), such match-
ing in the hands of the same taxpayer is a desirable legislative goal. 
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to allow the expenses to the individual bankrupt in any period end-
ing after the filing of the petition and, thereby, supplement his "fresh 
start" with postbankruptcy tax savings that are "rooted in the pre-
bankruptcy past.''424 Since the deductible items, so far as satisfied at 
all, are paid from the estate and deplete the assets available for other 
creditors, the appropriate legislative solution would be to allow the 
individual to deduct at the time of bankruptcy all otherwise deducti-
ble obligations that are, in fact, ultimately satisfied in the proceed-
ing.425 In this manner, the deductions either would reduce a tax that 
(under the Commission's proposal) would be allowable as a claim 
against the estate426 or would become available for carryback or carry-
over for the benefit of the estate.427 The deductions would also be 
matched against the yet uncollected income, which, under my preced-
ing proposal, would be taxed in the same period.428 
In support of this recommendation, I tum again to the prece-
dent of the 1934, 1936, and 1938 Revenue Acts and the 1939 Code 
as originally enacted, by section 43 of which the "accrued" deduc-
tions of a decedent were allowed in his final return, regardless of 
his accounting method, in a manner similar to the treatment of 
accrued income items under section 42, discussed above.429 The 
Board of Tax Appeals (predecessor of the Tax Court) held that sec-
tion 43, like section 42, dispensed with the usual requirement that, 
in order to have "accrued," an item must have been :fi..xed or deter-
mined in amount (that is, not contingent or in contest) within the 
taxable period,430 but that decision was reversed by the Second 
Circuit.431 The legislation here suggested should make clear that, 
consistently with its purpose, any deductible items constituting 
424. Cf. Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966). 
425. The Tax Court in Mueller, 60 T.C. at 44 n.6, protested that "[o]bviously, allo• 
cation of percentage receipts between business and nonbusiness creditors would pose 
many problems." Yet, the allowance by the court of discrete claims makes the appor-
tionment far simpler than, for example, the task, which the Tax Court has not 
shunned, see Sidney Merians, 60 T.C. 187 (1973), of apportioning a lump sum legal fee 
among services of a deductible and nondeductible nature. Cf. Rev. Rul. 72-545, 1972-2 
CUM. Buu.. 179. 
426. See text accompanying notes 319-35 supra. 
427. Under present law and the Commission's proposal, refunds of individual taxes 
resulting from carrybacks from the period in which bankruptcy occurs become assets 
of the estate, and the Commission would also make carryovers from such period al• 
lowable to the estate, if it is taxable at all. See text accompanying notes 452-535 infra. 
428. See text accompanying notes 336-85 supra. 
429. See id. 
430. Estate of Lewis Cass Ledyard, 44 B.T .A. 1056, 1066-67 (1941), reud. sub. nom, 
Commissionerv. United States Trust Co., 143 F.2d 243 (2d Cir.1944). 
431. Commissioner v. United States Trust Co., 143 F.2d 243,245 (1944). 
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allowable claims against the estate, whether or not fixed in amount 
before bankruptcy, should be accumulated in the tax computation 
for the debtor's final prebankruptcy period, which would be held 
open for the purpose.432 
In corporate bankruptcies, provided the estate is not exempted 
from tax,433 there may be less need to accelerate the deduction· 
of expenses into the period preceding bankruptcy, since the· estate 
continues the tax identity of the bankrupt,434 and the creditors, 
through the estate, will theoretically get the same benefit whether 
the deductions are allowed in one year or another. As the B & L 
Farms case435 illustTates, however, in a bankruptcy situation a 
deduction deferred will very likely be a deduction lost, for the 
delay pending liquidation of assets and payment of debts may well 
make it impossible for losses during administration to be carried 
back as far as the corporation's last profitable period. To avoid 
penalizing creditors for the law's delays,436 as well as to lessen the 
discrimination against cash-basis taxpayers, I suggest that this pro-
posal be applied to corporations, as well as to individual bankrupts. 
In addition, while somewhat different considerations apply, the 
treatment adopted for expense items should be applied consistently 
to income. 
It may be noted that the foregoing proposal would not eliminate 
the discrimination between cash- and accrual-basis taxpayers ( or 
their creditors, who would indirectly benefit from their cleductions), 
since the tax liabilities of those on the accrual basis :will have been 
reduced, not merely by the deduction of obligations that are sat-
isfied in the proceeding, but also by the deduction of those obliga-
tions that it proves impossible to pay from the assets of the estate. 
One might suppose that the better way to equalize cash- and accrual-
basis taxpayers in this respect would be to undo the prior accrual 
of expenses to the extent that it is established in bankruptcy that 
432. The reporting procedure described above, see text accompanying notes 374-76 
supra, should be followed. · 
433. If the Commission's exemption proposal is adopted, there is strong reason to 
accelerate the deductions for expenses attributable to the prebankruptcy period, since 
these expenses have nothing to do with administration and should not be wasted 
merely because payment was deferred. · 
434. See text accompanying notes 75-104 supra. 
435. See text accompanying notes 392-99 supra. 
436. Cf. American Iron & Steel Mfg. Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 233 U.S. 261, 
266 (1914), in which, in stopping interest from running during bankruptcy, the Court 
said, "As this delay was the act of the law, no one should thereby gain an advantage 
or suffer a loss." 
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they will never be paid,437 rather than to give the cash-basis tax-
payer an equal right to an unearned deduction for unpaid ex-
penses.438 There would be merit in that view if the deductions 
might benefit the debtor. But to deny the deductions against taxes 
that are collectible from the estate or to deny resulting carrybacks 
or carryovers from which the estate might benefit depletes the very 
funds that might otherwise be available to pay the defaulted obli-
gations and make them deductible.439 It would be just to give the 
unsatisfied creditors, in effect, a preference over so much of the 
bankrupt's tax liability as is incurred solely by reason of his inability 
to satisfy other creditors, by allowing deductions to cash-basis tax-
payers, individual or corporate, for accrued expenses unpaid at the 
time of bankruptcy for the purpose of computing the tax claim 
allowable against the estate and any resulting carrybacks or carry-
overs, but not for the purpose of computing the debtor's nondis-
chargeable liability for such tax or any carryover from which he 
may benefit.440 I submit that this suggestion is not inconsistent 
with the substance of the Commission's proposal, which I support, 
to reduce the debtor's (or a successor's) loss carryovers by the amount 
of deductions attributable to obligations that go unpaid as a result 
of a proceeding in bankruptcy.441 That proposal is designed to 
prevent the debtor, or creditors other than those who suffered the 
loss, from gaining a benefit from such deductions, but it is not meant 
to deprive the unpaid creditors of such benefit, as is evidenced by 
the fact that the disallowance is expressly made inapplicable to 
unpaid obligations for which a creditor receives an equity security 
and thus retains a stake in the resulting tax benefit. 
437. The tax consequences of debt reduction in bankruptcy will be more fu]]y 
discussed in Plumb, supra note 270. 
438. The Service resists efforts by cash-basis insolvents to change to the accrual 
basis in order to avail themselves of deductions for expenses they cannot pay. See 
Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Womack, Inc., 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ,r 9146 (E.D. Va. 1972), affd. 
on another issue, 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ,r 9326 (4th Cir. 1974). Cf. Millar Brainard, 7 T.C. 
USO, ll82-83 (1946). 
439. See Wurzel, Taxation During Bankruptcy Liquidation, 55 HARV. L, REv. 1141, 
1149 (1942). Cf. United States v. Rochelle, 384 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 
U.S. 946 (1968) (funds of bankrupt confidence man exhausted by claim for taxes on 
his ill-gotten gains, to exclusion of obligation to repay victims); Irving v. Gray, 344 
F. Supp. 567,573 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), afjd., 479 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1973). 
440. The Commission would deny an individual any carryover of prebankruptcy 
losses against his postbankruptcy income. See text accompanying notes 503-10 infra. 
441. COJ',!MISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 293 (proposed INT. REV. CODI!: OF 1954, 
§ 172(d)(7)). See Plumb, supra note 270. 
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4. Gain or Loss on the Bankrupt's Property Applied to His Debts 
It has been urged above442 that there is no justification for 
exempting from taxation the gains on sales by the trustee of property 
of the bankrupt or for denying deductions for losses on such sales, 
but it does not follow that the trustee is the proper party to whom 
such gains and losses should be recognized. I suggest that it would 
be more appropriate to treat the occurrence of bankruptcy as the 
event by which gain or loss is realized, not by the trustee but by 
the debtor, as if he had then applied the property, to the extent 
of its value, in satisfaction of his debts.443 While it may be argued 
that the surrender of the debtor's property to the trustee does not 
per se discharge his debts,444 the application of the property to the 
partial satisfaction of the debts is certainly the contemplated result 
of the series of transactions initiated by the petition, and the inter-
vention of the trustee as the instrument for liquidation and· pay-
ment may properly be ignored.445 The suggested treatment is, fur-
thermore, the logical concomitant of the preceding proposal to treat 
bankruptcy as the event giving rise to deduction by the debtor of 
his previously undeducted expenses.446 
Where losses would result from disposition of the property, as 
is likely when the bankrupt's property is obsolete or in poor con-
dition, treatment of the occurrence of bankruptcy as the loss-realizing 
event would provide greater flexibility in absorption of the loss 
deductions against income. The estate, if exempted from tax, would 
itself have no use for the deduction of losses on its subsequent 
sales and, if taxable, could use them only against the (probably) 
limited income of the period of administration. While the bankrupt, 
too, may, during the three full years before bankruptcy, have had 
little net income against which a loss might be offset (with result-
442. See text accompanying notes 242-72 supra. 
443. Under present law, the bankrupt's surrender of his property to the trustee, 
although it results in discharge of his debts, is not a transaction resulting in gain or 
loss to him. Homer A. Martin, 56 T.C. 1294, 1299 (1971); Norris Bloomfield, 52 T.C. 
745, 749 (1969); Frances M. Parkford, 45 B.T.A. 461, 471 (1941), afjd., 133 F.2d 249, 251 
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 741 (1943). Cf. I.T. 2898, XIV-I CuM. BULL. 70 (1935). 
444. See Henry C. Mueller, 60 T.C. 36, 43-44 (1973), discussed in text accompanying 
notes 400-21 supra, 
445. Cf. Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179, 184-85 (1942). 
446. In general, the application of property to the satisfaction of deductible ob• 
ligations results in realization of gain or loss, in addition to the deduction. United 
States v. General Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 843 
(1961); International Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1943). 
Cf, United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962). 
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ing benefit to the estate through tax refunds),447 the chance that the 
loss may be absorbed against income of the debtor or of the estate 
at some time in the carryback or carryover period is enhanced. 
It is assumed, of course, that this suggested treatment will be coupled 
with adoption of the Commission's proposal to allow the trustee 
to utilize carryovers qf any individual losses on the estate's returns,448 
so that turning the loss into an individual one will not make it 
unavailable to the estate to the extent that it is not absorbed against 
past income of the debtor. 
Where gains would result, creditors would, of course, be better 
off if the gain were deemed realized by the estate, assuming adop-
tion of the proposed exemption. Nevertheless, I submit that the 
prebankruptcy values thus realized are not income incident to 
administration of the estate and should not enjoy the exemption. 
If the estate remains ta'Cable, some creditors (preferred wage claim-
ants and state and local governments) may prefer the treatment here 
suggested, which would reduce the resulting tax from its present 
inappropriate priority status as an expense of administration. If the 
tax is not satisfied from assets of the estate, the suggested treatment 
would leave it outstanding as a nondischargeable obligation of the 
debtor, whereas, at present, it can be satisfied only from the estate. 
That effect is regarded by Krause and Kapiloff as an undesirable 
one, which "would frustrate the theory of rehabilitation of giving 
the debtor a fresh start."449 So long as Congress has seen fit, how-
ever, to "frustrate" that theory to the extent of making certain taxes 
nondischargeable, it is difficult to see why any different treatment 
should be given to the tax on appreciation realized and made avail-
able for satisfaction of the bankrupt's debts, whether the property 
is sold before or after the occurrence of bankruptcy. In many cases, 
the effect of this proposal on the bankrupt may be neutral, since 
the consequence of treating the tax on the trustee's gain as an admin-
istration expense, as at present, may be to leave other nondischarge-
able outstanding taxes unsatisfied; it would also be neutral, of 
course, if assets, including the appreciation on which the tax is 
imposed, suffice to pay both first and fourth priority items. 
As a matter of strict principle, only the tax that would have· 
been incurred on a sale at fair market value at the date of the peti-
tion should be treated as proposed, since the tax on any further 
447. See Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966), discussed in text accompanying 
notes 458-67 infra. 
448. See text accompanying notes 484-92 infra. 
449. Krause & Kapiloff, supra note 83, at 417. 
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increment in the gain may be regarded as an incident to admin-
istration. To split the gain and the resulting tax, however, would 
require the expense of an appraisal at the date of the petition, and 
the chance that realizable values in a bankruptcy sale (unless pos-
sibly in the case of a mineral strike or a prolonged administration 
in an inflationary period) would exceed the fair market values at 
the date of bankruptcy seems too remote to justify imposing such a 
requirement.46~ Therefore, I suggest that the measurement of the 
gain or loss should be deferred until sale by the trustee, even 
though the taxable event is deemed to be the transfer from the 
bankrupt to the trustee.451 This deferral of determination of the 
gain also permits eliminating from taxability the appreciation on 
any property that is returned to the bankrupt without sale, either 
as exempt property or as property in excess of debts. 
JI!. Ar.LOCATION OF CARRYOVERS AND CARRYBACKS BETWEEN THE 
EsTATE AND THE INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR 
The Commission would confirm the present rule that the trustee 
for an individual bankrupt is entitled to recover for the estate any 
refunds that result from the carryback of losses incurred before 
bankruptcy and would preclude the dilution of such carrybacks 
by income the debtor may realize in the postbankruptcy portion 
of the year in which bankruptcy occurs.452 In addition, carryovers 
of such losses to postbankruptcy years would, in all cases, be denied 
to an individual bankrupt and would be made available to offset 
income of the estate in those unusual situations in which, by reason 
of the ultimate solvency of the estate, the estate's income would 
remain taxable.453 No provision is proposed to be made, however, 
for the trustee, in such cases, to step into the shoes of the bankrupt 
450. Nevertheless, it may be appropriate to charge the administration with so 
much of the gain as equals depreciation and depletion deductions taken on the 
property during administration, at least so far as the deductions resulted in tax 
benefit to the estate. 
451. While this would make the amount of the priority claim uncertain until dis-
position of the property, it should not interfere with normal administration, since the 
contingent priority claim cannot exceed the proceeds of the unsold property, which 
itself should suffice as provision therefor. See text preceding note 376 supra. In the 
rare case in which the sale proceeds exceed the value at the date of bankruptcy while 
the nondischargeable tax imposed on the bankrupt under this proposal remains unsatis-
fied from assets of the estate, it may be appropriate to relieve the bankrupt to the 
extent that the unsatisfied amount exceeds what his tax would have been if meas-
ured by the value of date of bankruptcy. 
452. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 5-104(c). However, certain cash equiv-
alents, including tax refunds, would be exempt to an aggregate amount of 500 dollars. 
Id. § 4-503(c)(3). 
453. Id. § 5-104(c). 
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individual with respect to miscellaneous carryovers, accounting 
methods, application of the tax benefit rule, and the like.41i4 
A. Net Operating and Capital Losses 
I. Carrybacks 
In the typical case, a business bankruptcy will have been pre-
ceded by a period of net operating losses that extended to the date 
when the trustee took over the business and property. Such losses, 
for federal income tax purposes, may ordinarily be carried back to 
offset any net income the debtor may have had in the three years 
preceding the taxable year of the loss and thus result in refunds 
of taxes previously paid.455 Since the trustee in bankruptcy of an 
individual does not succeed to the tax identity of the bankrupt 
and the individual's taxable year is not interrupted by the occur-
rence of bankruptcy,456 the courts at one time supposed that refunds 
that resulted from the carryback of losses for the year of bankruptcy 
were postbankruptcy assets that did not pass to the trustee.m In Segal 
v. Rochelle,458 however, the Supreme Court held that the right to 
refunds, so far as they are based on the carryback of the portion 
of the bankrupt's net operating loss that had been incurred before 
bankruptcy, is an asset that existed at the date of bankruptcy and 
passed to the trustee, under section 70a(5) of the Bankruptcy Act,409 
as "property, including rights of action, which prior to the filing 
of the petition he could by any means have transferred . . .. " The 
Court declared that the "main thrust" of that provision is "to secure 
for creditors everything of value the bankrupt may possess in alien-
able or leviable form when he files his petition,"460 that it was 
equitable to give the creditors the benefit of the carryback because 
"the very losses generating the refunds often help precipitate the 
bankruptcy and injury to the creditors,"461 and that the refund is 
454. See text accompanying notes 536-43 infra. 
455. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 172(b)(l)(A). 
456. See text accompanying notes 106, 319-22 supra. 
457. Fournier v. Rosenblum, 318 F.2d 525 (1st Cir. 1963); In re Sussman, 289 F.2d 
76 (3d Cir. 1961). No similar question arose in corporate cases or in individual re-
habilitation proceedings, where the estate steps into the tax shoes of the debtor. See 
text accompanying notes 75-104, 142-46 supra. Concerning the possible exception when 
a corporation in straight bankruptcy obtains a discharge and resumes business, sec 
notes 94-96 supra. 
458. 382 U.S. 375 (1966). 
459. II U.S.C. § 110(a)(5) (1970). 
460, 382 U.S. at 379. 
461. 382 U.S. at 378, citing the misgivings of the courts in the earlier adverse de-
cisions cited in note 457 supra. Although the debtor, too, has lost his stake as a result 
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"sufficiently rooted in the prebankruptcy past and so little entangled 
with the bankrupt's ability to make an unencumbered fresh start 
that it should be regarded as 'property' under § 70a(5)."462 The 
contingency that "earnings by the bankrupt after filing the petition 
might diminish or eliminate the loss-carryback refund claim"463 
did not negate its character as property under the Act, since "an 
interest is not outside its reach because it is novel or contingent or 
because enjoyment must be postponed."464 The argument that 
the rights were property that the bankrupt could not "by any means 
have transferred" was rejected on the ground that, while assign-
ments of claims against the United States, before their allowance, 
are by law made "absolutely null and void,''465 that provision voids 
a transfer only as against the government and does not affect its 
validity between the parties to the assignment.466 The Commission 
would confirm and codify the Segal rule by prescribing that, not-
withstanding any federal or state law to the contrary, "[t]he right 
to any refund of taxes paid by the debtor, resulting from the carry-
back of net losses sustained before the date of the petition, shall 
be vested in the trustee and may be recovered as property of the 
debtor."467 
Since the trustee is not entitled to file a return for the indi-
vidual, the approved procedure for his obtaining the benefit of the 
carryback refunds is to file a claim for refund in his capacity as 
representative of the bank.rupt.468 If the bankrupt improperly obtains 
of his operating losses, it is the creditors who are entitled first to be made whole out 
of the assets existing at bankruptcy. 
462. 382 U.S. at 380. 
463. 382 U.S. at 380. 
464. 382 U.S. at 379. 
465. 31 u.s.c. § 203 (1970). 
466. Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 384 (1966), citing Martin v. National Surety 
Co., 300 U.S. 588, 596 (1937). Matured income tax refund claims bad earlier been held 
to pass to the trustee, Chandler v. Nathans, 6 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1925), and to be trans-
ferable to a receiver in a chapter XI arrangement. In re Kepp Elec. 8e Mfg. Co., 98 F. 
Supp. 51 (D. Minn. 1951). The requirement of alienability would in any event, under 
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 4-601, no longer be a condition to the passing of 
property to the estate. 
467. Id. § 5-I04(c). In prescribing a federal set of standards for exemptions, in lieu 
of those established by state law and section 6 of the present Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. 
§ 24 (1970), the Commission would exempt certain cash equivalents, including tax 
refunds, in the aggregate amount of 500 dollars plus the excess of the debtqr's "home-
stead" exemption (5000 dollars plus 500 dollars for each dependent) over the value 
of the equity in his home. CoMl\IJSSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 4-503(b)(2), (c)(3). But 
such exempt property would vest in the trustee for the purpose of collection and ad-
ministration. Id. §§ 4-601(a)(l), -503 n.1, 
468. Rev. Rul. 72-387, 1972-2 CtJM. BULL. 632. The requisites for refund claims 
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the refund in his ovm right (for example, by accompanying his 
return filed after bankruptcy with an application for a "quickie" 
refund for the earlier years469), the bankruptcy court may order 
the bankrupt to tum over the amount recovered to the trustee.470 
Sometimes, however, the carryback will result, not in a refund, but 
in reduction of a proposed deficiency for the earlier years to which 
the loss is carried, a reduction that the trustee may assert as a 
defense to a tax claim filed by the government in the bankruptcy 
proceeding. If, before bankruptcy, the bankrupt had filed a peti-
tion in the Tax Court contesting the deficiency, the Tax Court 
retains jurisdiction concurrent with the bankruptcy court, and the 
amount of the liability will be settled by the first court that reaches 
a decision.471 The trustee may make himself a party to the Tax 
Court case and assert the bankrupt's defenses.472 
by trustees in their representative capacity are set out in Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2(e) 
(1955). A claim by the bankrupt himself is improper even if the estate has been 
closed. Brangan v. United States, 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ,i 9214 (E.D. Va. 1973), 
469. Refunds based on loss carrybacks are required to be paid within 90 days after 
application therefor (made after filing of the return for the loss year), subject to sub-
sequent audit. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6411; Treas. Reg. § 1.6411-1, T.D, 6950, 1968-1 
CUM. BULL. 528, 538, 
470. This procedure was followed in Fournier v. Rosenblum, 318 F.2d 525 (1st 
Cir. 1963), although (since the case arose prior to the Segal decision) the First Circuit 
vacated the order of the district court inasmuch as it felt that it was not improper for 
the bankrupt to claim the carryback refund, 
471. In re Fotochrome, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 958 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Fotochromc, 
Inc., 57 T.C. 842 (1972). See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6871. The Commission's pro-
posal to permit removal to the bankruptcy court of "any civil action" pending on the 
date of the petition, C0Minss10N REPORT, supra note 3, § 2-202, would not apply to a 
Tax Court case since it relates only to actions "in a state or federal district court." 
472. Treas. Reg. § 301.6871(b)-l(a), T.D. 6425, 1959-2 CUM. BULL, 384, 413, See 
BANKR. R. 610. If the carryback exceeds the income determined for the earlier year, 
the Tax Court may find an overpayment. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6512(b). The Tax 
Court seems clearly in error in holding, in Norris Bloomfield, 52 T.C. 745 (1969), 
motion denied, 54 T.C. 554 (1970), that, since the trustee and the bankrupt arc separate 
taxpayers and the carryback, under the Segal rule, belongs to the trustee, the carryback 
cannot be allowed in a case instituted by the bankrupt, even if the trustee is made a 
party. The carryback, on the contrary, belongs to the trustee, not as a taxpayer, but 
as one to whom an asset of the bankrupt has passed by operation of law. It originates 
as an inchoate right before the estate comes into existence, Segal v. RocheUe, 382 U.S. 
375, 380 (1966), and is measured by income and deductions of the individual, not of the 
estate; there will be a refund only if, taking the carryback into account, the banlirupt 
has overpaid his tax for the earlier year. 'While the Tax Court correctly, see United 
States ex rel. Girard Trust Co. v. Helvering, 301 U.S. 540, 542 (1937), pointed out, 52 
T.C. at 750 n.7, that it had no power to order payment of the refund to the trustee, 
it improperly abdicated its statutory, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6512(b), function of 
determining by how much, considering the carryback, the individual taxpayer had 
overpaid his tax. The Bloomfield decision apparently puts the estate to the further 
trouble, expense, and delay of separately litigating the carryback issue in the bank-
ruptcy court in defense to the government's claim for the deficiency found by the 
Tax Court, a defense that would not be barred by res judicata if, as Bloomfield holds, 
the Tax Court had no jurisdiction to pass on the issue, INT, REv. CODE OF 1954, 
§ 65ll(d)(2)(B)(i); Hanson Clutch & Mach. Co. v. United States, 72-1 U.S. Tax Cas, 
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2. Offset of the Debtor's Income for the Balance of the Year 
For two reasons, the present structure of the federal tax law 
does not permit carrying the Segal rationale to its logical conclusion. 
The first is that, because the individual debtor's taxable year is 
unbroken at bankruptcy, any loss he may suffer in the prebank-
ruptcy portion will first be offset by his earnings, if any, during 
the balance of the year, thereby reducing the amount available 0to 
produce carryback refunds for the benefit of the estate473 and giving 
the debtor a windfall in the form of tax-free treatment of income 
that is unavailable to his creditors.474 This problem would be resolved 
by the Commission's proposal (applicable to state and local, as 
well as federal. taxes) that the loss for the prebankruptcy portion 
of the year be made available for carryback for the benefit of the 
estate, unreduced by postbankruptcy income, on which the debtor 
would be subject to tax.475 
3. Carryovers 
The second impediment to giving full effect to the equitable 
principle of the Segal case is that frequently the bankrupt will have 
had insufficient net income in the three preceding years to absorb 
the losses and produce maximum refunds for the benefit of the 
estate; the unabsorbed operating losses-to which are added 
excess capital losses, which can be carried only forward and not 
back476-may then become available to reduce the taxes that would 
otherwise have been incurred by the discharged debtor on his 
income for five postbank.ruptcy years.477 
,I 9303 (N.D. Ohio 1972). So far as the carryback offsets the deficiency determined by 
the Tax Court, it will be barred if not raised as a defense in the bankruptcy court. 
Cohen v. United States, II5 F.2d 505 (1st Cir. 1940). But if a net overpayment results 
from the carryback, the trustee would apparently have to fragment the case still fur-
ther by filing first a claim for refund and then a plenary suit, since the bankruptcy 
court would have no power to grant affirmative relief against the United States. In re 
Vista Liner Coach &: Trailer, Inc., 447 F.2d 497 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 
954 (1972). The Commission's proposal to permit the trustee to proceed in the bank-
ruptcy court to collect claims on behalf of the estate, COMMISSION REPORT, supra 
note 3, § 2-20l(a), including claims against the United States, id. § 1-104, would 
make unnecessary the third stage of fragmentation, the plenary suit. The Bloomfield 
jurisdictional aberration is not otherwise dealt with and, unless Congress takes the 
initiative, must be left to the Tax Court's power of self-correction. 
473. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 172(c). 
474. On the other hand, if the bankrupt suffers a further loss during the balance 
of the year, it appears that the refunds resulting from the carryback of the loss for 
the full year are to be apportioned between the estate and the individual. See Segal 
v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 380 n.5 (1966). 
475. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 5-104(c). This legislative solution had been 
suggested in Fournier v. Rosenblum, 318 F.2d 525, 527 n.3 (1st Cir. 1963). See also 
Seidman, Some Implications of Segal v. Rochelle, 40 REF. J. 107, 108 (1966). 
476. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1212(b). 
477. INT, REV. CODE OF 1954, § 172(b)(l)(B). 
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The Segal decision left open, but implied a negative answer to, 
the question whether the estate might recoup the ta."C savings enjoyed 
by the debtor from carrying the unabsorbed loss forward to suc-
ceeding years.478 The loss could, in any event, not be used against 
income of the estate as a taxable entity, since loss carryovers, in the 
absence of an express statutory provision, may not ordinarily be 
offset against income of another taxpayer.470 Theoretically, on the 
other hand, the estate should be as entitled to recoup the ta."C saved 
by the individual through his use of the prebankruptcy losses to 
offset his future income as it is to recover the refunds of past taxes 
resulting from carryback of those losses. The individual's tax savings 
through carryovers to later years are as much "rooted in the pre-
bankruptcy past" as the refunds resulting from carrybacks, and the 
bankrupt's right to an "unencumbered fresh start" does not require 
that he enjoy freedom from income tax on his subsequent earnings 
by reason of carryovers of prebankruptcy losses, the burden of which 
fell on his creditors. Loss carryovers and carrybacks are essentially 
averaging devices, "designed to permit a taxpayer to set off [his] 
lean years against [his] lush years, and to strike something like an 
average taxable income computed over a period of longer than one 
year."48° Congress could as easily have provided for the loss to go 
back eight years, in which case the entire benefit of the losses would 
belong to the trustee under the Segal principle. The fact that Con-
gress elected for practical reasons to have the loss carried three years 
back and five years £orward481 does not alter the equities. 
The Court in Segal, however, suggested482 a conceptual impedi-
ment to such an extension of the principle: Whereas the carryback 
refund reflects the offset of income earned by the individual in the 
past against a loss already sustained and is contingent only on the 
possibility that his earnings later in the year of bankruptcy will 
deplete the loss, the tax saving from carryovers is subject to the 
further contingency that the individual have future earnings against 
which the loss may be offset. The Court also took note of the prac-
tical impediment that the estate might have to be held open for a 
number of years awaiting the realization of sufficient earnings by 
the bankrupt to offset the earlier losses.483 It might also have observed 
478. Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 381 (1966). 
479. New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435 (1934). Cf. Libson Shops, Inc. 
v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382, 385-86 (1957). 
480. Libson Shops, Inc, v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382,386 (1957). 
481. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, §§ 172(b)(I)(A)(i), (l)(B). Longer periods for carryback 
and carryover are provided in section 172(b) for special situations. 
482, 382 U.S. at 381. 
483. 382 U.S. at 381. 
April 1974] Tax Recommendations 1019 
that, since the carryover results, not in a claim for tax refund, but 
in a reduction of the bankrupt's tax bill, the trustee would have 
to recover the difference by proceeding against the bankrupt him-
self for the amount saved. 
An alternative to incurring the practical difficulties of policing 
the debtor's later tax situation and of keeping the estate open 
during the five-year carryover period484 ( or of reopening the estate 
for unadministered assets, if necessary485), in order to reclaim later 
tax savings from the debtor, would be to make the debtor's loss 
carryovers available directly to the estate as a taxable entity, to be 
offset against any net income realized by the estate during admin-
istration.486 There is legislative precedent for transferring loss car-
ryovers to a different taxable entity where there is sufficient con-
tinuity of beneficial interest (as there is here, under the Segal ra-
tionale, between the individual in his prebankruptcy period and 
the trustee as representative of the creditors, who bore the burden 
of the loss). The unused operating and capital losses of an estate or 
trust, after its termination, are made available, by section 642(h)(l) 
of the Code, for use against income of the "beneficiaries succeed-
ing to the property of the estate or trust," a phrase that the regula-
tions interpret to mean "those beneficiaries ... who bear the burden 
of any loss for which a carryover is allowed.''487 And such loss carry-
overs of one corporation are made available by sections 38l(c)(l) 
and (3) to offset income of another corporation, if the latter succeeds 
to all or substantially all of the farmer's assets in certain tax-free 
transactions, subject to certain restrictions488 on the transferability 
of the benefit of the loss carryovers to new owners who did not bear 
the burden of the losses. Although the present situation is unusual 
in that the individual taxpayer in whose returns the losses origi-
nated continues to exist, whereas under section 642(h)(I) and in 
most cases under section 381 the transferor's existence is terminated, 
there is precedent for such a case as this. In certain corporate reor-
ganizations within the scope of section 381 it is permissible for the 
484. In the case of capital losses, the carryover period may last for the taxpayer's 
lifetime. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 1212(b). 
485. Bankruptcy Act § 2a(8), 11 U.S.C. § ll(a)(8) (1970). Cf. Brangan v. United 
States, 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 11 9214 (E.D. Va. 1973). See J. MAcLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF 
THE LAw OF BANKRUPTCY§ 307, at 366 (1956). 
486. See Krause & Kapiloff, supra note 83, at 417-18, who urge, as an alternative 
to their preferred course of exempting the estate entirely from income tax, that "at 
the very minimum, the trustee in bankruptcy should be entitled to all of the tax 
benefits to be derived from a debtor's pre-bankruptcy history of operating losses.'' 
487. Treas. Reg.§ l.642(h)-3(a) (1956). 
488, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 382-83. 
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transferor to continue in existence,489 although the transferee suc-
ceeds to the transferor's loss carryovers,490 and the transferor makes 
a fresh tax start.401 
Therefore, in lieu of making the discharged debtor's tax savings 
through carryovers recoverable by the trustee for the benefit of the 
estate, the Commission has proposed that prebankruptcy losses of an 
individual in straight bankruptcy (so far as they are not carried 
back against the debtor's income and made available to the estate 
under the Segal principle) "shall not be allowed [as carryovers] to 
the debtor but shall be allowed to the estate in the computation of 
any [federal, state, or local] taxes on or measured by income of the 
estate in the same manner and for the same periods in which such 
carryovers would have been allowable by law to the debtor."492 
The transfer of the debtor's loss carryovers to the estate will, in 
most cases, be a futile gesture, so far as creditors are concerned, if 
Congress adopts the Commission's companion proposal to exempt 
estates in straight bankruptcy from any taxation of their income, 
except in the unusual cases in which all debts can be paid and 
there remains a surplus for the debtor.403 But even if the estate 
remains subject to income taxation, it may have little administrative 
net income against which to absorb the loss carryovers and, in fact, 
may itself suffer an operating loss, particularly if the expenses in-
curred by a debtor on the cash basis, paid from the proceeds of 
liquidation, are not accumulated as deductions in the debtor's last 
prebankruptcy return ( as I have urged above494) but are considered 
expenses of the estate. The question then arises whether the estate's 
own unused losses and those it inherits from the bankrupt might 
be availed of by the creditors on their own tax returns. Reference 
has been made above to section 642(h), by which unused loss carry-
overs of an estate or trust are made available to the "beneficiaries 
489. Rev. Rul. 68-358, 1968-2 CuM. BuLL. 156, which holds that a reorganization 
described in INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a)(l)(C) (the acquisition by one corporation, 
solely in exchange for all or part of its own or its parent's voting stock, of substan-
tially all the properties of another corporation) may exist even if the transferor retains 
the stock received in exchange and continues to exist as a holding company. 
490. World Serv. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 471 F.2d 247 (8th Cir. 1973); Treas, 
Reg. § I.382(b)-l(b)(2) (1962). Although the government attempted (unsuccessfully) 
to deny the carryovers in the cited case, the attempt was on the basis of its inter• 
pretation of restrictive language in section 382(b) of the Code, which there would be 
no occasion to make applicable to the present situation. 
491. Treas. Reg. § l.38l(b)-l(c) (1960). 
492. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 5-104(c). The final clause is intended 
to ensure that the period during which the carryovers will remain available will not 
be shortened as a result of the injection of an additional "taxable year" when the 
carryovers pass from the debtor to the estate. See text accompanying note 240 supra, 
493. See text accompanying notes 147-88 supra. 
494. See text accompanying notes 386-441. 
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succeeding to the property," whose shares were diminished as a 
result of the losses.495 The Tax Court, in denying the inheritance 
of the estate's unused losses to the debtor himself, has declared that 
it is not he but the creditors who "receive a lesser amount" when 
the estate has suffered a loss.4911 The court has also ruled, however, 
that the estate of an individual bankrupt, even though the only 
basis on which it has been held a taxable entity is that it is an 
"estate" within the meaning of the revenue law,497 is not an "estate" 
for purposes of section 642(h).498 In any event, the creditors receive 
their distributions, not as "beneficiaries" in the sense commonly 
understood, but as payees of obligations.499 
The practical difficulties of making the unused losses deductible 
directly by the creditors argue strongly against adopting that expe-
dient, and the Commission has not recommended any amendment 
toward that end. It would be impracticable to apportion the benefit 
of the losi;i among a mass of creditors with different priorities, even 
if they found it feasible to calculate the losses sustained in the 
absence of any returns by the trustee. Furthermore, since the only 
equitable ground on which the creditors might be entitled to such 
a benefit would be that it enables them to recoup a portion of their 
uncollected claims,500 logic would require that the amount of any 
ultimate tax saving they personally enjoy should itself be taxed to 
them as a recovery on their previously deducted bad debts"°1 or on 
claims they had not theretofore taken into income.502 
In my opinion, the Commission erred in recommending5°3 that 
the individual debtor himself be deprived of the right to use his 
own loss carryovers, even when the estate is unable to utilize them. 
In justification of its position, the Commission states: "Nor should 
the bankrupt have the benefit in future years of loss carryovers when 
the very debts reflecting the losses have been cancelled and the loss 
has been sustained not by the bankrupt but by his creditors. The 
bankruptcy law is designed to give the bankrupt a 'fresh start'-
not a 'head start.' "504 I submit, however, that the unqualified denial 
495. See note 487 supra. 
496. Henry C. Mueller, 60 T.C. 36, 45 (1973). 
497. See text accompanying notes 106-18 supra. 
498. Henry C. Mueller, 60 T.C. 36, 45 (1973). 
499, Rev. Rul. 68-48, 1968-1 CuM. BULL. 301, 303. See text accompanying notes 
217-25 supra. Cf. Greggar P. Sletteland, 43 T.C. 602,610 (1965). 
500. Cf . .!iegal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966). 
501. See First Natl. Bank of Lawrence County, 16 T.C. 147, 153 (1951). Cf. INT. REv. 
Com, OF 1954, § 111. 
502. See Clifton Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 290,292 (4th Cir. 1943). 
503. CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 5-104(c). 
504. Id., pt. I, at 280. Although the verbal flourish in the second sentence is ap• 
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to the debtor of any benefit from his unabsorbed loss carryovers 
represents a meat-ax approach to a problem to which the Commis-
sion has elsewhere properly applied a scalpel. The amount of the 
carryovers may differ substantially from the amount of unpaid debts 
and may not even include any such unpaid debts if the debtor had 
used the cash basis of accounting and was entitled to deduct only 
the expenses he had paid. 505 The proper remedy for any undue 
advantage to the debtor that results from inclusion in the carryover 
of accrued but unpaid obligations is not to deny the carryovers 
absolutely, but to reduce the carryovers to the extent that they 
reflect deductible obligations that are cancelled or reduced in the 
proceeding, thereby confining the carryovers to the actual economic 
loss suffered by the debtor. Curiously, the Commission recognized 
that principle in a companion recommendation by which carryovers 
generally would be so reduced.500 In reorganization and rehabilita-
tion proceedings, that is the only adjustment that would or should 
be made.507 To deny the individual discharged in straight bank-
ruptcy the benefit of his own unabsorbed carryovers, properly so 
adjusted, is not only unjust discrimination, but unsound tax Iaw.u0a 
parently derived from the dissent in Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 21 (1970) (Harlan, 
J., dissenting), that case involved a very different issue (the debtor's right to receive, 
free of the claims of creditors, vacation pay that he had earned before bankruptcy). 
The Commission's viewpoint, however, accords with that of the prevailing opinion 
(but not of a clear majority) in Henry C. Mueller, 60 T.C. 36, 45 (1973), discussed in 
text accompanying notes 400-21 supra, although the carryover denied there was based, 
not on expenses paid by the debtor before bankruptcy, but on expenses of the debtor's 
business paid from his assets by the trustee as a distinct taxable entity. 
505. In fact, the proposed forfeiture of past carryovers would apply even if every 
dollar of the debtor's previously unsatisfied debts is paid by the trustee from his 
assets. Cf. Henry C. Mueller, 60 T.C. 36, 48 (1973) (Quealy, J., dissenting). 
506. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 293 (proposed INT. REv. CODE OJ.' 1954, 
§ 172(d)(7)). See also text accompanying note 441 supra. 
507. It would not be made in such cases if the creditor received an equity security 
for the debt and thus became a participant in the continuing enterprise by which the 
carryover is to be utilized. For the same reason, no such adjustment should be made in 
the carrybacks and carryovers so far as they benefit the estate rather than the debtor. 
Cf. text accompanying notes 437-41 supra. 
508. A similar case of "overkill" is reflected in the reasoning of Willingham v. 
United States, 289 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 828 (1961), where, among 
other grounds for denying loss carryovers following a bankruptcy reorganization, the 
court referred to the purpose of the carryover provision to enable a ta.xpayer to 
"'set off its lean years against its lush years,'" and declared that "[t)his loss ta.xpayer 
'set off its lean years' by having them wiped out in the reorganization proceedings." 
289 F.2d at 287, quoting Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382, 385 (1957). It has 
been pointed out: 
Willingham fatally oversimplifies a most complex situation. There is at best an 
uncertain relationship between the benefits of a discharge of indebtedness and 
the detriment of eliminating net operating losses • • • • [T]here is no necessary 
relationship between the amount of debt discharged and the amount of the 
existing net operating loss •••• This analysis suggests that if there arc unjus• 
tifiable tax windfalls growing out of a Chapter X or XI proceeding, they should 
not be dealt with by an arbitrary denial of net operating loss-they should be 
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Unquestionably, the ta.'s. benefit to be derived from the debtor's 
loss carryovers, even when they reflect actual cash expenditures by 
him, is something of value that is "rooted in the prebank.ruptcy past" 
and should be subjected so far as practicable to the superior equity 
of the creditors.609 Provision has properly been made in the Com-
mission's recommendation for the· use of such carryovers by the 
trustee in so far as they can be availed of, and, practical considera-
tions aside, it would be appropriate to entitle the trustee to reach 
the debtor's own tax savings from use of the unabsorbed carry-
overs. 610 However, the superiority of the creditors' unexercised equit-
able right detracts nothing from the subordinate, but nonetheless 
real, equitable right of the debtor himself to utilize losses arising 
from his assets and business, with proper adjustment for deductions 
attributable to unpaid expenses. When the creditors have had all 
the benefit they can practically derive from the carryovers as an 
asset of the debtor, that asset ought, in effect, to be abandoned to the 
debtor rather than forfeited to the taxing authorities. 
For the same reason, I submit that the unabsorbed losses sus-
tained by the estate itself, when the creditors, through the estate, 
have gained all the advantage that it is practicable to give them, 
should be made available to the debtor to reduce his postbankruptcy 
taxes. The losses of the estate, although it is a legally distinct tax-
payer, derive from the trustee's payment of deductible items with 
the bankrupt's assets, from the realization by the trustee of declines 
in the value of the bankrupt's assets below his cost, and from the 
administration of the bankrupt's assets for the satisfaction of his 
debts. Such losses do not differ qualitatively from the debtor's own 
losses; the former and latter together, with due adjustment for 
unpaid items, reflect the debtor's economic loss. 
No doubt the Commission's proposal to relieve the trustee of 
filing any returns will, if adopted, raise a practical impediment to 
the determination of the estate's tax losses, as well as of the amount 
of the individual's prebankruptcy carryovers that would have been 
absorbed by income of the estate if it had been taxable. But an 
expedient adopted for convenience in bankruptcy administration 
should not be made to penalize the debtor. The amount of the 
estate's losses or income can presumably be reconstructed from the 
accounts required to be filed with the court, and, if the debtor under-
remedied through modification of the cancellation of indebtedness and basis 
adjustment rules. 
Tillinghast&: Gardner, supra note 267, at 714. 
509. Cf. Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966). See text accompanying notes 
478-81 supra. 
510. But see text accompanying notes 482-85 supra. 
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takes such a reconstruction, he should be entitled to the benefit of 
the losses. 
If those losses are to be made available to the debtor, considera-
tion must be given to the taxable years to which they should be 
carried. If the pattern of section 642(h) were followed, the losses 
would be carried first to the taxable year of the bankrupt that is 
in progress when the administration terminates and then forward 
to succee~g years.511 Application of that principle, however, would 
gr~atly restrict the period ·within which the carryovers of net operat-
ing losses may be absorbed. The customary three-year carryback 
would not be available at all, 512 and the five-year carryover period 
would be constricted into as few as three calendar years by the rule 
that each short taxable period is considered a "taxable year" for 
this purpose.513 The twelve-month period in which bankruptcy 
occurs and the trustee succeeds to the bankrupt's carryovers would 
embrace two such periods, 514 and two more "taxable years" of avail-
ability would be embraced in the twelve-month period in which 
the proceeding ends and the carryovers revert to the bankrupt_llll, 
To illustrate: A, who files returns on the calendar-year basis, becomes 
bankrupt on July I, 1974, having suffered a net operating loss for 
the period ending on that date, much of which remains unabsorbed 
by carryback against income of earlier years. The trustee, who also 
reports on the calendar-year basis, terminates the administration on 
November 30, 1975, leaving part of the loss still unabsorbed. Under 
the foregoing principles, the "taxable years" in which the loss carry-
over may be used would be (1) the estate's six-month period ending 
December 31, 1974; (2) the estate's eleven-month period ending 
November 30, 1975; and the bankrupt's calendar years (3) 1975, 
(4) 1976, and (5) 1977.516 Absent bankruptcy, a loss sustained in 
1974 could have been utilized in years through 1979. In the interest 
of equity, as well as of rehabilitation of the bankrupt, a device 
adopted to make the debtor's losses available to the estate for the 
511. See Treas. Reg. § l.642(h)-l(b), T.D. 6828, 1965-2 CUM. BULL. 264, 265-66. 
512. The unused losses of an estate or trust, under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, 
§ 642(h), may be carried only forward, not backward, by the beneficiaries. Treas. Reg. 
§ I.642(h)-5(b) (1956). Although not observed by the court, which was right for tlte 
wrong reasons, the debtor in Henry C. Mueller, 60 T.C. 36, 43 (1973), relying on INT, 
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 642(h), erroneously sought to use the bankrupt estate's unused net 
operating loss, in part, by carryback to a year earlier than that in which it was sus-
tained. 
513. Treas. Reg.§ I.172-4(a)(2) (1956). 
514. Cf. Treas. Reg. § l.38l(c)(I)-l(e)(3) (1960). See note 240 supra. 
515. Treas. Reg. § l.642(h)-l(b) (1965). 
516. The trustee's selection of a taxable year ending with a different month from 
the bankrupt's could vary the details, but the effect would generally be the same fol• 
lowing the reversion of the carryovers to the bankrupt. 
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benefit of his creditors to the extent needed should not be permitted 
to reduce the period in which he may utilize the amount the trustee 
does not need. I suggest, therefore, that the losses not consumed by 
income of the estate during the full period of administration be 
made retroactively available to the bankrupt, to be used by him 
for years during and after bankruptcy as if bankruptcy had not 
occurred.517 
4. Losses on Partnership and Joint Returns 
a. Partnerships. The dual status of a partnership creates special 
complications in dealing with carrybacks and carryovers in bank-
ruptcy. The Bankruptcy Act marshals partnership assets first against 
partnership debts and individual assets first against individual 
debts.518 But since the income tax law treats the individual partners, 
before bankruptcy, as liable for tax on the partnership income and 
entitled to deduct its losses,519 it is the individual bankrupt estates 
from which the tax on any prebankruptcy income is to be collected,520 
and to which, under the normal operation of tl1e Segal rule, the 
refunds attributable to carrybacks of partnership losses would flow.521 
The Commission properly proposes that the amount of any refunds 
of individual taxes that is fairly apportionable to the carryback of 
partnership losses (unless such losses were reimbursed by the part-
ner) shall become assets of the estate of the partnership, whose credi-
tors suffered the burden of those losses.522 
Following bankruptcy, the partnership estate is no longer treated 
for tax purposes as a mere conduit of income to the partners or their 
estates but is treated as a distinct taxpayer.523 The Commission's 
proposal would assure that, to the extent that such estate may remain 
taxable, it would be entitled, to the exclusion of the individual 
estates, to deduct the individual loss carryovers fairly apportionable 
to partnership losses. 
517. This detail is consistent with the principle of the Commission's more limited 
recommendation that the bankrupt's carryovers be allowable to the estate "in the 
same manner and for the same periods in which such carryovers would have been 
allowable by law to the debtor." Cm,rMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 5-104(c). 
518. Bankruptcy Act§ 5g, 11 U.S.C. § 23(g) (1970). The Commission would modify 
this rule to permit partnership creditors to share in the partners' estates on a parity 
with individual creditors but would still subordinate individual creditors in partner-
ship assets. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 4-405(f) & n.14. 
519. INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, §§ 701-04; United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441, 448 
(1973). 
520. Cf. United States v. Kaufman, 267 U.S. 408 (1925). The Commission's remedy 
for this problem will be dealt with in part I(B}(2}(c) of Plumb, supra note 165. 
521. This question was inherent in the fact situation in Segal, where the bankrupts 
were a partnership and its partners, but was not the subject of the litigation. 
522. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 5-104(d). 
523. See text accompanying notes 133-34 supra. 
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If a partnership becomes bankrupt but one or more of its part-
ners does not, 524 the non bankrupt partners' rights to refunds based 
on the carryback of their shares of the partnership's losses would 
nevertheless, under the proposal, vest in the partnership estate,11:m 
but the carryovers of such losses would remain available to them 
and would not be allowable to the partnership estate, 626 Such treat-
ment is beneficial to the creditors, however, since the partnership 
estate, unless solvent, would be nontaxable anY'vay under the Com• 
mission's proposal and could gain no benefit from the carryovers, 
while the nonbank.rupt partners, not having the benefit of a dis-
charge, would enhance by use of the carryovers their future assets, 
which partnership creditors may reach.627 
b. Joint returns. Where the bankrupt had filed joint returns 
with his or her spouse, losses may be apportioned between them 
for the purpose of giving the trustee the benefit of the carrybacks.1128 
If the year to which the losses are carried back is also a joint return 
year, it may be claimed, in certain states where rights to money 
may be so held, that the refund right belongs to the husband and 
wife as tenants by the entirety, 520 exempt from creditors of either 
spouse under state law and hence unreachable by the trustee under 
the present Bankruptcy Act1530 (unless the nonbankrupt spouse dies 
within six months after the filing of the petition). li31 In an effort to 
make uniform the exemptions applicable in bankruptcy (heretofore 
governed by widely varying state laws), the Commission proposes632 
524. See Bankruptcy Act § 5a, 11 U.S.C. § 23(a) (1970); Liberty Natl. Bank v. Bear, 
276 U.S. 215 (1928). 
525. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, § 5-104(d) entitles the partnership estate 
to any refunds "of a partner's tax" attributable to partnership losses and is not con• 
fined to bankrupt partners. 
526. Under id., § 5-104(d), only carryovers "allowable to the estate of a partner in 
accordance with [§ 5-104(c)]" become allowable to the partnership estate to the extent 
attributable to partnership losses and are disallowed to the "debtor." Such language 
can refer only to a partner who is himself bankrupt. 
527. Bankruptcy Act § 5j, 11 U.S.C. § 23(j) (1970). Cf. Francis v. McNeal, 228 U.S. ' 
695 (1913). 
528. Cf. Treas. Reg. § l.172-7(d) (1956), concerning apportionment of joint return 
losses carried to separate returns. 
529. See In re Sussman, 188 F. Supp. 320, 323-24 (E.D. Pa, 1960), a[fd,, 289 F.2d 
76 (3d Cir. 1961), in which the district court referred to but did not rely upon the 
referee's conclusion to that effect. But the court in In re Wetteroff, 453 F.2d 544 (8th 
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972), found no such intention manifested by 
mere joinder in a single tax return in order to use the more favorable ta.x rates 
applicable thereto. 
530. Cf. Hayes v. Schaefer, 399 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1968) (similar argument made by 
bankrupt not accepted by court due to interpretation of state law); Reid v. Richardson, 
304 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1962) (dictum), 
531. See Bankruptcy Act§ 70a, II U.S.C. § IIO(a) (1970), 
532. CoM11nssroN REPORT, supra note 3, § 4-60l(b). Since the banluupt spouse's 
interest is not an outriglit half interest but is subject to mutual survivorship rights, 
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to make available to the trustee the bankrupt spouse's interest in 
property held by the entirety, an effort that may prove ineffective 
if the courts adhere to the view588 that the immunity of entirety 
property results, not from an exemption, but from a constitutionally 
protected right of the nonindebted spouse to the enjoyment of the 
whole property, shared only with the spouse. But even if that pro-
vision is not enacted or is ineffective, it would be only the carryback 
refunds that the immunity would affect, and the use of carryovers 
of the bankrupt spouse's losses could validly be made available to 
the trustee; the carryovers are not a property right of the spouses 
but exist by grace of Congress, 534 and what Congress gives it can 
take away or confer upon another (the trustee).585 
B. Other "Tax Attributes" 
Although attention is generally focused on loss carryovers, there 
are numerous other "tax attributes," including such matters as 
accounting and depreciation methods, carryovers of excess charitable 
contributions and pension plan deductions, investment credits, and 
the like, the carryover of which may be of concern in any business 
succession. Congress, in section 38l(c) of the Code, has identified 
twenty-two such tax attributes, in addition to losses, that it has con-
cluded ought to follow the business into the hands of successors in 
certain intercorporate transfers, and there may be as many more not 
expressly dealt with.536 In the case of a corporate bankruptcy, the 
trustee's succession to such tax attributes is assured, since the law 
places the trustee in the tax shoes of the corporation as if there had 
been no transfer.537 But, because the survivai of the individual as a 
taxpaying entity, although divorced from his business and most of 
it appears that the nonbankrupt spouse would be paid the actuarial value of his or 
her interest in the proceeds of the claim. See id. § 5-203(c). 
533. See, e.g., United States v. Hutcherson, 188 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1951). See Plumb, 
Federal Liens and Priorities-Agenda for the Next Decade 11, 77 YALE L.J. 605, 634-40 
(1968). 
534. New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435,440 (1934). 
535. The resulting anomaly that the bankrupt and his spouse would then enjoy 
the benefit of the prebankruptcy loss to the extent that he and his spouse had pre-
bankruptcy income to offset it and that the creditors would benefit only from what 
they are unable to absorb in that manner must be blamed, not on the legislative pro• 
posal, but on the anachronism of property law. 
536. See Reese, Reorganization Transfers and Survival of Tax Attributes, 16 TAX 
L, REV, 207, 208 (1961). Their inheritance in intercorporate transfers is left to the ill-
defined "common law" of taxation. Treas. Reg. § 1.381(a)-l(b)(3)(i) (1960); Rev. Rul. 
68-350, 1968-2 CUM. BULL. 159. 
537. The further right to carry over tax attributes from a debtor corporation or its 
estate to a successor in a reorganization, a right that is doubtful under present law, 
would be provided for by the Commission in proposed amendments to sections 381 
and 382 of the Code. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 296-97. See Plumb, supra 
note 270. · .-
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his assets, necessitates treating the estate of a noncorporate bank-
rupt as· a new and distinct ta.-xpayer, it is unlikely that the tax attri-
butes follow the business in such cases. 
Among other questions in this area, it is uncertain whether the 
estate, if required to repay an amount on which the bankrupt had 
been taxed when he received it erroneously but under claim of 
right,538 would be permitted, as the bankrupt would have been,1mo 
to relate the repayment back to the year of receipt and thus to 
recover an amount equal to the tax the bankrupt had paid thereon 
for that year.540 It is also doubtful that the trustee would be entitled 
to exclude from taxable income of the estate a recovery of a bad 
debt or of an overpayment of a tax or expense that the bankrupt 
had deducted in a loss year without enjoying any tax benefit from 
the deduction, 541 although the bankrupt himself would not have 
been taxable on such recovery.542 It is also unlikely that the trustee 
would succeed to, or be bound by, the established methods of 
accounting, inventory, and depreciation of the bankrupt individual 
or partnership whose assets and business he assumed. 543 
The Commission made no recommendation on these matters, 
perhaps because, under its proposal, the estate will rarely be a tax-
payer (although that did not deter the Commission from dealing 
with the transfer of loss carryovers in such circumstances). At least 
if estates in bankruptcy are to remain generally taxable, Congress 
ought to provide that the trustee for a bankrupt individual or part-
nership, even though deemed a new taxable entity, should, never-
theless, succeed to those and other tax attributes of the business he 
has taken over, in the same manner that a trustee for a bankrupt 
corporation would do. 
538. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951). 
539. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1341. 
540. The Service holds such relief unavailable to a decedent's estate when death 
intervenes between the receipt and the repayment. Rev. Rul. 67-355, 1967-2 Cur.r. 
BULL. 296. Contra, Estate of Good v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 521 (E.D, Mich, 1962) 
(rejected by Rev. Rul. 67-355). See Estate of Samuel Stein, 37 T.C. 945, 958 (1962), 
computations afjd., 40 T.C. 275 (1963). 
541. Cf. Michael Carpenter Co. v. Commissioner, 136 F.2d 51 (7th Cir, 1943) (die• 
tum); National Bank of Commerce of Seattle, 12 T.C. 717 (1949), But cf. Ridge Real• 
ization Corp., 45 T.C. 508, 523-26 (1966), not acquiesced in, 1972-2 Cu11r. BULL, 4. 
In certain intercorporate transactions, the successor now steps into the predecessor's 
shoes for this purpose. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 381(c)(l2). 
542. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 111; Treas. Reg. § 1.111-l(a) (1956). 
543. Cf. Te.xtile Apron Co., 21 T.C. 147 (1953) (involves LIFO inventory method, 
following a tax-free transfer to a controlled corporation). The trustee may also be 
regarded as a new taxpayer for the purpose of the adjustments required by INT, REV, 
CODE OF 1954, § 481, if the estate adopts or is obliged to adopt a method different from 
the bankrupt's. Cf. Ezo Prods. Co., 37 T.C. 385 (1961); Frank G, Wikstrom &: Sons, Inc,, 
20 T.C. 359 (1953). Congress has provided for continuity of such methods following 
intercorporate transfers in INT, REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 38l(c)(4), (5), (6), 
